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Abstract
The 'Peace Arsenal' scheme: the campaign for non-munitions 
work at the Royal Ordnance Factories, Woolwich after the
First World War.
Daniel Weinbren
Following the Armistice many Arsenal workers wanted to 
retain their well-paid employment. There was a well 
established community; there was little comparable work in 
the locality and accommodation was difficult to find 
elsewhere. In order to secure peacetime production at the 
Arsenal, the labour movement in Woolwich organised a 
campaign which drew in traders, councillors, ex-Servicemen 
and clerics. The effect of this was to aid the integration 
of the local labour movement into the national constitution 
which was being reconstructed at the time.
Central aspects of this new constitution were an increase 
in the integration of representatives of labour and 
industry in the government, and a new role for the Labour 
Party. The reconstruction of the constitution involved a 
degree of economic and legal coercion, and the transmission 
of government propaganda. These were all orchestrated at 
national level. The new order also included the 
accommodation of the working class, which had become more 
assertive during the war. This meant that social stability 
could not simply be imposed; the new order had to involve 
the absorption of tensions and the encouragement of 
specific strands of working class tradition. The creation 
of common assumptions could not be done in Whitehall and 
Westminster alone, it required the active participation of 
the citizenry; a specific focus and contact with notions 
generated from within the working class.
That the creation of the new order required these elements 
is shown through the particular circumstances of the 
causes, course and consequences of the 'Peace Arsenal 1 
campaign. The campaign involved the chief architects of 
the new order, private armaments companies, the Cabinet and 
the civil service. It also it involved parochial notions 
derived from the experiences of Arsenal workers.
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Chapter I
munition factories are being closed, 
dismantled and then adapted and refitted 
for the work of peace. When a full 
account can be given of the changes 
which are taking place there will be an 
interesting story to tell
The Times 19/4/19
Woolwich is always interesting
Haw G From Workhouse to Westminster the 
life story of Will Crooks MP London 1917 
p307
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The post-war settlement did not solely evolve from within 
a national consensus, nor did it result merely from the 
impositions of central government or the forces of capital. 
Rather the stabilisation required the participation of the 
working class. This will be shown by an analysis of extent 
to which the Woolwich 'Peace Arsenal 1 campaign aided the 
stabilisation of society after the First World War.
There are a considerable number of historians who stress 
the continuities of the period around the First World War, 
'minimal modernisation within the existing liberal 
framework 1 in the words of one the most recent contributors 
(l). Many of those who emphasis the turmoil of the period 
go on to say that due to the strength of the old order, 
working-class discontent was contained. They too tend too 
play down the novelty of the post-war state formation. My 
analysis derives from the concept that there was a crisis 
of liberalism in that although the Liberal Party was still 
of significance until the early 1930s, it went into sharp 
decline during the First World War, as did the concepts of 
the laissez-faire liberal state and the civic ideologies 
and practices which drew upon liberal philosophy.
There are explanations which frame the decline of 
liberalism and the rise of Labour in terms of occupational 
shifts and proletarianisation. A number detail the 
structure and practices of working class organisations (2). 
Labour tended to recruit from among workers in large-scale 
industrial production and there are connections between 
internal plant relations and the social environment (3). 
Changes in attitude to unemployment has also been linked to 
location (4). Parkin argues that to vote Labour was 'a 
symbolic act of defiance' which thus required 'structural 
support from a wider society 1 (5). He also argues that 
'class is a society, not a community phenomenon' (6). This
- 8 -
smothers local conflict under a blanket notion of 
environmental factors.
An analysis of transformative politics in mass urban 
society requires more than a material base in a locality. 
A broader analysis has been provided by Hall, Schwarz and 
Durham (7). They draw upon Gramsci's notion of 'passive 
revolution 1 , a reordering of society from above, without 
mass participation, in order to stabilise it and forestall 
a threat from below (8). Gramsci relates the idea of 
'passive revolution* to that of 'war of position 1 , 
political struggles which are not overt military struggles 
and which occur in those societies where there is 'a proper 
relation between state and civil society'. He went on; 
'the massive structures of modern democracies both as State 
organisations and as complexes of associations in civil 
society... constitute the permanent fortifications of the 
front in the war of position 1 (9). Hall and Schwarz apply 
this to the situation in Britain. Hall and Schwarz also 
employ concepts alien to Gramsci in their theoretical 
framework; 'corporate bias', 'new liberalism 1 and 
'feminism'. In section (a) the reasons why their model has 
been selected as an appropriate one for a study of the 
'Peace Arsenal' campaign, is outlined.
Section (b) is an account of the Woolwich 'Peace Arsenal' 
campaign. Prior to a thematic examination of the key 
elements of the campaign it is necessary to establish a 
clear understanding of the chronology of events and the 
priorities of the campaigners and their opponents. The 
campaign promised to undermine revolutionary discontent in 
Woolwich by providing work for those at the Arsenal, work 
for those who used the items produced there, and work for 
those reliant on the spending power of Arsenal workers. 
The campaign offered a vision of a regenerated pre-war- 
style community, and the opportunity to reduce the amount
- 9 -
spent on payments to the unemployed and on items required 
by the state. These factors, and the initial success of 
the campaign, were sufficient for it to secure a central 
role in the town. It involved the co-operation of members 
of all classes in respectable activity under the aegis of 
the artisanate. It thus aided the integration of the 
latter into the post-war constitution.
The focus in section (c) is specifically upon the campaign 
to build locomotives at the Arsenal. The workers were 
familiar with locomotive construction. Locomotives bridged 
the gap between munitions and non-munitions work, they 
could aid the national recovery, of which transport was an 
intrinsic part, and they symbolised a return to the 
certainties of the mid-nineteenth century, when Woolwich 
artisans were called 'Labour Aristocrats 1 . Locomotives 
were symbols of both study pre-war engineering and a new 
direction for state activity.
- 10 -
(a)
Mayer argues that there can be 'DO comprehensive vision 
without recourse to organising generalisations and 
principles' (10). He offers a view of the period after the 
First World War which emphasises its continuity from the 
pre-war period. He suggests that there were connected 
post-First World War political crises across Europe which 
led to substantial political changes from which, with the 
exception of Russia, 'the forces of perseverance... the 
pan-European ancien regime 1 recovered. Workers were 'too 
weak and too well integrated into nation and society to 
resist impressment 1 . In England 'the governing classes... 
grafted industrial capitalism into social and cultural 
structures' and the country 'continued to be a nation of 
small shopkeepers'. Mayer's 'Marxist history from the top 
down... with the focus on the upper rather than the lower 
classes' is too diffuse and begs too many questions about 
the working class to be of great value to a study of the 
role of that class in the settlement.
Foster too has considered the success of the ruling class 
in Britain during the same period. He argues that the 
quiescence of the working class before the war was because 
the 'Labour Aristocrats' were bribed with the profits of 
empire (11). The war, unionisation, full employment and 
the Russian revolution left this system in disarray (12). 
After the war there were divisions within the ruling class 
which, the banking fraternity proposed, could be resolved 
by greater monopoly production. The 'classic example' that 
he cites of the growth of monopolies is that of the 
armaments industry (13). The ruling class also maintained 
its dominance through appeals to the public via the mass 
media; at one time the Ministry of Labour was giving out 
1,000 articles a week to newspapers. In addition the 
ruling class selected key figures from the labour movement
- 11 -
to buttress its ideology (14). The leaders of the labour 
movement adopted the ruling class idea that it was 
important to win over public opinion and to marginalise 
extremists (15). Foster notes that there was a link 
between 'cultural identity on a locality basis' and the 
'Labour Aristocracy* and the importance of 'the wartime 
creation of a locally rooted mass labour movement* (16). 
He also notes that the bribes were 'distributed locally' 
and that 'detailed local studies' are required. However it 
is not these ideas that are developed, but the concept of 
national 'blanket control through bureaucracy* which is 
insufficiently subtle for use in an analysis of the 'Peace 
Arsenal 1 campaign (17).
Middlemas acknowledges the importance of the integration of 
the labour leaders to the recasting of bourgeois Britain, 
their new role in the constant brokerage which 
characterised the period from 1917 (18). He concentrates 
on the 'arts of public management* and reduces regional 
disparities to 'the middle class south east' and the 
'derelict 1 remainder. Lloyd George, Middlemas argues, 
introduced a system in which decision making was a matter 
of collaboration between 'governing institutions', the 
government and the leaders of the employers and the unions. 
The Trades Union Congress became responsible for the 
maintenance of order in the union ranks. Middlemas does 
not state how decision makers were selected, how decisions 
were made or who set the agenda (19). He also pays 
insufficient attention to the influence of, and the 
hierarchies within, the civil service. It is widely 
accepted that the Treasury was an influential promoter of 
the idea that a balanced budget and a return to the gold 
standard would be a bulwark against economic catastrophe 
(20). There is some disagreement as to exactly when the 
Treasury became influential and how great its ascendancy 
was and whether its central concern was to build its own
- 12 -
empire or to administer efficiently (21). There is no 
serious qualification to the argument that it was of 
importance (22). The Treasury was particularly anxious to 
reduce the role of the Ministry of Munitions which was 
responsible for the alternative work at the Arsenal (23). 
At the Arsenal the Ministry of Munitions was associated 
with collaboration between unions and management. By 
contrast Middlemas positions the Ministry of Labour with 
its sympathetic attitude towards the unions, as central to 
the fostering of corporate bias and ignores the Treasury 
(24).
McKibbin argues that 'everything points to Labour's 
enduring ante-bellum character: continuity of leadership 
and personal at all levels, effective continuity of policy, 
and above all, continuity of organisation' (25). He also 
says 'the industrial disputes of the war, for example, were 
no worse than those which occurred immediately before it, 
and arose out of traditional grievances' (26). His central 
interest is in the Head office and the leadership. He 
frequently refers to 'the unions' meaning the leaders of 
the larger trade unions affiliated to the Labour Party. On 
its own McKibbin's is not an appropriate text for a study 
of a particular locality because the evidence from Samuel 
and Jones is that movement within the Labour Party did not 
radiate from the centre (27). Hinton too mentions the 
'residential and community solidarities which played such a 
vital role in the emergence of labour's early twentieth 
century identity - arguably at least as important a role as 
workplace and occupation' (28).
McKibbin also marginalises important changes within the 
working-class during the war. The economic and social 
distances between the poorest and the artisan strata were 
narrowed (29). Wages and security of employment improved 
for the former, and the latter gained relatively little
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except a reduction in working hours (30). Organised labour 
made substantial gains in terms of union recognition (31). 
Trade distinctions and apprenticeships were eroded (32). 
The growth of both the non-manual lower middle class and of 
work graded as 'semi-skilled', rendered the artisan less 
distinct. Between 1914 and 1919, the percentage of skilled 
workers in engineering dropped from 60% to 50% and down to 
40% by 1926, whilst the percentage of semi-skilled workers 
rose from 20% to 30% and to 45% by 1926. Contemporary 
studies by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Henry 
Wilson; the Labour Party leader, Henderson; Fabian Beatrice 
Webb; senior civil servant Thomas Jones; and American 
academic Carter Goodrich, noted changes within the working 
class. The spate of publications with the titles, What the 
workers want, Labour in transition The new labour outlook 
and Fed up and full up bear witness to the discontent as do 
the reports about the activities of subversives that the 
Cabinet received (33). Labour politicians used the idea 
that there was chaos in order to counter it with their 
vision of sober, orderly socialism (34). Over the last 
seventy years the notion of post-war instability has been 
frequently reasserted (35). Engineers and ex-Servicemen 
were considered to be particularly vociferously truculent 
(36). Not only were there around 1,400 troops in Woolwich 
in April 1919 and at least as many engineers, there was 
also an active organisation especially for veterans who 
were employed in the Arsenal (37). The most recent account 
of industrial relations in this period, by Wrigley, accords 
with Hall and Schwarz's analysis that it was only following 
a reconstruction that the political settlement came to 
represent an unequivocal victory for the forces of 
constitutionalism (38). Wrigley argues that the government 
did not proceed through pragmatic adjustment, as those who 
stressed continuity propose, but through the deliberate 
crushing of direct action (39).
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Hall, Durham and Schwarz, within a framework derived from 
Gramsci, synthesise the studies of specific aspects of the 
transformation of liberalism made by Hinton, McKibbin, 
Middlemas and Foster. They conclude that there was a 
1 recomposition of British society, politics and the state 
from the 1880s to the 1920s 1 which they call the 'crisis of 
liberalism (40). This was the means by which social 
relations were reconstituted 'reconstruction in the very 
moment of destruction' as Gramsci puts it. Following 
Foster and Middlemas, Hall and Schwarz propose that 'the 
architect of this transformation' was Lloyd George (41). 
His role, and that of other elected politicians, in regard 
to the 'Peace Arsenal' campaign, is examined in Chapter 2 
(a).
Hall and Schwarz also argue that 'internal administrative 
reform became a key mechanism for transforming the state 1 
and that this was performed by 'state intellectuals 
informed by Fabian or new liberal ideals' (42). The role 
of the civil service is considered in 2 (b) and (c). Hall 
and Schwarz engage in a reappropriation of the Dangerfield 
thesis that 'the death of Liberal England' occurred 1910- 
1914 (43). However, their view also owes much to 
Dangerfield's opponents, who suggest that there was a rise 
of 'new liberalism'. Clarice and Morgan say that an 
intellectual elite provided an ideology of reform which was 
accepted by the Liberal leadership and a large number of 
working class voters. Before the First World War there was 
a decline in that which Clarke terms 'community polities', 
which were capable of uniting economically antagonistic 
groups around a common political cause. These were 
replaced by national, class, issues (44). Hall, Durham and 
Schwarz refer to the 'new liberals' as 'a group of highly 
gifted professional intellectuals with an ethical 
evolutionary body of thought which aimed to preserve 
individual liberty through greater state intervention.
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They say that 'liberalism did not 'die 1 in the years 
between 1910 and 1914'. Rather there was a 'frenzied 
reconstruction of constitutional liberalism' which 
'remained (for the most part) within the constitutional 
boundaries'. Schwarz and Durham add that MacDonald's 
constitutionalism owed much to the new liberals. This 
appears to follow Morgan's line more than Dangerfield's. 
Morgan holds that, by 1914, 'the new Liberalism had in 
large measure supplanted the old, a factor which in itself 
goes far to demolish the "Dangerfield thesis'" (45).
The importance that Schwarz and Hall grant to the civil 
service is evident from their description of the route from 
Victorian laissez faire to the new state where there were 
universal social rights for all citizens, rule via 
constitutionalism rather than force, and integrated union
leaders and employers.
Challenges for reform from below [l] 
were first defined in public discourse 
by new liberal or Fabian social 
theorists, [2] taken up by progressive 
state administrators, reconstituted in a 
bureaucratic mould, installed as state 
policy [3] and at that point presented 
back to the people [4], This was a 
process that lay at the very core of an 
administrative type of passive reform 
and led to the consolidation of statism 
(46).
In the case of the campaign for alternative work from 1903 
the workers urged those who controlled the Arsenal to adapt 
it in order to ease unemployment (stage 1). Their argument 
was defined by Woolwich Labour mayor Gilbert Slater, later 
principle of Ruskin College, in a critique of the private 
arms trade published in 1905. A government committee under 
Arthur Henderson examined a refinement on this argument in 
1907, the case for a great state production centre in 
Woolwich (stage 2). Hall refers to the Ministry of 
Munitions as 'the new powerhouse of state intervention 1 and 
Hinton calls those who ran it 'the administrative elite of
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new Liberalism 1 (47). Officials at the Ministry of 
Munitions argued that the Arsenal could be efficiently used 
for peacetime production, they became in the words of the 
'Peace Arsenal 1 campaigners 'commercial travellers on 
behalf of Woolwich Arsenal 1 (stage 3) (48). The workers 
then received a constitutionally safe version of their own 
ideas from the civil servants in the form of orders for 
railway locomotives (stage 4).
The role of the private armaments companies in relation to 
the 'Peace Arsenal 1 campaign is considered, in 2 (d), in 
the light of Hall and Schwarz's analysis. Despite the 
factual errors that Lowe and Dintenfass note, Schwarz 
describes Politics in Industrial Society as 'formidably 
well researched 1 and Hall and Schwarz endorse Middlemas's 
notion of corporate bias (49). Schwarz says that 'the 
British economy underwent a profound transformation... with 
a succession of mergers, takeovers and informal trade and 
cartel agreements' (50). Hall and Schwarz make the case 
that in the late nineteenth century 'the most significant 
in the political realignments [was] the recomposition of 
the capitalist class', due to 'the expansion of capitalist 
accumulation' (51). Schwarz adds that 'the state had two 
key areas of concern: the armaments industry and the 
railways' and that 'state guaranteed contracts ensured a 
steady source of super-profits' (52). Foster also notes 
the importance of the large armaments companies.
Hall and Schwarz also argue that the 'the drive of capital 
to break down the skills of the those workers strategically 
placed in the production process had crucial implications 
in the restructuring of the division of labour' and that 
the working class was 'remade 1 (53). During the period 
from the late nineteenth century until 1914 'different 
strands of "socialisms" appeared as organic expressions of 
proletarian experienced though this process was manifestly
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uneven and heterogeneous 1 (54). There were other new 
forces, including a feminist movement, which broke the 
liberal system. All of them, Hall and Schwarz say, wished 
to reconstruct 'the forms and boundaries of the state 1 
(55). Hall and Schwarz also say that 'a central feature of 
many of the emergent solutions was collectivism 1 . This was 
the theory that the state was required not merely to hold 
the ring within which individual interests competed, but to 
intervene (56). This was linked to 'a set of new claims 
upon the state by the unenfranchised masses, a new 
conception of citizenship 1 (57). One of these "socialisms" 
was Fabian socialism, which both had 'much in common* with 
new liberalism and was also 'reformist, bureaucratic, 
anti-democratic and illiberal 1 . It was 'deeply at odds 
with other socialist currents and with the spirit of self- 
activism 1 (58). In chapters 3 and 4 the significant 
elements of the Woolwich variation on socialism, its union 
orientation, and business and clerical influences, are 
explored, not in terms of its doctrinal position - which 
did not amount to a considerable body of thought - but 
through an examination of a specific example of its 
activity, the 'Peace Arsenal 1 campaign.
The need to focus on the concrete example of the campaign 
can be gauged by a comparison between Hall and Schwarz's 
generalisations, and events in Woolwich and Whitehall. The 
case for alternative work at the Arsenal did not proceed 
through the civil service as smoothly as implied in Hall 
and Schwarz's description of how the 'machinery of state 
began to be transformed' with the formation of particular 
ministries, and the use of scientific administration by 
civil servants such as Beveridge, Morant and Llewellyn 
Smith (who was seconded as Permanent Secretary of the 
Ministry of Munitions, 1915-18). The campaigners recorded 
the efforts of the management to secure orders, and that, 
'every effort is being prosecuted by Ministry officials to
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substantially increase the programme of alternative work . 
They received 'organised assistance 1 and thought the 
Director General, Factories, 'a straight man 1 who was 
'virile and sympathetic'. However they also noted that the 
progress of the latter was blocked by opposition within 
Whitehall and that there were frequent disruptive changes 
within the Ministry of Munitions personnel (59).
Hall and Schwarz say that the 1889 Dock Strike was 'the 
first major sign of the organised workers' movement 
disengaging from the Liberal Party', but for Woolwich the 
closure of the Dockyards by the Liberal government in 1869 
was of greater moment (60). Hall and Schwarz also argue 
that the Representation of the People Act, 1918, 'shaped 
the conditions which made possible the strategic 
reassertion of the absolute centrality of Parliament and 
constitutional polities', by providing for the resources 
for the emergence after 1926 of a new political language of 
citizenship (61). However Woolwich was famous for its 
constitutional politics long before 1926. There was 
individual membership of the Woolwich Labour Party (WLP) 
before the war and, on a visit in 1919, militant shop 
steward Arthur MacManus scathingly noted how people in 
Woolwich referred to themselves as citizens not as workers. 
In Woolwich the Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE), 
was, according to local Labour MP Snell, a 'respectable and 
deferential movement, whose members were as harmless as 
rabbits' (62). It was also a formative influence in the 
foundation of the WLP. On the Clyde the engineers were 
less deferential.
Hall and Schwarz marginalise the importance of faith and 
locality of those involved in labour politics. In the WLP, 
and in other local Labour parties, people's perceptions of 
why they joined was not because of the national programme 
but rather because of a specific local experience. Snell
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stressed the need for 'a sense of vocation 1 , wrote of his 
own 'confession of faith 1 when he joined a left-wing party 
and his later 'call of duty* to politics. He also 
mentioned the 'moral fervour and idealism 1 that Grinling, 
another WLP activist, derived from his early work at 
Toynbee Hall (63). When the WLP won 25 of the 36 seats on 
the town council 'it was fun' one contemporary recalls, 'a 
discourse which sounded like a revivalist sermon... the 
capitalist system and the Devil might have been 
interchangeable' (64). The 'Peace Arsenal' campaign was 
developed from the experiences of those within the ASE, the 
WLP and nonconformity.
The campaigners experience of the state was unusual. Hall 
and Schwarz note how 'the labour movement, clearly, was an 
emergent organic social interest with which the state would 
have to deal'. In the Arsenal the state already dealt with 
the labour movement (65). A J P Taylor's remark that in 
1914 a 'sensible law-abiding Englishman could pass through 
life and hardly notice the existence of the state 1 cannot 
be applied to residents of Woolwich (66). There was little 
else in Woolwich besides the Arsenal, the Dockyards and the 
Royal Military Academy. During the first decade of the 
nineteenth century the population around the Arsenal rose 
by 73% due to the Napoleonic Wars, then fell back only to 
rise when weapons were required for one of the 72 Victorian 
military campaigns (67). There were no major bourgeois 
employers in the locality until the twentieth century (68). 
Although Churchill, when Minister of Munitions, claimed 
that 'workers do not care very much whether they are 
working for the state or a private employer' there is 
evidence to the contrary (69). Hall and Schwarz's review 
of the main features of the arguments misses the 
particularities of the implementation of the 
transformation.
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Writing about the Woolwich artisans Crossick says 'ideology 
only moves and survives if it is capable of making sense of 
the world in which those who share it live 1 . The values of 
the Woolwich artisans were not an external imposition but 
rather 'the drawing out in a changed situation of strands
. j ^_ j
within a working class tradition' (70). It was through 
local experience of the 'Peace Arsenal' campaign, rather 
than through speeches, or the machinations of civil 
servants, that the transformation was realised.
Hall and Schwarz make no mention of Gramsci's 
conceptualisation of the way in which society requires the
'active consent' of its citizens. Everybody, Gramsci says,
contributes to modifying the social 
environment in which he develops... 
Everyone is a legislator in the broadest 
sense of the concept, he continues to be 
a legislator, even if he accepts 
directives from others - if, as he 
carries them out he makes certain that 
others are carrying them out too, if 
having understood their spirit he 
propagates them (71)
Furthermore Gramsci argues that everybody constructs a 
belief system which derives from common assumptions and 
language. He calls this the 'commonsense' of society (72). 
People's views are created, and their consent gained, both 
in society and in 'private associations' (73). The post- 
war reconstruction involved new rules and new rulers, it 
was a dialectical process because, in order to be 
successful, the ideology of the settlement had to be in a 
Gramscian sense, a 'lived relation', that is it had to be 
rooted in the specific. Joan Smith argues during this
period Britain was
still a 'local 1 society in the sense 
that each conurbation's industrial and 
social structure could have a profound 
influence on the political life of the 
town. Not until the late 1920/1930s 
were local differences overwhelmed... 
workers' beliefs develop in relation to 
the 'conmonsense' of their towns as well
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as their own class interests 1 (74).
Richard Hoggart proposes that the 'the core of working 
class attitudes' was a sense of the personal, the concrete, 
the local (75). Hobsbawm and Macintyre note how important 
within the conditions which gave rise to social movements 
was a sense of 'community feeling 1 and 'a variety of 
locally controlled institutions [which] bound the community 
together' (76). The cohesion felt within Woolwich was 
greater than the rest of London, claimed the local Labour 
newspaper, but it was 'civic pride' not class consciousness 
of the 'Little Moscow' variety (77).
Gramsci shows little interest in gender politics, but Mall 
and Schwarz include an analysis of 'popular and public 
concern over sexual matters' and the ways in which feminism 
activated 'new sources of contention and antagonism' (78). 
Hall and Schwarz's addition is of relevance because the 
status of the skilled men at the Arsenal relied on the 
subordination of women and this was challenged during the 
war.
Women were restricted by the military presence in the town 
and by the lack of jobs. Defence regulations, - the 
Contagious Diseases Acts which named Woolwich as a 
'subjected district' and then, during the war regulation 
DORA 40D under which women who had VD and then had sex with 
a man in the forces could be gaoled - made women the object 
of military suspicion (79). In addition before the war 
there were few opportunities for paid work for women in 
Woolwich and many ASE members disapproved of their wives 
earning money (80). The construction of masculinity was 
central to the response of skilled men to mid-nineteenth 
century industrialisation and to new patterns of women's 
employment (81). Alexander concludes, from her examination 
of the rhetoric of skilled working men, that in their minds 
'their status as father and heads of families was indelibly
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associated with their independence through 'honourable 1 
labour and property in 'skill 1 which identification with a 
trade gave them... masculine privilege was embedded in 
popular conceptions of both skilled labour and authority* 
(82).
Masculinity is linked to the concept of skill by Philips 
and Taylor who suggest that skill is 'often an ideological 
category imposed on certain types of work' and the 
1 sexualisation of skill 1 was a response to de-skilling of 
the work process (83). At the Arsenal skills were acquired 
through apprenticeships where by younger men copied older 
craftworkers. Thus workers were not dependent upon the 
employer for their skills but upon fellow workers. This 
was inexpensive for the state, as it had no need to provide 
specialised training staff and it could pay apprentices 
lower wages. Apprenticeships helped to bond the workforce 
together, a process enhanced by virtue of the fact that at 
the Arsenal once a man was trained he had little chance of 
promotion beyond foreman, itself an opportunity open to 
only a few. Arsenal workers could neither take their 
'skills' elsewhere, as many were not recognised as 
'skilled 1 beyond the confines of their own specialised 
Arsenal work, nor could they establish their own rival 
munitions works (84). They were tied to the Arsenal and 
their best hope for improvement was through reliance on 
their own collective resources. Joyce and Melling both 
argue that it was the erosion of their industrial skills 
and the continuation of their political privileges which 
helps to explain the 'quiescence' of artisans during the 
late Victorian period (85). The skilled men relied upon 
one another in matters of safety and they worked together; 
nobody could make a gun as enormous as 'the Woolwich 
Infant" on their own. Their activities extended outside 
the Arsenal into educational and recreational activities, 
which further bonded the men together and reinforced their
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workplace hierarchies. This was the period when the post 
of shop steward was created in the Arsenal and as Durham 
and Schwarz say, 'in the formation and development of the 
shop stewards movement a masculinist model of socialism did 
perhaps restrict its own popularisation 1 (86).
From 1914 the skilled men's power base of skilled Arsenal 
work was threatened by dilution and then unemployment and 
the growth of 'semi-skilled 1 work. Segal notes; 'Male 
unemployment and the restructuring or dismantling of old 
industries created new crises in traditional patterns of 
male authority. Such disruption connects up with cultural 
struggles over the meaning of 'masculinity' (87). The ASE 
was prepared to admit men who had learned skilled trades 
during the war, and in 1926 semi- and unskilled men were 
admitted. Women were only allowed to join seventeen years 
later. The ASE, along with 32 other unions, was, after 
meeting the government in 1915, prepared to drop its 
restrictions on employment practices for the duration of 
the war. No women's unions were involved in the drawing up 
of this agreement. Women were paid the same rate as men if 
they were doing the same work. There were many disputes 
about the extent to which women were doing the same work as 
men (88). The strike led by the shop stewards during the 
war, which involved the most people, a quarter of a million 
workers, was about the substitution of women for men on 
non-war work (89).
Hinton stresses the importance of 'class consciousness at 
the grass roots' and the relationship between struggles 
over the dilution of skilled labour and consciousness (90). 
He argues that where craft privileges were intact in 1914 
and were then arbitrarily and acutely attacked, there was 
the highest degree of militancy. Dilution at the Arsenal 
involved a rise in the number of women workers from almost 
none to over 23,000 in four years. The control exercised
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by the Woolwich craftsmen allowed them 'to maintain a 
contemptuous superiority towards the less skilled 1 (91). 
Jeffreys, the historian of the engineers, suggests that 
after the war 'the dilutees ran, drifted or were eased out 
of the industry 1 (92). This smooths over the restructuring 
of gender relations and marginalises the lengths to which 
the ASE went to obtain agreements that employers would 
expel the new workers. Snell's contemporary account links 
work and masculinity in a more pertinent fashion. He said 
that employers used the threat of starvation to bring 
workers into line and that in order for a worker to gain a 
job he had 'to crawl on his belly so that his manhood was 
taken out of him and he became a sycophant' (93).
In Woolwich the skilled men dominated the inter-union 'All 
Grades' Committee (AGC) which masterminded the 'Peace 
Arsenal' campaign and which bound together people in 
Woolwich in a common identity arising from work at the 
Arsenal. They were central to the course, concerns and 
emphases of the campaign. It was they who formulated it as 
being state- and locality-orientated and also distant from 
London, socialists and direct action. As Hobsbawm says, it 
was the skilled male workers, 'trapped in their own 
sectionalism' who carried a 'strong tradition of working 
class consciousness' based within nineteenth-century 
industry into the post-war period (94).
Hall and Schwarz argue that 1880-1920 were 'the crucible 
years' for 'the major political forces of the 1980s' and 
that 'the neo-liberal resurgence today is testimony to the 
unfinished trajectory of the crisis' (95). In the 1980s, 
as during the time of the 'Peace Arsenal' campaign, there 
were government sales of state assets and there was an 
interest in the conversion of the armaments industries 
(96). In 1985 Labour MP Gordon Brown argued that 'the 
privatisation of defence work has been a major theme of the
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Thatcher administration since 1979. The interests of 
national security have been subordinated to commercial 
gain 1 (97). Both were periods of high unemployment, 
induced deflation, technological change and government 
relief schemes. In the 1980s an important group of 
workers, coalminers, opposed the orthodox commodity economy 
which justified the destruction of community, jobs and 
skills on the grounds of 'efficiency*. The Woolwich 
workers also sought traditional employment within a 
locally-based community in the face of a government 
obsessed with inflation.
In his lengthy history of the Arsenal Brigadier Hogg gives 
the 'Peace Arsenal' campaign only a curt glancing blow and 
Trebilcock is dismissive of the post-Boer War campaign 
(98). In 1919 the Daily Telegraph suggested that the hard 
times experienced in Woolwich were, like the post Boer War 
depression in the town, 'inevitable* (99). Dr Thorn argues 
that the 'Peace Arsenal' campaigners went unheard as there 
was already an 'adequate supply' of goods from private 
industry. She also suggests that the principle body in the 
'Peace Arsenal 1 campaign, the trade unions' 'All Grades 
Committee' had no women members. To these minor 
inaccuracies she adds that 'it was obviously hopeless to 
switch to producing agricultural machinery, railway wagons 
and ambulances; the government did not have enough money to 
finance the turning of swords into ploughshares' (100). 
Even if the demise of the Arsenal was inevitable, and the 
fight against closure hopeless, this need not mean that the 
workers' plans should be ignored as we are not at the end 
of social evolution ourselves and, as Edward Thompson says, 
from lost causes we may discover insights (101).
Furthermore whilst,
the causes of Labour's failure to effect 
a more substantial transformation of 
British society are many and various. 
To show that alternatives were discussed 
and fought for is not to argue that,
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given the circumstances of post [World] 
war [II] Britain, they were realistic. 
Such alternatives are of interest not 
because they might have created a 
different past, but because of their 
implications for our futures (102).
Hall and Schwarz, with reference to Middlemas, argue that 
the political stability created in the 1920s, with its 
rhetoric of collectivism, citizenship, efficiency and 
constitutionalism, lasted until the 1960s. The dominant 
feature of the new order were the 'governing institutions' 
of 'the corporate state' (103). Middlemas defines a 
'governing institution' as 'a body which assumes functions 
devolved on it by government 1 and he refers to national 
organisations. To extend his concept to include the Board 
of Guardians and the Borough Council, bodies which took up 
and shaped the campaign for alternative work, would 
highlight that the settlement required resolution at all 
levels of society, and that the working class made a 
contribution to it.
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The 'Peace Arsenal 1 campaign ran for four years from the 
summer of 1918. It rested upon the idea that orders for 
alternative work would be placed at the Arsenal if a 
rational case was presented by a well-established civic 
community. The seeds of the campaign were planted in the 
depression following the Boer War.
Although the Arsenal workers produced weapons for use 
abroad at the behest of the government, and there were 
soldiers who had fought in many parts of the globe in the 
town, there was a strong sense of locality in Woolwich. It 
was physically separated from other areas, being built 
between marshes and a river, with only 'indifferent 1 rail 
facilities (104). Despite the free ferry and the tram 
service, in 1907 the locals were 'dependent to a degree 
more than usual on finding employment in the district 1 
(105). There were 5,000 soldiers in Woolwich at the height 
of the Boer War but the Arsenal was the major employer with 
21,000. It employed far more people than most employers in 
London, which in the main lacked large-scale production 
(106). The remark that Woolwich, 'although peopled by 
Cockneys, stands apart from the metropolis... the people 
seem conscious of the separation 1 is echoed in many 
contemporary accounts (107). McKibbin suggests that the 
town 'had a social homogeneity akin to some of the mining 
divisions', which distinguished it from the rest of south 
London (108). The borough was also distinctive in that in 
1903 it elected a Labour MP, and a Labour majority onto the 
town council. By 1906 there were Labour majorities on the 
council (WBC) and the Board of Guardians (WBG) and both the 
county councillors were Labour (109). Despite the 
limitations on the franchise 'the union man, with the 
prospect of a settled home, [such as a Woolwich artisan]
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had the ballot in his hand 1 (110). Foster has argued that 
Labour in this period emphasised 'unionisation and union 
rates' and that these were 'intertwined with expectations 
of state legislation* (111). Certainly this was the case 
in Woolwich. One of the first moves of the labour council 
was to pay union rates, and to lobby the government for the 
provision of work. When, after the war, the secretary of 
the central group in the campaign for alternative work 
'called on every worker to use his (sic) power at the 
ballot box 1 , he was drawing on the pre-war success of 
Labour (112). In contrast to this the rest of the capital 
was as Tom Mann put it, 'the sphinx of Labour', in which it 
was difficult to mobilise and organise the migratory and 
industrially heterogeneous working class. This diversity 
was satirised in Shaw's Pygmalion (1912). Higgins, whose 
interest is 'the science of speech 1 claimed to be able to 
tell the part of London from which a speaker came, 'within 
two miles', by their accent.
To the prosperous Woolwich community the dismissals from 
the Arsenal after the Boer War were a disaster. 4,000 jobs 
were lost in 1902, another 3,000 before 1906. The workers 
demanded that the government place its orders for munitions 
at the Arsenal, rather than with private armaments firms. 
They also argued that it was efficient to maintain a 
skilled workforce at the Arsenal, making either munitions 
or non-munitions (113). This was an argument which built 
upon contemporary economic assumptions and was designed to 
maintain the distinctiveness of an elite within the
workforce. As Gramsci points out;
to build up an organic and well- 
articulated skilled labour force in a 
factory... has never been easy... It 
would be uneconomic to allow the 
elements of an organic whole so 
laboriously built up to be dispersed... 
this limitation has always been at the 
origin of the formation of privileged 
labour aristocracies (114)
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The post-Boer War demand for alternative work was taken up 
by local churches and civic figures (115). The WBC 
provided some work, encouraged emigration and established a 
committee on unemployment which organised conferences in 
1903 and 1906. These were attended by religious, political 
and labour representatives (116). There were marches to 
London, mass public meetings, a petition to the King and 
meetings with the Secretary of State for War and the PM 
(117). The Chamber of Commerce, (WCC) the unions, friendly 
societies, co-operative society and Guardians were united 
in their interest in securing employment for the town. 
Through the provisions of the 1905 Unemployed Workmen's 
Act, a local Distress Committee was established (118). The 
Woolwich Distress Committee annual reports from 1905-12 all 
point to the significance of finding work for the Arsenal 
and call for 'the manufacture of the implements of peace 1 , 
and no further discharges from the Arsenal.
The campaigners also repeatedly called for a government 
inquiry (119). In the two decades prior to 1907 there were 
six government inquiries into the role of the Arsenal so 
the workers were well used to this means of investigation. 
The petitions system of wage negotiation also involved the 
workers directly with central government. One of the 
committees, chaired by a civil servant, Murray, sat from 
1905-07. It concluded that there need be only 10,000 jobs 
at the Arsenal in peacetime (120). Murray later joined the 
armaments company, Armstrongs. Whilst this committee was 
deliberating, the number of employees at the Arsenal was 
pruned and the people of Woolwich underwent severe hardship 
(121). In 1906, the Parliamentary Labour Party sent six 
MPs, including Henderson and Barnes (a former Arsenal 
engineer), to the Arsenal in 'with a view to making 
themselves acquainted with the idle machinery 1 . The Labour 
Party then pressed Haldane, the Minister at the War Office, 
to appoint a committee to inquire into the prospects of
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alternative production. Local calls for work were 
bolstered by these parliamentary voices and a committee, 
chaired by Henderson, was established to consider the 
possibilities for alternative work.
Despite this co-operation with the national party the WLP 
remained distinctive because, unlike others on the left, it 
did not oppose military expenditure (122). In the years 
before the First World War the left was vociferously 
opposed to military expenditure and the WLP was isolated, 
particularly from the ILP (123). Local MPs, Labour and 
Conservative, often supported votes for armaments orders as 
this led to local work (124). In 1913 the TUG condemned 
the manufacture of arms and pledged to 'do everything 
possible to make war impossible 1 , which implied that 
Woolwich would be without work (125). This did not lead 
Woolwich to form a community of interest with other 
munitions towns. J Tudor Walters, HP for Sheffield, a 
centre for private arms firms, was on the Henderson 
Committee. He was adept at gaining orders for Sheffield, 
as he boasted in August 1907, 'It is up to me to go to the 
War Office and the Admiralty and get the orders... 
Sheffield has obtained a higher proportion of them than 
ever before 1 (126). He also said that he got a seat on the 
Henderson Committee in order to look after the interests of 
Sheffield (127). Will Crooks, the Labour MP for Woolwich, 
found allies in the Labour MPs for the dockyard towns of 
Barrow and Chatham, but there was still a degree of rivalry 
which encouraged the post-war campaigners for alternative 
work to look closer to home for allies (128).
The evidence that the Henderson committee heard from 
Arsenal officials and workers and from local dignitaries 
was that the Arsenal could be efficiently adapted; 31 
shops were capable of general work, and 43% of the 
machinery was idle and maintained by supervisors in a state
- 31 -
of readiness. However, the Chief Superintendent Ordnance 
Factories (CSOF) argued that it was inappropriate to use 
the Arsenal for non-munitions work and the Conservative 
mayor proposed that some of the Arsenal's land to be sold 
to the private sector (129). Both arguments were aired 
once again after the war. The Committee recognised that 
Woolwich was adversely affected 'in a more than ordinary 
degree' by reductions in orders for arms as, 'apart from 
the Royal Arsenal there are no other very considerable 
works in the immediate vicinity, and a rise in the tide of 
general commercial prosperity leaves Woolwich to a great 
extent untouched'. The Medical Officer of Health reported
in 1907 that:
It is certain that very many persons 
have suffered in health and many have 
died as a result of poverty due to loss 
of work (130).
During the winter of 1908-09 there was, said the Labour 
paper, the Pioneer 'almost unparalleled distress from 
unemployment, the percentage of men out of work reported by 
the Board of Trade exceeding all past records'. A local 
employer, H J Furlong, set up a Soup and Bread Society 
whereby people purchased tickets for food and distributed 
them as they saw fit (131). Like the Murray Committee, the 
Henderson Committee rejected the idea of a 'great State 
manufacturing Department* and suggested instead that the 
Arsenal survive on a third of the state arms orders (132). 
Henderson proposed that the Arsenal be maintained as a 
reserve in case of war; that the Services place more orders 
at the Arsenal; and that, although it could be used to 
manufacture non-munitions items, it should not be used for 
this purpose. After the war an official at the Ministry of 
Munitions recorded that, 'absolutely nothing came of the 
labours of this committee 1 (133). Meanwhile, numbers at 
the Arsenal continued to fall and emigration continued 
(224). The cumulative effect of these committees and 
inquiries was to strengthen the idea that the state was of
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central importance; that there was access to its decision- 
making processes, and that the private firms, at least 
before the war, had better access than the working class.
By 1910 the WLP had lost control on the council, lost its 
seats on the LCC and Crooks had lost his seat. The WLP 
split, the left joined the British Socialist Party leaving 
the right even more firmly in control (134). The 
conclusion that those who remained within the ranks of the 
WLP drew from this was that unity, rather than socialism, 
was of the greatest importance (135). The Arsenal was 
reduced to a core of skilled workers whilst there was high 
unemployment for others in the town.
During the pre-war period there was an active campaign in 
Woolwich for the extension of the franchise to women (136). 
Although it was not directly related to work at the 
Arsenal, it contributed to the restructuring of the 
community based on work at the Arsenal. The WLP sought to 
integrate the challenge within its own activities. There 
was some support for extra-legal action, Labour Councillor 
Newman claimed in 1907 that conditions in Woolwich were 
'quite as bad as a state of slavery 1 and advocated 
following the example of civil disobedience as practised by 
the suffragettes. (137). The Pioneer condemned the 
government's treatment of suffragettes and the 1913 'Cat 
and Mouse 1 Act and published articles by Sylvia Pankhurst 
up until 1914. Charles Grinling was particularly 
supportive of the women's suffrage campaign and Crooks, 
supported the integration of women as voting citizens, as 
did the Conservative councillor, Ingram, and a financial 
backer of the Pioneer, Pethick Lawrence (138). Local 
Labour activists Crooks, Snell and Barefoot were unhappy at 
some of the suffrage activities and encouraged women to 
channel their energies into unions and electoral politics; 
areas over which the men had some control. Women workers
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in Woolwich were, compared to the rest of London, 
exceptionally well unionised and of all the co-operative 
societies the Royal Arsenal Co-operative Society had one of 
the highest percentages of women members (139). In 
addition before and during the war there were women Labour 
councillors in Woolwich. Within a year of the extension of 
the franchise, 400 women had attended the first Labour 
Party women's social and there were 400 members of the 
Woolwich habitation of the Primrose League, most of them 
women (140). Grinling suggested that 'Woolwich public men 
and women for the most part began their experience and 
training in the life of the voluntary organisations' (141). 
In Woolwich the pre-war suffrage movement provided a 
training ground for civic life, the local militants did not 
set fire to any letterboxes, as occurred in Lewisham, or 
engage in revolutionary activity. They sold newspapers and 
held meetings and received qualified support from the WLP 
(142).
Before the war the Arsenal ASE was more concerned with the 
administration of benefits than it was in strikes or even 
pay negotiations. The union took on many friendly society 
functions, such as offering loans for house purchase, which 
enhanced its respectability (143). This encouraged caution 
and bound men to the union organisation (144). Young men 
were attracted because the union offered a route to better- 
paid parts of the trade, older men stayed for the benefits. 
Membership was encouraged in order to discourage non-union 
members from undercutting the union rate. Such activities 
showed the union to be respectable and if a member left he 
forfeited his entitlement to benefits. He had to rejoin 
and 'occupy a position in all respects as if he had never 
been a member', for, at the very least a probationary year 
(145). The bonds of craft solidarity were strengthened by 
the ties of insurance. Even after the pre-First World 
War Liberal welfare reforms which placed some of its
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concerns in the hands of the state, help in times of 
unemployment was offered (146). The Unemployed Worknens 
Act (1905), the Workmens Compensation Act (1906), which 
explicitly excluded casual labourers, the introduction of 
state pensions (1908), and the National Insurance Act 
(1911) encouraged regular contributions and good behaviour 
as dismissal rendered one ineligible for insurance. The 
legislation was 'designed to benefit the respectable poor, 
to incorporate them into society 1 and, as such, did not 
undermine the position of the Arsenal ASK (147). There was 
better provision of benefits than in other unions (148). 
This emphasised, once again, the need for unity. This was 
reflected in the remark, made after the war, by the shop 
steward and WLP activist, Jack Sheppard; 'people who will 
not organise are not worth looking after... I do not stand 
to help those who constitute the biggest enemy - the 
unorganised mob 1 (149).
The workforce at the Arsenal increased fifteen-fold during 
the war, from 6,400 in 1914. The core of ASE members at 
the Arsenal maintained a degree of control during the war 
because they had considerable influence over both the 
dilution of labour and over the other major unions, the 
National Federation of Women Workers (NFWW), the Workers 
Union (WU) and the South Side Labour Protection League 
(LPL) (150). These latter three unions grew in membership 
during the war and tried to emulate the steadier ASE.
The NFWW, with ASE help, recruited 1,474 of the 27,000 
women workers at the Arsenal. It owed much of its 
influence with the government to its ability to discipline 
dissident members. When members complained about the 
dangers to health of working with TNT it did not support 
them (151). Its scheme for patrols to keep women workers 
away from soldiers was adopted by the Metropolitan Police
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(152). When there was a spontaneous march to Westminster 
of dismissed women workers it tried to marginalise the 
anger, not harness it (153). The NEWW, and the WU, both 
promoted the idea that women ought to leave their jobs 
after the war in order to allow men to work. In 1918 WU 
was the largest union in the country, with an eighth of its 
members, 15,000 people, in the Arsenal (154). The 
Divisional Organiser was Tom Macnamara, (1870-1919) a 
skilled worker who gave evidence to the Henderson committee 
and the post-war McKinnon Wood committee and was tutored in 
political thought by a local Liberal who became the first 
Labour Party councillor, E T Fennell. The WU had an 
unemployment scheme which encouraged solidarity - in that 
in order to benefit from a payoff a member had to stay in 
the union. It also discouraged militancy, in that a strike 
might have jeopardies funds. In this the WU mimicked the 
Arsenal ASE (155). The LPL was a general union in the 
Arsenal which also emulated the ASE. It motto was 'defence 
not defiance 1 and it too prided itself on the benefits that 
it provided for its members rather than on its militancy 
(156). A number of its activists, Jackman, a turner who 
gave evidence to the Henderson committee, Gilder, Langham T 
II Thompson (the LPL President) and Harris (LPL secretary) 
were active in the campaign for alternative work (157). 
Although there was an instance when the ASE returned to 
work after their claim had been settled and before the 
labourers had got a rise, often the unions worked together 
before and during the war (158). The significance of this 
was that the 'Peace Arsenal' campaign rested on co- 
operation between all grades of workers and on respectable 
trade unionism.
In August 1918 a government committee, chaired by Mc Kinnon 
Wood, was established to consider the post-war role of the 
Arsenal. In response to this, the issue of alternative 
work was raised in the Pioneer, and taken up by a joint
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committee of the WCC and the Woolwich Labour and Trades 
Council (WL^TC). The Arsenal shop stewards established a 
sub-committee to campaign for alternative work. This 
became the 'All Grades' Committee, the central body in the 
campaign. At the time of the Armistice the workers 
favoured retention of the Arsenal, for munitions and non- 
munitions production, the private sector which was not 
based in Woolwich was largely in favour of a swift return 
to the pre-war version of the free market, and the 
government sought stability and was prepared to compromise 
with some labour demands to get it. A few days after the 
Armistice, workers dismissed from the Arsenal marched to 
Westminster to seek redress. The AGC met Addison, the 
Minister of Reconstruction, and received the assurance of a 
promise of alternative work, some of which was forthcoming 
(159). In December there was a General Election and 
further promises of work from Lloyd George, the PM who was 
returned to office as leader of a coalition.
The AGC argued that an experienced workforce had been 
assembled and housed in Woolwich (160). The Arsenal could 
do work which was beyond the scope of private firms (161). 
Alternative work could utilise the otherwise idle machinery 
which was in the Arsenal and that which the government 
owned and which was sited elsewhere (162). It would also 
mean that the skilled workforce was not scattered. If 
armaments production was not linked to making profits then 
there would be less incentive for armaments firms to 
promote war. Wartime controls were not a step towards 
socialism and peacetime state production was conceivable 
within a liberal framework. As the government had 
attracted people to Woolwich, and there was considerable 
damage to the town due to the war, unemployment, and the 
repair of the infrastructure should be a national 
responsibility (163). The AGC used evidence from the Board 
of Trade to contend that private output was being
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restricted in order to to keep up prices, 'which is the
cause of all Labour troubles'. The use of the Arsenal 'to
combat this evil is desirous in the Nation's interest 1 .
In January 1919 there was a mood of optimism amongst the 
campaigners; 'It was a first-class move when the 
representatives of the 'All Grades' movement got before Mr 
Lloyd George and told him straight to his face what they 
thought about the matter. The moment was opportune. 
Conversion was the fashion' (164). The enthusiasm was 
misplaced as during the same month, on the advice of Sir 
Eric Geddes, a businessman appointed to wartime posts in 
the Ministry of Munitions and the Admiralty, the War 
Cabinet decided that national factories could only produce 
goods for the state and then only if there were no private 
suppliers in competition (165). This effectively sealed 
the fate of the national factories (166). Though the 
Arsenal, Waltham Abbey and Enfield were kept under state 
control, from February 1919 the national factories began to 
be sold off. None, despite negotiations, were sold to the 
labour or co-operative movement. Local authorities were 
not allowed to purchase them and produce goods commercially 
(167).
The 'Peace Arsenal 1 campaign was built up during 1919 on 
constitutional lines. The Arsenal men were neither 
soldiers, despite the military command of their workplace, 
nor, despite the wartime control of the Ministry of 
Munitions, were they civil servants. As workers they had 
not, in the tradition of Victorian public administration, 
internalised the spirit of servility, but neither were they 
prepared to strike for alternative work. Whilst they were 
prepared to utilise the disruption around them, a bakers 
strike in Woolwich in the summer of 1919 and more dramatic 
events elsewhere, they were not prepared to engage in such 
action (168). The remarks from the AGC secretary, that if
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there was not work provided 'it was too much to expect good 
temper and good order to be maintained 1 , and from the chair 
that, 'Woolwich was a colony that the government should 
hesitate to disturb 1 were more a warning of the 
difficulties of their policing role than a threat (169). 
They were indicative of the ethos of the core workers.
The AGC received support from Crooks (returned to the 
Commons in 1918), the council (WLP run after Spring 1919) 
and the Board of Guardians which had a Labour majority. 
Scoble who was on the AGC was a Guardian. Voce, the AGC 
chair, served on the National Industrial Conference, and 
Mills, the AGC secretary, was made an Alderman and then 
elected as an HP in 1920. In March 1919 there were 25,000 
men and 2,000 women workers left at the Arsenal. The AGC 
decided to join forces with the Ministry of Labour Local 
Advisory Committee (LAC) and the Woolwich Chamber of 
Commerce (170). 3,000 people attended a public meeting 
with the local MPs, councillors and representatives of the 
AGC and the WCC (171). There was less enthusiasm from the 
ranks of those above the skilled men in the Arsenal 
hierarchy. The CSOF argued that whilst the Arsenal should 
be used for armaments work and whilst alternative work 'may 
be necessary... there is a good deal in the saying that the 
shoemaker should stick to his last*. The President of the 
Foremen's Association was also unenthusiastic. He thought 
that, although Arsenal workers could execute any kind of 
work 'as may answer to the national requirements... it does 
not appear as if the time has arrived when the sword may be 
beaten into a ploughshare' (172). A committee of 
representatives from the council, WCC and AGC was formed 
and the Joint Town Committee, (JTC) went to see the PM, the 
Minister of Supply, and Bonar Law (173). The JTC later met 
with Auckland Geddes, the chair of the Railway Executive 
Committee, Walker, and the Minister of Munitions, Lord 
Inverforth.
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The JTC deputation told the PM about local unrest and how 
they had had difficulty 'in keeping the Arsenal employees 
away from Downing Street 1 . The PM said that 'unless 
Woolwich Arsenal was kept fully occupied it would be a 
national disaster 1 . He established a new committee, with 
civil servants and four members of the AGC, to discuss the 
prospects for alternative work. The campaigners thought 
that the M°Kinnon Wood Committee had been reduced to 
considering 'mere domestic reorganisation 1 at the Arsenal, 
while this new committee, set up with Prime Ministerial 
blessing would be influenced to a far larger degree by the 
workers (174). This was a relief to them for, although 
Woolwich West MP, Sir Kingsley Wood, claimed that the 
M°Kinnon Wood committee would produce a report which would 
aid the prospects for the Arsenal as he had friends on the 
committee, the Pioneer was sceptical of his powers (175). 
The impression that the McKinnon Wood Committee left on the 
Arsenal workers was that of business men 'determined to 
keep business in their own hands'. Wages were considered 
to be too high by Lord Marchamley, a member of the Mc Kinnon 
Wood committee and formerly an MP connected with the 
Treasury (176) .
In July 1919 the M°Kinnon Wood Committee reported that it 
favoured the retention of a state arsenal, ready for 
expansion in time of war, at Woolwich. It recommended that 
government orders be placed there, but that the stores be 
moved. M cKinnon Wood recognised that there was a potential 
market for the items that could be produced at the Arsenal; 
that the Arsenal could be converted back to the production 
of munitions if an emergency arose and that the Arsenal did 
not have to pay shareholders a dividend, nor to bear the 
costs of advertising, interest on loans or insurance (177). 
The committee concluded that 'labour is most extravagantly 
used and inefficiently regulated' and that the overheads 
and initial conversion costs were expensive. The Arsenal
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could be efficient in conventional economic terms, if there 
were large or long production runs (178). Two Labour MPs, 
William Adamson and Will Thorne, sat on the committee, and 
produced a minority report favouring alternative 
production. Adamson went on to serve on the Woolwich 
Advisory Committee which advised on the implementation of 
the M°Kinnon Wood proposals. In addition, he helped the 
Woolwich campaigners by arranging for them to meet Addison, 
accompanying them on delegations, and, at one time, 
visiting the PM three times in six weeks on behalf of the 
AGC (179).
Although the Treasury argued that the Arsenal was 
inefficiently laid out and badly managed, the Cabinet 
decided that equipment would be moved to Woolwich and goods 
for the state produced there (180). Montagu, Rarnes, 
Milner, Roberts and Addison voted for the nationalisation 
of the mines in Cabinet in August 1919, a potential market 
for Arsenal products, but soon afterwards there were moves 
towards a return to gold, and a balanced budget (181). 
Governmental enquiries stretching over thirty years had 
drawn attention to some of the inadequacies of the site. 
The Engineer, 18th July 1919, echoed these when it drew 
attention to the lay out of the buildings, for 'no-one ever 
puts new muscles on an old skeleton 1 , and there was another 
problem, 'to put it baldly, bad management'. The magazine 
went on, 'One cannot help feeling with regard to Woolwich 
Arsenal... that the very best thing that could happen to it 
would be for a devastating fire to consume it, lock, stock 
and barrel... Woolwich is hampered by many old buildings... 
Its regeneration is a matter of national importance' (182). 
As competition with the private sector was disallowed the 
Arsenal was denied economies based on horizontal and 
vertical integration. This restriction was rather vaguely 
worded so that all varieties of alternative work could, if 
it suited the private sector, be challenged, as the
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Ministry of Munitions noted (183). It made finding 
appropriate alternative work a difficult task (184). 
Eventually the Arsenal produced items for the Post Office, 
the Indian Postal Service, Trinity House, the Anatolian 
railways, the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Food.
By the end of first year of the existence of the AGC, the 
number employed at the Arsenal had decreased by 50,000. 
The AGC had little to show for its meetings with the PM, 
Ministers and civil servants, its rallies and its attempts 
to raise the issue at a national level. There were three 
replies to its appeal to 'every national factory, every 
body of shop stewards' every trades council and every body 
of organised men in the country' to campaign to preserve 
the national factories. The AGC held 24 conferences and 
75 ordinary meetings within the first 18 months of its 
existence (185). The AGC campaigned on the assumption 
that the workers were citizens whose grievances could be 
redressed within the emergent post war social order.
By September 1919 the idea that unemployment could be 
diminished by lobbying or that a Labour government would be 
elected and adapt the existing institutions looked less 
likely. There were 6,000 registered unemployed in the 
town. In the face of this the Woolwich United Trades Union 
Discharges Protest Committee (UTUDPC) was formed by 
disgruntled shop stewards, including Scoble of the AGC 
(186). It argued that, in the face of continued 
dismissals, the AGC had diluted the industrial and social 
interests of the workers by marginalising the links with 
workers in other national factories and concentrating on 
collaboration with representatives of business and civic 
interests. Although only one of the three skilled men on 
the AGC had voting rights, (the secretary and chair did 
not), and although 75% of the alternative work was for 
semi-skilled and unskilled workers, it was argued that the
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AGC was dominated by skilled men (187). The immediate 
catalysts for the creation of the UTUDPC were that, whilst 
Jack Mills went to Glasgow for the TUG conference and the 
other two skilled men on the AGG went to the Midlands to 
learn about locomotive construction, 1,000 men were laid 
off. There was also the implementation of recommendations 
of the Nathan report on the Danger Buildings (DB). 
Following from the McKinnon Wood Committee, Sir Frederick 
Nathan had been asked to investigate the safety of the 
Arsenal. The conclusion was that it was dangerous to store 
high explosives close to London at the Arsenal and that, 
despite the excellent safety record and the experience of 
the workforce, the DB should close. The JTC had largely 
accepted this proposition. The AGC shop steward in the 
Danger Buildings refused to sign a petition for the CSOF 
protesting at the transfer of all the work of the Danger 
Buildings to Banbury. He supported the argument that the 
JTC worked for the DB men not by protecting their jobs but 
by arguing for alternative work. The stores were 
transferred in September 1919 (188). The UTUDPC argued 
that the DB workers had had few accidents, and could do 
civil work such as making materials for housing (189). 
Whilst the Danger Building were being run down, 
advertisements appeared inviting tenders for the breaking 
down of ammunition, which required the sort of special 
plant already in existence in the Arsenal (190). The AGC 
had fought to get other work for Woolwich rather than 
fighting the transfer itself. Although the division was so 
serious that the UTUDPC and the JTC sent separate 
delegations to the PM, unity was re-established in time for 
the inspection of the alternative work by the PM in 
November 1919 (191).
When the PM inspected the alternative work in November 1919 
the AGC presented him with a copy of their 'The Case For 
Woolwich Arsenal 1 (192). A copy had been sent in advance
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to him and a critique of it prepared by a Ministry of 
Munitions official (193). This stressed that the 
government already had a surplus of much of that which the 
plan proposed could be produced at the Arsenal and that 
there was a board trying to distribute surplus government 
property (194). The workers 1 representatives workers asked 
for a stoppage on discharges until after Christmas which 
the PM did not promise. By the end of 1919 there were 
1,000 demobilised unemployed soldiers in the borough, a 
further 1,000 unemployed men who were not in receipt of the 
donation, around 1,100 women without paid work and about 
400 unemployed youths.
Throughout 1920 the Woolwich Guardians, Council, Labour 
Party and Chamber of Commerce agreed that the opposition to 
the securing of more work for the town derived from 
particular private firms and from general government 
inefficiency. The 'Peace Arsenal 1 campaigners argued that 
the 'greatest thing they were up against was private 
interest 1 (195). The solution to unemployment was 
alternative work (196). The Labour mayor continued to 
preserve the distinction between soldiers, engineers and 
unskilled labourers and to refer to the unemployed as 
citizens of the community. He sought the common ground 
that existed between parties on the subject of 
unemployment. The WLP's election slogans referred to 
'labour' and 'anti-labour* and 'community versus monopoly 1 
and promised jobs rather than socialism (197). One of the 
slogans ran 'The Labour Party is not politics - it is life. 
Do you belong?' (198). The WLP's interest in gaining 
individual members, it was the best supported Constituency 
Labour Party in the country, led it to stress rational 
efficiency and to seek broadly acceptable policies (199). 
Organisation of wards, registration of voters and 
'increased political representation' were central (200). 
The WLP chair declared that the 'main duty of the Labour
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Party is to gain representation on all public bodies both 
local and Parliamentary and when in a majority to carry out 
administrative duties with efficiency 1 (201). Widespread 
concern about future employment prospects was directed, via 
the 'Peace Arsenal 1 campaign, along the newly opened 
corridors of power. The WLP secretary Barefoot argued that 
there 'was an absence of real grip on the part of the 
government of the problem of organisation' and called for 
Labour control. His example of the case of private 
shippers holding up the delivery of materials for a road- 
building scheme in Woolwich was echoed in the Commons by 
Crooks (202). The AGC chair Voce also criticised 
governmental mismanagement. The 'Peace Arsenal 1 
campaigners critique lent support to the Conservative town 
councillor who said that there was a need for 'every 
citizen to assist the government in order to get over the 
difficulty 1 , as if the problems did not lie with the 
individual Coalition government politicians in office. 
Such arguments also paved the way for the WCC President to 
decry the 'unholy muddle' of government activity as if all 
government activity was inept and all economic activity was 
better in private hands (203).
The campaigners blamed unemployment in Woolwich upon 
specific foreign policy decisions. Sanctions against 
Russia and arms for Poland and the Empire, were a 
misallocation of much-needed resources (204). One of 
Woolwich's Labour county councillors, Haden Guest, argued 
'we ought not to be fighting Russia: we ought to be 
helping, sending machinery and things which could be made 
at Woolwich Arsenal*. He wanted locomotives to be made for 
Russia and Britain (205). Woolwich, it was argued, could 
do with the orders for the goods that Russia required, or 
with the money spent on munitions for Poland. 'The 
situation would be Gilbertian if it were not tragic' 
suggested the Pioneer. Barefoot, put his hope in a
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demonstration and supernatural forces to get those in power 
to change their ways, 'my call; he wrote 'is for a great 
rally... such as will put the fear of God into the hearts 
of even this government 1 (206).
In February 1920 a number of ex-Servicemen at the Arsenal 
were dismissed. They formed their own committee and tried 
to march to the Commons. They were beaten back on 
Westminster Bridge by the police. The AGO continued to 
meet the Minister and to press, with little results, for 
alternative work. The lack of progress was blamed, in the 
main, on officialdom and private enterprise, though some 
Ministry officials were praised.
In January 1919 the Ministry of Munitions became the 
Ministry of Supply under Lord Inverforth formerly Andrew 
Weir the private armaments manufacturer. Inverforth was not 
interested in business efficiency and although supportive 
of the Ministry in many ways, was anxious to resign his 
post (207). In April 1920 the closure of the Ministry was 
announced. The Ministry finally disappeared in 1921. The 
functions of the Ministry were divided amongst other 
Ministries (208). This caused some consternation in
Woolwich;
it seems that the War Office and the 
Admiralty are merely the mouthpiece of 
the Armaments Ring: therefore the 
workers of Woolwich must see to it that 
Nationalisation of all production must 
be enforced and the means to do this is 
in their own hands. [it is through] 
Parliamentary election (209).
In June 1920 the War Office took over those parts of the 
Arsenal in which the alternative work was done and which 
had been run, since 1915, by the Ministry of Munitions. 
Bonar Law claimed that this would make no difference to the 
work, but the relationship between the campaigners and 
Ministry officials was undermined (210). The abolition of
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the Ministries of Shipping, Food Information, National 
Service, and Reconstruction, had preceded the end of 
Munitions. As the role of the state was reduced the number 
of potential state purchasers of Arsenal products 
diminished. Hinton argues that whilst the ideas of the 
militant shop stewards movement were countered by Fabian 
and Labourist arguments, and the rise of managerial 
prerogative, the most decisive factor was decontrol. 
'Decontrol effectively removed from the immediate political 
agenda all arguments about popular control of economic 
life 1 (211). During the war most firms had sub-contracted 
to the Arsenal but from this time the Arsenal was forced to 
subcontract to private firms (212).
In July the Pioneer held that the overall situation was not 
entirely gloomy but by October it reported that the jobs 
outlook was 'black 1 and that there might be a test to 
civilisation if things did not improve (213). There was a 
violent demonstration about jobs for Woolwich in Whitehall. 
The Woolwich mayor met the PM mentioned the capacity of 
Woolwich for alternative work and requested central 
government funds towards roadbuilding (214). Money for the 
latter was accepted by the WBC, though other Labour 
councils were more dubious of the offer to ease 
unemployment through public works (215). In November 1920 
the government made it clear that whilst it was still 
searching for appropriate orders for the Arsenal, and sub- 
contracted work could be done, in order to reduce costs 
numbers at the Arsenal would have to be reduced (216). In 
December 1920 a Minister suggested that the alternative 
work was only a temporary measure and that some alternative 
work would take place at other national factories. Arguing 
within conventional economic parameters, Jack Mills MP, 
proposed bringing forward government work scheduled for 
1922 and 1923. The council established an Unemployed 
Committee food parcels were distributed and £3,000 was
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donated to the Mayor's Unemployment Fund. In January 1921 
orders for guns for battleships went to the private sector, 
the Arsenal went on short-time, a much hated and, if the 
cost of overheads was included, uneconomic option. In 
addition a further 3,000 workers, 20% of the workforce, 
were laid off (217).
Throughout 1921 the local economic situation did not 
improve and the campaign made no gains. Short time was 
introduced at the Arsenal and workers were unemployed one 
week in six, from January 1921. Work was shared, and wages 
and union funds depressed during a period when, through the 
local rates, 5,000 unemployed had to be supported. The 
Pioneer saw short-time as a plot to 'smash the trade union 
rates and conditions'. It went on 'every man who realises 
the true import of the danger that is threatening the 
organised industrial community must constitute himself a 
missionary against short time' (218). The ex-Servicemen 
proposed that the idle machinery be used for an export 
drive. The skilled men referred the matter to the JTC, 
which wrote to various Ministers and the TUG. The National 
Union of General Workers, (which included the LPL and NFWW) 
joined the WU, in inviting the engineers to join in an 
'all-together-movement', so that 'their front was solid 
against the Cabinet' The Amalgamated Engineering Union, 
(which included the ASE), joined as did a number of other 
unions, and an all-together-movement' deputation met the PM 
and War Office officials. The single issue unity was not 
being lost as the focus was on alternative work and the 
same individuals were involved (219). In November 1921 the 
government agreed to guarantee fully bills on goods 
exported to Europe, except, significantly for Woolwich, 
armaments and products destined for Russia. Barefoot 
argued that peace with Russia could bring 8,000 jobs to 
Woolwich and the WLP supported both the local Council of 
Action and the demonstration in favour of peace (220).
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In 1922 the number of workers at the Arsenal dropped to 
below the pre-war figure and no more orders for non- 
munitions work were placed there (221). The Pioneer nearly 
collapsed under enormous debts and the WLP, the unions, the 
organised unemployed and the WCC formed a new Town 
Committee. This aimed to gain Services' orders for the 
Arsenal and to attract private firms to Woolwich. The 
Combined Shops Stewards' Committee, dissatisfied with the 
Town Committee, called a conference for MPs and Ministers 
but the venture failed. The government announced that 
there would be a minimum of 8,000 Arsenal workers, this 
figure was later reduced to 6,000. Some MPs suggested that 
parts of the Arsenal be sold to private firms. A number of 
private firms tried to use the Arsenal for work which could 
not be done in their workshops during the lock-out of the 
AEU. Just as in 1897, during the ASE lockout, the Arsenal 
was not directly involved in the significant struggle 
between the union and the EEF. Arsenal workers boycotted 
the work but the AEU nationally was defeated. In 1922, 
and again the following year, wages were cut, short time 
was maintained and more workers were dismissed. 
Alternative work was not required to subsidise the private 
sector during the post-war dislocation, nor was it required 
to fulfil demand as there was a recession, nor was it 
needed to break strikes or make weapons for use during 
domestic social unrest. A former Labour mayor of Woolwich
argued that,
Leading opinion in Woolwich is now 
clear. The demand for alternative work 
is not practical politics at present. 
War Office and Treasury officials don't 
like it... Further, now that all private 
engineering firms are so badly off for 
demand, this is the wrong time for 
Government establishments to compete 
in the open market (222).
An offshoot of the M°Kinnon Wood Committee, the Stevenson 
Committee, had been considering the fate of the Arsenal and 
was the last, tiny, hope for the alternative work
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proponents. In 1923 it was disbanded. Woolwich was by 
then the key factory retained by the state after the war 
but there was no further alternative production there and 
the numbers employed had been reduced by a factor of more 
than ten.
The campaigners approached their activity as if alternative 
work could be introduced without any major political 
repercussions; as if it was a goal that responsible men 
could reasonably attain. This method diffused the 
potential for other approaches and sanctified the 
procedures that the campaigners endorsed. The form of the 
campaign allowed the campaigners to be admitted to the 
corridors of power in Whitehall and Westminster. Once 
there there they found that, by the criteria that they had 
accepted, it was legitimate for the doors to be slammed in 
their faces on the grounds that, as Slater put it, 'this is 
the wrong time 1 .
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(c)
Hall and Schwarz argue that the recomposition of the state 
took the form it did because new liberals reconstituted 
challenges from below in a bureaucratic mould (223). 'The 
defining feature of a passive transformation 1 say Hall and 
Schwarz 'is the success of the dominant groups in 
maximizing the exclusion of the masses from determining 
political affairs and the reconstruction of the state 1 
(224). This, they say, favours 'those elements which 
contribute to restoration and continuity'. An examination 
of a specific aspect of the campaign for alternative work 
clarifies how this occurred. The challenge came from 
Woolwich, the people of Woolwich were excluded, and then 
the 'organic state intellectuals' who had taken up their 
challenge were ousted from power and the campaign for 
locomotive production collapsed (225).
The campaign to secure orders for locomotives for the 
Arsenal was part of a broader movement for the utilisation 
of the national factories. Other factories were either 
shut down or converted with few problems. In America the 
state factories were closed, and private companies 
reconverted their factories. In France the Ministere de 
1'Armament et des Fabrications de Guerre became the 
Ministere de Reconstruction Industrielle and the national 
factories were used for the production of such items as 
door and windows (226). In Britain for private firms, such 
as the local saw millers J Watt Torence, packing casemakers 
of Woolwich, conversion was fairly straightforward (227). 
In the case of the national factories, the government was 
unwilling to maintain them in the state sector. Concern 
was expressed about popular attitudes towards them by Sir 
Stephenson Kent, 'a businessman [who] naturally favoured 
the ending of controls' (228). He was the director of six
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companies and a prominent shareholder in Vickers (229). He 
was also the head of the Ministry's labour department and 
on the Munitions Council. In December 1918 he said that of
the current 'dangerous state of affairs' that
the principle trouble was deputations of 
disgruntled munition workers... The 
chief grievance of these workers was 
that no consideration had been given to 
their claim for turning munitions 
factories into peace factories.
On another occasion he noted that workers preferred working 
for the state and 'protest with vigour against being turned 
out of government employment when a demand exists for which 
the National Factories... could be well adapted' (230). 
Thomas Jones, the secretary to the Cabinet, told Lloyd 
George that popular unrest was being caused by 'rumours 
[that] the surplus factories and stores of the government 
are being handed over at ridiculously low prices to the 
profit makers' (231). The closure of the second largest 
government-run plant, the Slough Government Motor Transport 
Depot, led to industrial disturbances including the 
establishment of workers 'soviets 1 (232). There was also 
'labour trouble' at the National Factory at Richborough, 
Kent, with its 'wastes of rotting war material' (233). 
Richborough, which was run by the War Office, was proposed 
as a suitable site for the repair work, as the GER could 
not get repairs done privately, but this was not allowed by 
the government (234). In Coventry and Newcastle former 
shop stewards in the munitions industry demanded conversion 
(235). Trade councils, unions and the Scottish TUC took up 
the issue (236).
In January 1919, at the National Aircraft Factory, Waddon, 
the shop stewards produced 'A scheme for the better 
utilisation of National Aircraft Factories, particularly 
the factory at Waddon'. These workers forged links with 
the the National Aero Engine Factory shop stewards at 
Hayes and the shop stewards at the National Aircraft
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Factory, Aintree. The workers were told that the 
government had not yet come to a decision about state 
aircraft production (237). There was a campaign for peace- 
time non-munitions work at the Waltham Abbey Gunpowder 
Factory and the Enfield Royal Small Arms Factory, which 
were run as one unit (238). The Conservative MP for 
Enfield argued for alternative work stating that 'I cannot 
see why it is any more socialistic to make them than it is 
to make guns and rifles' (239).
There was a joint march and rally of munition workers, 
addressed by Arsenal shop stewards in London immediately 
before the 1918 General Election. Although the workers 
wanted, and received, orders for tractors, dairy 
appliances, motor vehicles, coins, medals, house building 
materials there was considerable interest in locomotive 
construction because locomotives were already repaired and 
used at the Arsenal and because locomotive production was 
prestigious and required skilled work. Locomotives could 
be used to nurture the craft tradition. The manufacture of 
doors, which also occurred at the Arsenal, had not the same 
emotive appeal. Firstly the appeal of locomotives will be 
outlined and then the extent to which they were 'defined in 
public discourse by new liberals... taken up by progressive 
state administrators' will be examined (240).
The verities of the Victorian era were embodied in 
railways. When Lloyd George sought a way in which to 
disparage the Russian revolution he fixed on the fact that 
the Russians could not repair locomotives with the 
doctrines of Karl Marx (241). The construction of steam 
locomotives was a prestigious skilled, male, task. 
Whatever alterations the war had brought in terms of the 
dilution of skilled work, this was a relatively unscathed 
area. British locomotives in the nineteenth century were 
hand built for the most part, precision made and
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superlative examples of engineering quality. As such they 
were a metonym for the certainties of mid-Victorian 
masculine skills. Hamilton Ellis expressed the consensus 
view about Victorian locomotive engineers when he wrote 
that 'it is probable that in no other profession of the 
mechanical arts did a man, who has risen to the top, enjoy 
such nearly absolute power 1 (242). Typically a manager of 
a railway company 'knew little or nothing about technology 
and was the servant of the board in law and of the engineer 
in fact 1 (243).
In 1907 there were 68 steam locomotive engines and over 
1,200 wagons in use at the Arsenal. It was with some 
confidence that, in evidence to the Henderson committee of 
that year, engineers said that they were able to rebuild a 
locomotive from its nameplate upwards. Some Arsenal 
workers had been railway engineers, a group who constituted 
16% of all engineers in 1907. Amongst them was one of the 
workers who gave evidence to the Henderson Committee and 
who argued that locomotives could be built in the Arsenal. 
He was supported in this claim by the superintendent of the 
Royal Carriage Department, the CSOF and the mayor of 
Woolwich (244). All gave evidence that locomotives could 
be made at the Arsenal. Similar remarks were made to the 
McKinnon Wood committee. This claim was echoed outside the 
Arsenal as J A Cole noted, recalling the wartime period in 
his autobiography, 'the world looked to us [Woolwich] ,for 
guns and locomotives' (245). When Jack Mills addressed the
TUG about productivity he focused upon
the derelict engines at Derby waiting to 
be repaired, cargoes waiting for 
locomotives, food rotting for lack of 
transport power (246).
This familiarity was emphasised by the Pioneer in January
1919
Peace work was no new shibboleth for 
Woolwich workers... the Henderson 
Committee and its Report, the products 
of the labour movement, crystallised the
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arguments of those who had been seeking 
the welfare of Woolwich
To call for locomotives work was to follow a pre-war track.
The locomotives symbolised the idealised world of the 
labour aristocracy, which the engineers aimed once more to 
inhabit. The growth of their union in Woolwich Arsenal 
coincided with, and was linked to, the development of 
locomotives. Railways embodied progress for the working 
classes. Chartism, Fergus O'Connor declared was the first 
carriage behind the locomotive. John Stuart Mill wrote how 
railways, 'the more visible fruits of scientific 
progress... carry the feeling of admiration for modern, and 
disrespect for ancient times, down even to the most 
uneducated classes 1 . In 1851 the ASE, the union for those 
whom Marx termed the 'superior class of workmen', was 
formed. Its insignia depicted Peace, Unity and Industry, 
the latter denoted by a locomotive (247). The union had 
175,400 members in 1914 and eight branches at the Arsenal. 
Over the same period the Royal Arsenal Railway was 
developed within the Arsenal until by the end of the First 
World War there was 120 miles of standard gauge track and a 
considerable amount of narrow gauge as well (248).
Richard Price argues that much nineteenth century 
radicalism was rooted in an artisanal vision of a golden 
age of self-governing communities. In the mid-Victorian 
period workers accepted a large degree of subordination 
within society but enjoyed a large measure of self- 
determination in production. This accommodation was a 
blend of respectability, localism, workplace ritual and 
deference (249). The 'Peace Arsenal' campaign was in part 
an attempt to reduce workers' insecurity by a return to a 
Victorian world of locomotives. Rubin portrays the ASE 
nationally in a similar way. He suggests that Lloyd
George's
aim was not simply to restore a pre-war
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status quo. It was to mould a new 
realism in collective bargaining in 
respect to which trade unions would have 
no need to be defensive. [However] 
major unions, especially the engineers 
[made] a vain attempt to hold the line 
(250).
During the war technical changes in working practices were 
introduced for the production of munitions. Some of these 
alterations had to be maintained as George Barnes 
recognised 'some aspects of the matter which could not be 
restored. They could not eliminate knowledge 1 (251). Some 
changes could not be adapted to non-weapons production, and 
this was a further inducement to produce locomotives (252).
Hinton defines three principles of craft tradition as 
exclusiveness, craft control and local autonomy (253). In 
the locomotives there was an opportunity to nurture these 
ideals. As locomotives were expensive they were frequently 
repaired rather than scrapped. There was a large degree of 
local autonomy in the way that repairs were undertaken 
(254). The work was exclusive because locomotives were 
associated with the a masculine artisan world (255). 
Certain types of work, Walby argues, 'provide its 
practitioners with a reinforcement of their masculinity' 
(256). Rose suggests that, 'the connections between 
masculinity and working class respectability contributed to 
a working class divided upon occupational lines' (257). If 
the Arsenal no longer produced munitions, there was less 
need for the women dilutees to compete with the men for 
work. To construct locomotives was not a challenge to the 
economic and social power structure. As Jack Mills put it, 
'I have yet to learn that there is one economic law for 
wagons and another for munitions' (258). Rather 
Locomotives could be used to maintain the respectability 
and exclusivity of the artisans. Ramsay MacDonald told a
crowd in Woolwich
when swords will be beaten into pruning- 
hooks, I want the machines of the
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Arsenal to be making the pruning-hooks. 
When the time comes for the gun carriage 
to be scrapped, I want the railway 
carriage to be made in its stead... If 
in time the machines at Woolwich cease 
to make things that are necessary whilst 
men and nations are mad, I want the 
machines to be turned by the same 
skilled hands to make things that the 
nation and men will use when the nation 
and men become sane (my emphasis) (259).
That a civil servant who aided the campaign for locomotive 
work was praised as 'virile 1 is indicative of the 
perceptions of the campaigners. Hinton argues that 
'central to any understanding of the shop stewards' 
movement is the fact that it was a movement of craft 
workers who felt their traditionally privileged position 
within the working class to be under the most severe 
pressure' (260). The campaign for orders for locomotives 
exemplifies this.
The case for state locomotive manufacture was taken up 
during the 1918 election campaign. Lloyd George promised 
rail nationalisation and also that an order for 500 
locomotives would be placed at the Arsenal. He said that 
there was a need to to regenerate rural life through the 
extension of the rail network, 'and that was where Woolwich 
Arsenal might be used to an extent that it has never been 
used before'. He went on to say that 'it would be a very 
grave national disaster if Woolwich were not used to its 
fullest capacity for the work for peace' (261). Churchill 
argued for the state control of transportation and 
specifically promised rail nationalisation. He said it was 
government policy even though it was not (262). Making a 
virtue out of a necessity he claimed, 'We are doing our 
utmost to develop alternative industrial production as a 
stop gap pending the transition from war to peace industry' 
(263). He promised an order for the Arsenal of 1,000 
locomotives and 30,000 or 40,000 wagons if private
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enterprise was not forthcoming in placing orders. He also 
promised the Arsenal orders for Local Government Board 
equipment (264).
The efficient manufacture of locomotives at the Arsenal 
buttressed the case for the continuation of a Ministry, 
called either Munitions or Supply, to oversee production. 
The Ministry of Munitions favoured orders for locomotives 
being placed at the Arsenal. It received estimates as to 
the cost of 100 2-6-0 locomotives from Vickers, Beardsmore, 
SER and Armstrongs. The estimate for Arsenal locomotives 
was cheaper. The Ministry argued that placing orders would 
improve the Ministry's negotiating position in regard to 
the liquidation of its assets and would generally stimulate 
production and thus there would be national benefits.
Furthermore
in view of the probable great expansion 
of railways all over Europe, Africa, 
Asia and South America that it is 
necessary to organise immediately 
adequate sources of supply to meet the 
demands ... immediate government action... 
is necessary to legislate for 
unemployment and secondly because it 
will be too late to start...when the 
buyers are ready to place their orders. 
America is now ready to cope (265).
As the Pioneer pointed out no locomotives had been made for 
five years and as 2,000 had been blown up in France orders 
from the dependencies alone would be sufficient to keep the 
Arsenal going for five years (266).
Although the Ministry noted that there were no firm 
purchasers or price, but argued that this point was 'not 
legitimate' as the necessity of stopping unemployment 
overrode it and official approval would encourage buyers to 
place orders. The locomotive trade claimed that there was 
not an appropriate workforce available but the Ministry 
countered this by noting that soon former employees would
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be out of the Forces and that former Ordnance workers could 
be employed. There was no suggestion that ordnance workers 
could not build locomotives. However the Ministry 
official, formerly of Beardmores, V B Stewart did venture
the opinion that
I think the real reason is that the 
locomotive trade which is an old and 
extremely conservative one hesitates to 
employ the class of labour employed in 
the Ordnance work.
As the Arsenal could only produce items for the state, the 
nationalisation of the railways was of importance the 
'Peace Arsenal 1 campaign. There had been interest in state 
control of the railways from 1840 when the railway board of 
the Board of Trade was established. In 1844 the chair of a 
committee on railways, Gladstone, suggested that 'state 
purchase of railways was possible in the future 1 (267). 
There was provision for state purchase under the Cheap 
Trains Act of that year (268). Furthermore railway 
companies were regarded organisations akin to modern day 
public utilities. David Eversley writing about the Great 
Western Railway argues that, 'by 1885 railways were an 
institution and a public service. Trains might be more or 
less full but they would run, since the public expected it 1 
(269). From the 1890s the length of the working day on the 
railways, their charges, their industrial relations and 
their amalgamations were regulated by the state (270). 
Lloyd George and Churchill voiced their support for railway 
nationalisation in The Nation 7th March 1908 (271). The 
General Manager of the North Eastern Railway Co called for 
state ownership in an address to the Royal Economic Society 
in 1908 (272). The Times agreed in 1912, 'the railway 
system undoubtedly ought to be under the control of the 
state' (273). The Railway Companies' Association opined 
that 'the future of the great Corporations will lie more 
and more in the Government offices' (274). During the war
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the Railway Executive Committee, chaired by the President 
of the Board of Trade, ran the railways and after the war 
control was extended until August 1921.
Of the 1918 General Election campaign the chair of the 
South Eastern Railways, SER, Managing Committee told his 
board that 'railway shareholders had nothing to fear 1 and 
they 'must always take the remarks of a gentleman who was 
standing for Parliament with a pinch of salt' (275). 
However Armitage, in a study of the post-war settlement, 
argues that the promise was no political chimera but rather 
that 'a consensus for rail nationalisation existed in 1919' 
(276). When the Ministry of Transport was established 
control of electricity was tacked on in the belief that the 
railways would soon be electrified (277). Eric Geddes, 
formerly of North Eastern Railway Co, and first Minister of 
Transport said 'unified control was essential to 
transportation' and did not rule out nationalisation (278). 
In the Cabinet Eric Geddes, argued that state production 
was economical (279). He said that as there were a lot of 
wagons requiring repairs, the rates proposed by the private 
sector for such work were high and the actual work was 'not 
a very difficult thing' wagon building, by and for the 
state was 'probably the best thing to do* (280). Although 
the repair of coal wagons kept both mineworkers and Arsenal 
workers in employment it provoked alarm in the Commons 
(281).
Even if the railways were not nationalised there was a 
widespread understanding that railways were a vital aspect 
both of the war effort and the civilian economy and as such 
were a legitimate concern of any government. By blurring 
the distinction between munitions and non-munitions, the 
Ministry could bridge the gap between that which 
constituted legitimate work for the state and that which 
was the province of the private sector. As locomotives
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were associated with warfare, this increased their 
acceptability as items appropriate for the state Arsenal to 
produce. Following the innovative use of rail during the 
1871 Franco-Prussian War the Regulation of the Forces Act 
was passed, the Railway War Council established (1876) and 
locomotives became an integral part of internal and 
external state security plans. The 10th (Railway) Company 
Royal Engineers were stationed in Woolwich which was a 
principal supply and ordnance depot for the defence of
London. In 1907 the Henderson Committee concluded that
railways are an increasingly important 
feature of modern warfare. That being 
so the manufacture of railway stores 
becomes a proper class of work to be 
undertaken at the Royal Arsenal. We 
think the War and India Offices should 
be encouraged to place some portion of 
their orders for these stores with the 
Woolwich factories
During the war the High Court made it clear that railway 
repair work was in law and fact munitions work and the 
Ministry of Munitions maintained a liaison officer to deal 
with the railway companies (282).
These arguments carried less weight in the face of the 
economic recovery of political and economic stability. 
Recovery was aided by the government which paid £60 million 
to the railway directors for wear and tear incurred to the 
railways during the war (283). As private sector grew in 
confidence and the number of workers at the Arsenal was 
reduced, so the order for Woolwich locomotives was reduced. 
It became 100 in April 1919 and then the plan was to build 
one locomotive by the summer and two a week after that. 
Twice, and with no discernible effect, the shop stewards 
visited the Minister of Munitions, Kellaway, in order to 
secure further orders for locomotives. The JTC visited 
Bonar Law who promised orders for 2,000 wagons and 100 
locomotives. However, it was a private company, Elswick 
Ordnance, which received a government order for 50
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locomotives, whilst a private shell factory was refitted 
for railway work. Only in June 1919 was finance for the 
construction of any locomotives in Woolwich found (284). 
The SER expressed interest in purchasing the locomotives 
in July 1919 (285).
Some rail companies requested that the Arsenal be used for 
their repair work and ordered wagons from the Arsenal in 
1919 and 1920. 500 wagons were repaired for the GWR in 
1919 and 500 sold to the company in 1920. 2,000 wagons 
were repaired and another 2,000 made for the NER during the 
same period (286). Also some GER engines were repaired at 
the Arsenal (287). Repairs to wagons in the Ministry of 
Munitions pool were also undertaken (288). In July 1919 
the Cabinet decided to maintain the pool (289).
Immediately after the war there were few profits in 
locomotive construction (290). The Times claimed there was 
a shortage of wagons and that truck builders were without 
orders not because of shortages of materials but rather 
because private railway companies did not wish to invest in 
fixed capital goods in case they were nationalised and thus 
there was not a demand for wagons (291). The number of 
steam locomotives being exported fell during the war and 
did not pick up again during the post war 'boom 1 . In 1913 
the 141,685 tons worth were exported, at a value of 
£7992,000. The return to the employer was £56.4 per ton. 
In 1919 only 52,781 tons worth (37% of the pre-war figure) 
were exported at a value per ton of £105.6. By 1920 the 
value per ton was £138.6 and in 1921 it was £164.7 (a 16% 
rise) whilst the weight (which indicates the numbers 
employed) only grew from 73,694 to 77,458 tons (a 5% rise). 
Manufacturers could sell fewer locomotives for a greater 
profit and in a such a situation it was in their interests 
to halt production at Woolwich (292).
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After the initial post-war dislocation was over there was 
an increase in interest in orders for railway wagons, and 
not all civil servants were supportive of the case for 
production in Woolwich. The government had over 2,200 
wagons in its possession by June 1919, but there was, said 
the Ministry of Transport, still a shortage of 200,000 
wagons. Woolwich was required to build them as private 
firms 'cannot possibly overtake the shortage 1 . Indeed when 
three became surplus in August 1919 there were swift 
enquiries as to their future from a private firm (293). 
However the controller of the Railway Materials Department 
counted 23 firms which between could produce 1,890 wagons 
per week. These companies were 'none too well off for work 
and could give early deliveries. It would appear from this 
that they should be given a chance of tendering for the 
order for wagons, it is proposed to place with Woolwich 1 . 
The Director General, Purchases, felt that it 'would be a 
distinct advantage if Railway Companies would relieve the 
Department of [Surplus] wagons before we start out and 
build new ones - at Woolwich'.
Interested parties from industry complained to the Ministry 
of Munitions and they put the case for wagon orders to go 
to the private sector. The British Commonwealth Union, the 
FBI and other representatives of trade and industry in 
total almost fifty of them, held a meeting to discuss and 
then to repudiate, Geddes' statement of support for state 
wagon production (294). The chair of the Metropolitan 
Carriage and Wagon Co, Dudley Docker, claimed the company 
could undercut the Arsenal prices but this was only after 
the latter were announced and the company also complained 
about Woolwich being used as a locomotive construction 
centre (295). The private companies also said that the 
production of wagons at the Arsenal was unfair to traders, 
was injurious to national interests and a repudiation of 
the promise not to allow the state to compete with the
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private sector. A deputation from the private companies 
was formed and went to Bonar Law (296). The railway wagon 
builders demanded an inquiry (297). The Minister of 
Munitions was lobbied by the Railway Carriage and Wagon 
Builders and Financiers Parliamentary Association (298). 
In response in July 1919, the Director General, Factories, 
(DGF) Johnson, argued that Woolwich could 'efficiently 
economically and promptly 1 do railway wagon repair work 
(299). The government requirement for wagons was fulfilled 
at a lower cost than if the orders had gone to the private 
sector. This argument was a difficult one to make as the 
Cabinet had made it clear that Woolwich was not to 
undermine the prices of the private sector, nor to exceed 
the boundaries as to what constituted legitimate work for 
government establishments (300). Johnson also argued that 
the railway work kept the workforce located in the same 
area in case they were swiftly required in the event of 
national emergencies.
During the war some 2-8-Os, designed by J G Robinson, were 
built at government expense, for about £6,000 each. After 
the war consideration was given to building more Robinson 
2-8-Os at the Arsenal, but as the government had difficulty 
in disposing of those that it owned, (as well as over 
11,000 wagons), the idea was rejected. Instead the 
Maunsell 2-6-0 Class N design was accepted (301). 
Eventually in November 1919, just before the visit of the 
PM, work on the Arsenal locomotives commenced. In December 
1919 Given of the Ministry of Munitions stated that 'it is 
obviously impossible to turn the whole Arsenal over to such 
work [as locomotives] and it is premature to forecast the 
extent of the new department. But no time will be lost in 
pressing on with the work 1 (302). By the end of 1921 
although over £72,000 worth of work on the locomotives had 
been done at the Arsenal, there were only 13 completed 
locomotives. 12 other locomotives were complete except for
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tenders, 52 boilers were finished, all the wheels were cast 
and the materials had been supplied. As Robert Campbell a 
member of the ASE and a Woolwich Municipal Reform 
councillor said, in January 1921, the Woolwich locomotives 
were very expensive (303). In addition over £255,300 worth 
of work for railway companies had been completed.
Once the threat of industrial conflict had subsided and 
profitmaking appeared to be more assured, there was intense 
press and private sector hostility to state management of 
the railways. The specialist The Railway and Travel 
Monthly compared trade unionists to 'Huns', claimed that 
the state management of the railways during the war led to 
chaos and inefficiency and derided the scheme to build 
locomotives at the Arsenal as 'hare brained'. It pointed 
to the 'ghastly failures of the Metropolitan Water Board 
and Government telephones' as evidence of the inefficiency 
of nationalisation. Telephone parts were another 
alternative product made at the Arsenal (304). The Evening 
Standard emphasised the dangers of state production of 
wagons and locomotives and several times clarified that it 
was clearly not policy that production should be permanent, 
and that it was merely temporary (305). It argued that 'it 
can hardly be expected of a government that it will give 
Woolwich work to do unless it it can do it at least as 
economically and as well as any other town' and 'there is 
no greater need than national economy 1 (306). The idea 
that the national factories could do experimental work, 
was an example of 'complete confusion' by Labour men as the 
state should not provide work 'for the mere sake of 
providing employment 1 (307). In December 1919 the Stock 
Exchange Gazette thought the government was in danger of 
altering its policy of non-competition and that such a 
change to a 'Socialistic experiment' would mean that 'a 
deadly blow will have been struck at that spirit of private 
enterprize (sic) which the Prime Minister has just told the
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Nation is the key to our commercial stability and progress 1 
(308).
It soon became difficult for the Ministry to prove 
efficiency in its sales ability. The Ministry tried to 
sell the Arsenal locomotives to the dominions and colonies, 
'an easy market 1 according to one specialist magazine. 
However it was in competition with Armstrongs which 
received favourable terms for establishing a locomotive 
manufacturing company in India (309). Poland, which had 
lost 48% of its locomotives, wanted rolling stock and 
locomotives, as did Finland, but they could only offer 
sugar and timber in exchange (310). In addition in May 
1920 there was a strike in support of the Bolsheviks in 
the London Docks when the government attempted to aid the 
Polish struggle against Russia. This hampered the 
prospects of fulfilling further orders for Poland (311). 
In April 1919 the government acceded to a request from the 
the Czechoslovak government for locomotive engines, tenders 
and spare parts, but these sales were to an impoverished 
nation and little more by way of orders could be expected 
(312). By contrast in February 1921 Armstrong Whitworth 
received orders to repair large numbers of Russian 
locomotives, twenty a month for several years (313).
1922 was 'the first orderly year which Great Britain had 
known since the outbreak of war 1 , according to A J P Taylor 
(314). In May 1922 45 of the 100 Woolwich locomotives were 
complete, at a cost of £16,000 each. The highest price 
paid for a commercially constructed locomotive during the 
period of highest demand and shortage of 1919-20 was 
£12,000. The price for a commercial locomotive comparable 
to the Maunsell 2-6-0 was £9,000 (315). The Arsenal 
workers could not benefit from their experiences over the 
course of a lengthy production run or draw on previous 
experience of making Maunsell 2-6-Os. A further £88,000
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was required to complete the remaining 55 locomotives 
(316). By December 1922 another 5 had been completed and 
the remaining 50 were two thirds complete (317). By this 
time the atmosphere in Whitehall and Westminster had 
changed. Lloyd George was no longer PM, the Ministry of 
Munitions no longer existed. Sir Robert Home was arguing 
that alternative work was uneconomic, and Eric Geddes, once 
the advocate of state railways production, chaired a 
government committee examining how to save public 
expenditure. It argued for the cancellation of the last 
fifty Woolwich locomotives in order to save £900,000 (318).
In 1923 the first two locomotives were sold and in 1924 the 
Metropolitan Railway took some of the locomotives and 
Southern Railway (SR) purchased 50 of them and some parts 
(319). The remainder went to Ireland (320). Despite its 
high ambitions the Ministry failed to manufacture or 
promote the locomotives within the appropriate economic 
criteria. The Daily Mail's accusations, made in 1922, of 
the 'rusty locos' of Woolwich bleeding the taxpayer and the 
stories in the Guardian and Daily Express in 1925 of undue 
governmental pressure upon private companies in order to 
make the sales, reflected badly on the 'Peace Arsenal* 
campaign.
The locomotives could only be effective against the post- 
war economic fluctuations; the possible overpricing by 
private firms; a revolt by disaffected workers; an invasion 
of the country and as a means of maintaining a viable, 
skilled workforce in Woolwich, if they actually worked. 
The Arsenal management and workforce were accustomed to the 
very high engineering standards of the armaments trade and 
the pursuit of excellence, rather than fiscal savings. 
This, combined with the lack of experience at making 
locomotives, meant the work went slowly and was expensive. 
Arsenal tradition has it that the locomotives were made to
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such fine specifications that they were too good to be 
engines. A former worker recalled seeing the locomotives 
being tested. He said of them 'they made 'em so well that 
they wouldn't work..they were made so well by the engineers 
that they were a bit on the tight side, they weren't 
working so well., they had to sort of work them in. It 
wasn't shoddy work it was too good...eventually they were 
sold to Russia..all painted pink 1 (321). The official 
historian of the Arsenal, formerly at the Ministry of 
Supply, remembered that 'for years long lines of these red- 
coloured monsters could be seen on railway sidings...a 
gaunt tribute to the skill of the Royal Arsenal 1 (322). 
Others were more critical. The designer of the engines, 
Maunsell, was the Chief Mechanical Engineer (CME) at SR 
which purchased 50 locomotives. He claimed that they were 
poorly made. The CME at Metropolitan thought the 
workmanship 'decidedly second rate' (323). Orders for 
Arsenal locomotives were not sufficiently large to enable 
economies of scale to operate, and the work did not make a 
profit. Also the cost of the locomotives included within 
it the cost of the conversion of the gunshops, the cost of 
buying raw materials and the cost of purchasing privately 
made boilers. As Slater noted ruefully the locomotives 
although 'beautifully made' even apart from overhead costs, 
were more expensive than those made by private industry and 
so they became 'a deadly weapon against the policy of 
alternative work' (324).
Marx employed an apt metaphor when he described the ways in 
which technological and economic innovations reflect and 
endorse the social structures in which they are developed. 
Machinery possessed 'as capital through the instrumentality 
of the capitalists, both consciousness and a will... [it] 
is utilised as the most powerful weapon in the capitalist 
arsenal, as the best means of overcoming the revolts 
against capital' (325). The campaign to build locomotives
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appealed to engineering skills, masculinity, national pride 
and rational, efficient, state production. The Pioneer 
hailed locomotive orders as 'Revolution at the Arsenal 1 
(326). The railways had long been recognised as vital for 
wartime. In 1919 they were seen as essential to 
reconstruction. There was a post-war shortage of 
locomotives, and building them was appropriate for the 
Arsenal in terms of the available skills and facilities. 
To use the Arsenal would keep the skilled men in one 
location, undermine the threat to the social order that 
mass unemployment posed. The challenge was taken up by 
state officials who failed to organise efficient production 
and marketing. When the Ministry of Munitions closed there 
were relatively few workers left at the Arsenal and there 
was nobody left in Whitehall to defend Woolwich against a 
vicious press campaign and the economic resurgence of the 
private sector.
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Chapter II
I love the noise of men. That is why I 
love Woolwich
Burke T The outer circle London 1921 
pp45-6. Burke was a resident of Eltham.
One can hardly think of a more 
interesting part of London
WBC Industries of Woolwich London 1949
Pi
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This chapter is about those who had most influence upon the 
recomposition of the state and their influence upon the 
course and shape of the campaign for alternative work at 
the Arsenal. Hall and Schwarz argue that "'the crisis" and 
"the transition" were constituted by political forces, and 
their outcomes were determined in the first instance by 
political struggle 1 (1). The influence of national 
politicians upon the campaign is considered in section (a). 
The central figure was the 'architect of this 
transformation 1 , Lloyd George. He told labour audiences 
both that 'the whole of society is more or less molten... 
you can stamp upon that molten mass almost anything' and 
also that 'Woolwich has special claim to consideration 
because Woolwich has saved the whole of European 
civilisation 1 (2). The impact of the Treasury, which 
Schwarz says commanded 'a frontal assault against high 
state expenditure, is considered in section (b) (3). The 
bete noire of the Treasury was the Ministry in charge of 
alternative work at the Arsenal, the Ministry of Munitions.
At the core of Hall and Schwarz's concept of 'passive 
reform' were the new liberal administrators. Some civil 
servants were converted to socialism, or at least central 
state direction of the economy, by their experience of 
wartime public administration (4). Many of those at the 
Ministry of Munitions wanted to maintain or adapt as many 
of its war-time powers as they could. The use of the 
Arsenal in peacetime could be used to justify the 
continuance of the Ministry. The Ministry of Munitions 
conceived of a scheme whereby 10,000 workers would be 
employed at the Arsenal, 8,000 of them working on non- 
military projects and 2,000 on military research and 
production. It argued that state production allowed for 
effective price comparisons with the private sector which 
would act as a brake on price rise in the latter, noted 
that there were £21 million worth of orders for Indian
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railways and proposed that it was efficient to take over an 
'entire industry, such as the manufacture of locomotive and 
railway rolling stock (5). Fraser notes how f it must 
have been almost inconceivable to the wartime reformers of 
1917 that the whole structure would fall to the ground in 
brief post-war boom for lack of political support 1 (6). 
Certainly the rapidity of decontrol was startling and 
distressing to some. Sir L C Money, private secretary to 
the Minister of Munitions and parliamentary secretary to 
the Minister of Shipping, resigned over the break up of 
national organisation and the sale of the state's 
industrial sites (7).
Numerous committees, such as Lord Haldane's Machinery of 
Government Committee and the Health of Munition Workers 
Committee, took it as axiomatic that 'resolute central 
direction 1 would be maintained after the war (8). One of 
the committees which assumed that armaments production 
would be under state control in peacetime was the committee 
which was charged with proposing suggestions for the future 
role of the Arsenal. It was headed by a Liberal MP, 
McKinnon Wood, and it was followed by three other 
committees on the Arsenal, chaired by civil servants, 
Nathan, Johnson and Stevenson. The impact both of 
government committees and the Ministry of Munitions is 
considered in section (c).
Schwarz notes the importance of a 'temporary alliance 
between the Treasury (preoccupied with national debt) and 
those sections of manufacturing industry capable of 
sustaining high profits without the aid of government 
controls' (9). Private arms firms were determined that 
they would receive the few orders that were available from 
the government after the war. Their influence upon state 
production at the Arsenal is examined in section (d). For 
the Pioneer the position was clear, to provide alternative
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work
encroached upon the sacred confines of 
private industry which of course would 
be the last thing that a government 
composed of capitalists would do (10).
However there were distinctions between different firms. 
There was no clear route for all private companies to take 
if they wished to improve their profits. Some wanted a 
degree of state intervention in the economy to ease the 
difficulties of reconstruction, some placed a stress upon 
state controls on the unions, and some opposed competition 
from the state. There was initially little coherence about 
their views on the future of the Arsenal.
The obvious divisions amongst decision makers, the 
existence of a 'newly created space within the British 
political discourse 1 , had profound effects for the campaign 
(11). As Cronin observes, 'ordinary people's notions about 
what is politically possible and what is not and hence 
their efforts to act collectively - largely depends upon 
the state's present capacities and commitments' (12). In 
Woolwich the divisions fostered the argument that even if 
the Labour Party was in a minority in the Commons, Lloyd 
George would listen to reason. Such an investment in the 
lobbying of central personalities, rather than in workers' 
self-activity, aided the successful implementation of the 
post-war settlement.
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(a)
Significant though the Treasury and the Ministry of 
Munitions were, within the conventions of the political 
model which was constructed after the war, decisions were 
ultimately the responsibility of the Ministers who 
answerable to the Commons. This was particularly 
emphasised after 1918. The extension of the franchise from 
58% of men to 75% of adults meant that if the social 
stability was to be maintained, then the notions of the 
primacy of formal political processes arid of the value of 
electoral politics to ensuring equal citizenship needed to 
be fostered. Barefoot argued that 'the only way to get 
alternative work is by a Cabinet decision; and it is only 
by unity of purpose in Woolwich that the Cabinet will be 
influenced to make the right decision 1 (13). Within this 
model of the political decision-making process governmental 
committees and the Commons were also accredited with some 
importance. The campaigners sought to influence, not to 
weaken, the government by gathering mass support. The 
adoption of such a policy of 'political action, acting 
loyally and doing the right thing' involved trying to 
convince mainstream elected politicians through the 
appropriate channels, that alternative work at the Arsenal 
would aid the social and economic stability. The 'workers
of Great Britain' were told by the campaigners that,
Woolwich Arsenal is your property. You 
are responsible for it, it is your 
servants, the so-called Ministers of the 
Crown who hold the power, it is your 
representative in Parliament whose 
business it is to watch and control them 
(14).
The state needed to be presented not as central to the 
reproduction and accumulation of capital, or as promoting 
the interests of those who owned or controlled capital, but 
as neutral. A further implication of this framework was
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that leaders in Parliament grew in stature and the working 
class were categorised as passive public followers. A 
campaign constructed upon the notion of the passivity of 
workers and the dynamism of leaders required a personality 
to admire. The investment of time and energy in 
constitutional lobbying required not just faith that a 
Labour government would aid the campaign, although there 
were frequent references to Labour voting being the key to 
a successful campaign, it also required, especially after 
the 1918 election, a belief that leading politicians in the 
other parties could be persuaded of the value of the 
campaign.
Amongst the elected decision makers the Minister who was 
first among equals, Lloyd George, stood head and shoulders 
above the rest. In a recent biography of him B B Gilbert 
called Lloyd George 'the most important and influential 
British political figure of his time and probably of the 
twentieth century 1 (15). After the 1918 election in the 
Commons 'there were more wealthy profiteers than ever... To 
a man they were adherents of Lloyd George 1 (16). Over half 
those who voted, supported Lloyd George's coalition. It 
had 478 of the 707 seats and was further bolstered by the 
absence of 73 Sinn Fein MPs. The Cabinet, not restored to 
full size after the war until September 1919, was also 
dominated by the Prime Minister. He had a well established 
secretariat which did much to bypass both Parliament and 
the established civil service. In addition he used the 
Civil Contingencies Fund to bypass Parliamentary scrutiny 
of expenditure; he darted from one problem to another and 
so kept an eye on numerous matters; and he conducted 
foreign policy personally in semi-presidential style (17).
Apart from his official status Lloyd George was important 
in 1919 because he had a reputation, assiduously 
cultivated, for supporting radical state intervention and
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the integration of the labour movement. He supported the 
Lib-Lab pact of 1903, the year the liberal Labour candidate 
for Woolwich was elected, and he tried to form a coalition 
with Labour in 1914. During the war, in order to counter 
his unpopularity amongst some engineers, he had a 
communique signed by Addison and the ASE leaders in May 
1917 altered in order to create the impression that he 
alone had settled the dispute (18). After the war he urged 
voters not to forget the value of 'state action, state 
help, state encouragement and state promotion 1 - a message 
which might well have gladdened hearts in Woolwich (19). 
His schemes for a new society specifically mentioned an end
to an immediate problem in Woolwich, unemployment:
The old world was one where 
unemployment, through the vissitudes of 
industry, brought despair to multitudes 
of humble homes... The old world must 
and will come to an end (20).
In March 1919 he told the Cabinet that he favoured 
imaginative social reform (21). In July 1919 the PM 
rejected the idea of the nationalisation of the coal
industry (22). He was, however,
prepared to entertain such radical 
proposals as fostering new industries, 
state investment in...iron and steel and 
control over electricity generation 
(23).
This radicalism was communicated through Lloyd George's 
charismatic persuasiveness. Keynes and Lenin both noted 
his oratorial abilities, the latter specifically referred 
to his eloquence in front of labour audiences (24). A 
recent historian noted how he had 'the voice and magnetic 
personality to sweep an audience into an emotional frenzy 1
(25).
Lloyd George used his skills to great effect in Woolwich
(26). He 'adopted the principle that implements of peace 
are to be made at the Arsenal' in January 1919 (27). He 
promised a visit to the Arsenal, kept the issue on the boil
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by postponement, having the prices checked and the orders 
confirmed and then having equipment moved to Woolwich from 
the national and foreign factories (28). Geddes said that 
the Arsenal's estimates for various products were cheaper 
than the private sector's, which also increased confidence 
in the town. The Kentish Independent said that the 
situation would deteriorate if he did not visit soon - 'if 
the government do not act the workers may 1 . At this point 
the PM finally visited the Arsenal (29). He inspected the 
alternative work when progress upon it was at its zenith 
with 8,000 people engaged on peaceful production, making 
wagons, medals, penny blanks and locomotives. There was 
enough work to last until the following summer. Another 
5,000 had work for a year doing motor vehicle and wagon 
repairs and producing items for the Admiralty and the Post 
Office. Even then his arrival was stage-managed. Two 
newspapers reported cheering workers, (the official version 
was 'a cordial welcome 1 ), and the CSOF delayed 400 
dismissals from the Fuse Factory and the PM avoided it on 
his tour (30). When the PM announced that the munitions 
stores were destined to move to Banbury with a consequent 
loss of jobs in Woolwich he grandeloquently cried, 'clear 
them out.. I hope we shall never want them again. Clear 
them out and start on railway wagons'. He ostentatiously 
asked the DGF to make a note of the matter, as if the 
latter were unaware of the situation, and went on, 'thank 
God we shall not want guns and shells for the next hundred 
years'. He spent most of his time at the shop known as 
Frog Island observing the work being done for railway 
companies.
Although he unjustly blamed workers, specifically the lack 
of boilermakers, for hampering work at the Arsenal and 
proposed piecework payments, Lloyd George's popularity was 
bolstered and his position strengthened by the visit (31). 
The boilermakers union provided evidence that there were
- 77 -
boilermakers available in order to refute the PM. In 'The 
case for Alternative Work 1 the claim was made of the Fuse 
Factory that 'its range of usefulness is unlimited 1 , but 
although its range was not tested the Fuse Factory shop 
steward, found the PM's visit 'very satisfactory 1 . The 
mainstream press reported that the Arsenal was to be 'a 
great railway centre' (32). The Pioneer scrutinised that 
which was actually said and reported not that the PM had 
promised an 'Arsenal for locomotives' as the Evening 
Standard claimed, but merely a conference of his Ministers
(33). In fact the Ministry of Munitions were concerned at 
the Standard' s erroneous reporting of the PM's remarks. 
The AGC expressed their satisfaction and when they reported 
to the other shop stewards 'an optimistic air prevailed'
(34). This was tempered by the deficit of orders. 'what 
is the use of millions of parts of telephones? A place 
like the Fuse Factory needs trillions and trillions to keep 
it going', argued Voce. The WCC thought that the PM 
provided 'satisfactory promises' and on the strength of 
this paid £50 to the AGC to cover their expenses in 
providing for the PM a document outlining the case for 
alternative work, called 'a well considered scheme' by the 
Times (35). The PM received a municipal dinner which was 
attended by MPs councillors, workers and a WCC 
representative. Lloyd George also featured in a film of 
the visit was shown locally for a week. There was a 
promise of compliance with his outlook - the workers 
pledged to 'justify their claims by turning the experiment 
into a commercial proposition' (36).
Although in November 1918 the Pioneer said, 'the spirit of 
Barnum will not be dead as long as David continues to eat 
leeks', it went on to note, with 'sinister foreboding', 
that he was being reticent about the future and this was 
worrying as normally 'he makes whatever good he does go a 
thundering long way', (37). However, after the visit the
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Pioneer concluded that Lloyd George was 'without doubt 
sympathetic' (38). When it did criticise Lloyd George it 
was for stupidity rather than duplicity. It noted 
'definite promises and pledges were made by the Premier as 
to the attitude of the government in regard to Woolwich. 
These promises and pledges appear to have gone by the 
board' (39). This was because 'the flinty faced men who 
look as though they have done well out of the war... are 
confident that they have found a winner in the true 
demagogue Lloyd George'. Whilst Lloyd George was once a 
radical 'those days have passed. The flinty faced men have 
captured him' (40). The implication was that Lloyd George, 
the embodiment of the liberal state, was neutral and like 
the state he personified, could be captured by the boldest 
forces. Looking back on events in August 1921 the Pioneer 
compared the politics of Coalition to a series of tricks by 
performing animals, with 'entertaining wizardry' by Lloyd 
George. The paper continued, 'the wizard is inclined to 
dress as a prince of peace. Is this wickedness? No it is 
platform politics... A man who acts wrongly we call a 
villain but a man who cannot even carry out what he intends 
to do wrongly we call in plain English a fool'. To the WLP 
politics was about getting the performers in the ring to 
dance to the appropriate tune, it had tried to convince the 
Lloyd George to represent the workers' but he had protected 
the interests of capitalists, it was only the Labour 
politicians who were able to govern (41).
Amongst Lloyd George's colleagues there was a small group, 
including Fisher, Montagu and Addison, who were identified 
by R H Tawney and Beatrice and Sidney Webb in 1917, as the 
basis for a progressive politics of the future. In the 
event 'these expectations did not survive the first six 
months of the Lloyd George coalition 1 (42). Nevertheless 
Addison was an important figure regarding the 'alternative' 
work and, as the most recent historian of the coalition has
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pointed out, a leading reformer in the administration (43). 
Addison was on the wartime Cabinet Reconstruction Committee 
from its formation in 1916, and was appointed first 
Minister of Reconstruction in August 1917. He favoured 
spending in order to aid the economy and almost immediately 
after the Armistice he told his Cabinet colleagues, 'it 
will be no defence to say that vital proposals were not 
enacted for want of money. Nobody will believe it 1 (44).
Addison supported the incorporation of representatives of 
the working class into decision-making bodies in order to 
achieve more harmonious industrial relations (45). In May
1917 Addison told the ASE,
we have gone out of our way to take 
great risks to maintain the authority of 
trade unions... we must deal with the 
orthodox trade union which represents 
the trade collectively... We are 
entitled to ask your trade union... to 
keep you members in hand as much as you 
can... There has been a determined and 
concerted attempt in different parts of 
the country to upset the authority of 
the established unions, we have stood in 
the breach and helped for all we were 
worth (46).
A fortnight later Addison was at what he termed 'the most 
boisterous meeting I ever attended'. It was in Woolwich. 
The person chairing the meeting, Field Marshall Robertson, 
was heckled until he left and it was Jack Mills the chair 
of the shop stewards who 'proved to be a very good man' and 
quietened the meeting. Addison went on to praise Mills 
further for giving a 'faithful' interview to the Daily 
Express in which he stressed the need for 'local autonomy 1 , 
that is power for the shop stewards of the Arsenal (47). 
Both the faithful Mills and Addison became Labour MPs. 
Addison continued to maintain a cordial working 
relationship with the Arsenal shop stewards. In November
1918 Addison received a delegation from the Woolwich shop 
stewards. They impressed on him that work needed to
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provided in Woolwich as they had homes there. They 
accepted that even if work were provided some Arsenal 
workers would lose their jobs. In his diary he noted that, 
'they recognised that it was impossible to continue to give 
employment in Woolwich to the vast numbers who are 
congregated there now 1 . In addition he told them that 'in 
the use of National factories for the provision of public 
requirements, we should make special use of Woolwich* (48). 
This appearance of sympathetic ears in both No 10 and 
additionally in the Cabinet offered considerable hope to 
the 'Peace Arsenal' campaigners. Even if, as Macnamara 
suggested, Lloyd George 'never understood or sympathised 
with the aspirations of the skilled workers', there was 
still Addison (49). Moreover Addison actually implemented 
some of his supportive schemes. He kept those controls of 
'urgent importance such as... construction, locomotive 
building.. 1 and established a Factories Branch of the 
Ministry of Munitions shortly before the Armistice, in 
October 1918, in order to manage those factories which were 
to be kept under control following the Armistice (50).
There were others in the Cabinet with reconstruction plans. 
There were specific proposals for the retention of state 
control of alcohol, transport and milk (51). In addition 
there were plans for central control of government 
supplies. It appeared that as the Arsenal could produce 
churns and locomotives for the state this was much more 
fertile ground for the 'Peace Arsenal' campaigners than 
concentrating on the munitions which the Arsenal actually 
made, as these were not required in such vast numbers in 
peacetime.
In February 1918 Churchill, proposed that the Ministry of 
Munitions in peacetime co-ordinate supplies to the 
Services, organising rational distribution and bulk 
purchases and cutting down on inter-Service competition
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(52). The Chancellor set up a committee under Lord 
Inchcape to consider the contracts of the forces and 
although Inchcape personally attacked the 'wasteful 
interference of the government 1 , this committee favoured a 
Ministry of Supply in its report of March 1918 (53). The 
notion of a Ministry of Supply received praise from the 
Haldane Committee on the machinery of government and the 
Munitions Council Committee on Demobilisation and 
Reconstruction (54). The report of the latter was 
circulated to the Cabinet by Churchill and received a 
favourable response (55). The case for a peacetime 
Arsenal would have been enhanced if there was a Ministry to 
support the idea. Austin Chamberlain and Edwin Montagu 
were supportive of a Ministry of Supply but it met with 
resistance from those Ministries upon whose territories it 
encroached (56). Plans were laid for the 'beating of 
swords into ploughshares by sanctioning the drafting of a 
bill for the conversion of a demobilised Ministry of 
Munitions into a Ministry of Supply 1 (57).
Objections came from the Home Affairs Committee of the 
Cabinet (58). The Admiralty also objected as did Sir 
Alfred Mond at the Office of Works and the Air Force (59). 
In October 1918 the Munitions Council, under Churchill, 
decided that a decision would have to be made at Cabinet 
level regarding he use of state property for peacetime work 
(60). Churchill speculated that national factories might 
be used in peacetime in order to avoid mass unemployment. 
He wanted a guidelines on this matter established (61). 
Controls, Churchill maintained in November 1918 were 
'necessary for some time to come' (62). In response 
Addison and Stephenson Kent, who was in charge of 
demobilisation, suggested some work in state factories to 
secure jobs. Initially, in December 1918, the Cabinet 
decided that commodities required in bulk by the government 
or public bodies could be produced (63). The debate about
- 82 -
utilisation continued into 1919, linked to fears of unrest 
(64). In a study of this period Maurice Cowling stresses 
the extent to which the notion of reconstruction reflected 
fears about social and industrial disturbances (65). 
Minister of Labour Robert Home, (who 'seems to have the 
wind up about everybody 1 according to Lloyd George's 
private secretary), speculated about his Ministry becoming 
a Ministry of Munitions of Peace (66). Chamberlain told
his Cabinet colleagues:
it is far better to run the risk of 
manufacturing commodities which would 
not be required and to resolve them into 
their elements later, than to have 
multitudes in receipt of unemployment 
benefit (67).
There was another way in which fears about unrest aided 
plans for the continued use of Woolwich Arsenal. Supplies 
from Woolwich could be used in the event of a rail dispute. 
During the course of a wage dispute in the London and North 
Western Railway Company the London General management 
informed a deputation of workers that if necessary' the 
government had promised them men who could be sent from 
Woolwich to Crewe works' (68). Brigadier General Saville 
informed the Munitions Council and the Demobilisation 
Board, and Heads of the Supply and Stores Department that 
garrisons ought to be established so as 'to render as 
difficult and to delay as much as possible the offensive 
use of any warlike material that may fall into the hands of 
the evil disposed 1 . He recommended that these garrisons be 
in 'garrison towns', Woolwich being an obvious choice (69). 
In November 1919, shortly before his visit to Woolwich 
Arsenal, the Prime Minister called a Downing Street 
conference of sixteen Ministers including Inverforth the 
Minister of Munitions, and a number of high ranking civil 
servants and army officers attended. It was decided that 
essential stores and a permanent organisation to deal with 
national strikes was required and that the Ministry of
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Munitions would postpone the sale of appropriate stores 
which were owned by the state (70). In preparation for a 
'Triple Alliance 1 (of the MFGB, the NUR and the NTWF) 
strike and also immediately before the decontrol of the 
mines, tanks and lorries used for the transportation of 
tanks were taken from Woolwich (71). Although the 
immediate danger died down, Churchill was still worried 
about supplies in August 1920 (72).
During the course of 1919 the Cabinet maintained that it 
intended to nationalise the mines, the building industry 
and transport. It sanctioned two new ministries, Transport 
and Health (73). Geddes lauded the state operation of the 
railways, and Lord Pirrie praised the success of the 
national shipyards. Even the Treasury resisted a headlong 
rush into decontrol. Opposition to state activity from 
private companies effectively blocked the reconstruction of 
the electricity industry and the transport bill that Eric 
Geddes desired. The Cabinet did not unanimously want to 
adopt a policy of deflation or of a 'return to 1914'. In 
the Cabinet Roberts speculated that if the state 
manufactured there would be problems as 'if you embarked on 
trade you had got to be a monopolist. If the government 
entered into trade, stagnation would remain and 
unemployment would become greater than it was today'. 
Furthermore, whilst the government could take over a whole 
industry and run it as a monopoly, to run only a section of 
an industry 'would miss the advantages both of a monopoly 
and a minimum economic cost of production' (74). Alfred 
Mond thought that a 'timid and halting policy because of 
financial fears seems to me to be the most dangerous line 
of action any government could adopt* (75). At the first 
full Cabinet meeting on the subject of the Ministry of 
Supply, on 9th December 1919, there was very little 
discussion as the Cabinet were discussing the problems of 
Woolwich Arsenal (76).
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At a meeting in March 1920, after cursory reference to the 
supply problem, the bad organisation at the Arsenal was 
discussed at length. Thus one of the administrative moves 
which could have aided the Arsenal campaigners was 
partially blocked because the Cabinet was busy discussing 
another aspect of the Arsenal (77). Churchill then moved 
to the War Office and changed his view to that of the 
service chiefs who did not favour a Ministry of Supply. He 
cited the view of a committee chaired by the Surveyor 
general of the Air Ministry. The Cabinet, except for 
Chamberlain who recorded his formal dissent, ratified the 
recommendations of this report subject to the approval of 
the PM, then in Paris (78). This decision about the 
Ministry of Supply was influenced by civil servants. 
Similarly the Cabinet came to its decision as to the 
whether armaments, and other products required by the 
state, should be manufactured in state run factories, or 
whether these goods should be ordered from private firms 
after civil servants had made their opinions known. Most 
influential amongst these were Treasury officials.
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(h)
Before the war the financial constraints imposed by the 
Treasury determined both the products of, and the number of 
workers employed at, the Arsenal. S/aites argues for the 
novelty of the importance of the post-war monetary policy 
in public finance, but the Treasury was influential before 
the war and, as Wright has shown, had been growing more 
important over the quarter century prior to the war (79). 
The idea that the Treasury had more power than the Commons 
had been expressed as early as 1817 (80). However 
influential the Treasury was before the war, its powers 
waned during the war. After the Armistice, during a period 
of 'unparalleled administrative confusion', it sought to 
regain control (81). In 1919 it largely succeeded (32). 
It went on to greater influence. The interwar period was 
'the Augustan age of the civil service' and central within 
it was the Treasury (83).
From the end of the last century civil servants and 
politicians became 'deeply involved 1 in the resolution of 
industrial disputes. ^n increase in state activity began 
to be widely perceived, in terms of efficiency, security, 
prosperity and health, as desirable (84). Yeo calls this 
'a scramble for socialism as imperialist as the 
contemporary scramble for Africa 1 (85). Joseph Chamberlain
expressed the view that
Now Government is the organised 
expression of the wishes and wants of 
the people... it is our business to 
extend its functions (86).
However, Britain's domination of world trade and overseas 
investment was associated with laissez-faire, and 
intervention was principally to strengthen that notion. 
Both Jonathan Zeitlin and Robert Skidelsky note the 
importance, from at least the 1890s, of the policy of
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balancing government expenditure at the lowest possible 
figure (87). Not only was the Treasury 'deeply committed 
to the laissez faire state' but any alternative meant 
conflict 'and that typically meant defeat 1 for those who 
opposed the Treasury (88).
One of the means by which the Treasury exerted control was 
through ensuring that the budgets of other departments were 
limited. Before the war government accounting was 
relatively simple. There was however an exception. The 
accounts of the Royal Ordnance Factories were detailed and 
annually presented in a Treasury approved format. 
Furthermore the Treasury exerted influence through the 
committee system. In 1900 Sir Francis Mowatt, a permanent 
secretary at the Treasury, was appointed as chair of a 
committee to investigate the output of the Arsenal (89). 
Five years later the permanent administrative secretary to 
the Treasury, Sir G H Murray, chaired the Departmental 
Committee on Government Factories and Workshops (90). The 
These committees were not interested in alternative work, 
but in reducing costs. Trebilcock observes that in the 
period 1890-1914 in most states which were ideologically 
resistant to any public expenditure besides arms 
production, 'the mechanism for transferring funds from 
military to civilian use... was decidedly weak' and 
'ploughshares and swords did not enjoy high changeability* 
(91).
During the war government expenditure rose enormously, 
inflationary deficit financing was introduced, the national 
debt was increased and London's pivotal role in finance was 
overturned (92). The proportion of national income expended 
by the government rose from 8% in 1914 to 50% in 1918. 
Successive Public Accounts Committees criticised the 
financial latitude that the Treasury had accorded high 
spending war-time Ministries and there was criticism from
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the Bradbury Committee on the Organisation and Staffing of 
Government Offices (93). Lloyd George recognised the power 
of the Treasury and emphasised that a new tradition would 
have to be established at the Treasury. 'The men at the 
top were clever men but they were only the more powerfully 
obstructive for their cleverness. They were steeped in the 
Cobden Bright laissez-faire school and that was not 
suitable these days' (94). He wanted to shake up Whitehall 
(95). The Select Committee on National Expenditure, set up 
in July 1917, found that the War Office and the Ministry 
of Munitions were beyond Treasury control because the 
latter was understaffed (96).
After the war the Treasury aimed, in the words of the 
Controller of Finance 'to become the central Department to 
view expenditure as a whole' (97). Under Warren Fisher, 
the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury from October 1919 
(and also the head of the civil service who advised the PM 
on appointments), the emphasis was placed upon central 
control of expenditure and standardisation of accounting 
methods. The new ethos was one whereby officials, and 
ultimately Ministers, perceived themselves as custodians of 
the public purse, with an interest in and responsibility 
for, efficient expenditure (98). In July 1919 the Treasury 
warned that overspending was leading Britain down the road 
to ruin (99). In September 1919 Fisher advised Lloyd 
George that 'war time departments should, I suggest, be 
wound up as soon as possible and not continued... The 
Ministry of Munitions is the most spectacular case for 
abolition 1 (100). This did not preclude some public 
expenditure to increase employment and ease the burden of 
unemployment. There were a variety of public works schemes 
carried through by local authorities including provision 
for civil work in government establishments and road 
building in Woolwich. The Trade Facilities Act, (1921), 
and the Unemployment Insurance Act were passed. However,
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these were considered temporary measures and detrimental to 
the economy. The view that government intervention could 
not aid the economic revival, whilst a return to Gold and a 
reduction in wages could, became more dominant (101). 
Cronin suggests that the reassertion of control was not the 
objective of the Treasury alone, others wanted to limit the 
power of the new Ministries and Liberal Ministers (102). 
Indeed it is the consensus view that by 1919-20 the Bank of 
England and the City as well as the Treasury, favoured a 
reduction in both public expenditure and state activity, 
including long term alternative production at the Arsenal 
(103). Hall and Schwarz do not mention the concept of a 
'Treasury view 1 , which included within it the idea that 
there should be no radical state economic intervention. 
They do, however, refer to the persistence of opponents of 
collectivism. 'Neo-liberalism' was created during the 
period of recomposition which they identify. They define 
its project as 'systematically to contest and where 
possible uproot the political conditions in which 
collectivism flourished... state regulation of the 
market... was inimical in itself'. They refer to this 
strand of liberalism being 'submerged' but the idea of 
trying to reduce the fiscal burden on the state dominated 
the course of the 'Peace Arsenal' campaign (104).
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(c)
The Minister of Munitions had enormous powers of 
expenditure. There was no Treasury control of numbers 
employed at the Ministry (105). In addition the Ministry 
was a symbol of collectivism and as such it was a challenge 
to laissez-faire. Churchill claimed that the Ministry was 
'the greatest argument for state socialism that has been 
produced 1 (106). Even if it 'retarded rather than 
hastened' the spread of state socialism, as the Official 
History of the Ministry of Munitions claimed, it was still 
a potent reminder of state intervention (107). From the 
Treasury's increasingly cogent view, if the expansion of 
the state was to be contained, the Ministry, with its plans 
for a peacetime Ministry of Supply, had to be discredited 
and liquidated. However, others were eager to use the 
Ministry in order to prove that state intervention was 
beneficial.
The 'revolutionary step 1 of creating the Ministry in 1915 
was due to a wartime shortage of munitions. This was 
brought on in part by the fact that the Arsenal had been 
run down prior to the war (108). The new Ministry, headed 
by Lloyd George, was empowered to commandeer plant and to 
supervise the invention, testing, management and 
manufacture of munitions. Munitions included 'every kind 
of work indirectly essential to the needs of war', the flax 
crop, the metal and aircraft industries, clothing, bedding, 
food, drink, chemicals, electrical supplies, transport, 
hospitals and building and ships' requirements (109). In 
1917 the Ministry was responsible for 240 national 
factories, and over 4,000 controlled establishments 
including Woolwich Arsenal (110). By the Armistice the 
Ministry owned 350,000 different types of stores, 
everything 'from sardines to camels', in countries all over
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the world, had an administrative staff of 65,000 and 
employed between 3 and 5 million workers (111). There is 
some dispute as to the exact number employed. Tawney and 
Rubin both suggest that it was around 3,400,000, the Labour 
Party put the figure at 4,500,000 and Churchill placed it 
at 'nearly five million' (112). The junior Minister, 
Worthington Evans, said in the House in April 1918, that it 
was 'the biggest buying, importing, selling, manufacturing 
and distributing business in the world 1 . The Ministry was 
nominally under the control of a Cabinet committee which 
met only once, in 1915. The Ordnance Board of the War 
Office was suspended in December 1915 and in effect the 
Minister, had individual responsibility for spending (113). 
There were five senior Ministers and five junior Ministers 
at the Ministry during its six year lifespan. As the 
'Peace Arsenal' campaigners noted in 1920 'the absence of 
any continuity of control and policy has so far been very 
disadvantageous' (114). There may also have been 
detrimental effects on the efficiency of the Ministry.
Various Ministers claimed that the Ministry reduced costs, 
citing examples of savings made in expenditure upon rifles, 
guns and shells (115). Addison gave evidence to this 
effect to the 1935 Royal Commission on Private Arms. It 
was also argued that the Ministry aided the efficiency of 
many firms by the rationalisation of their accounts. The 
wartime national factories costing systems alone saved £440 
million according to the 1919 Select Committee on National 
Expenditure (116). There was a revolution in cost 
accounting. The Ministry argued that this could be 'an 
immense service in dealing with labour disputes [for] the 
ascertainment of actual facts relating to work and profits 
should remove much of the distrust and misapprehension 
existing between employers and employed' (117).
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However, the chair of the Public Accounts Committee found 
the Ministry accounts to be 'a nightmare 1 , two official 
reports found evidence of gross inefficiency and there were 
reports in The Accountant and The Economist of its 
wastefulness (118). Careful records were kept at Woolwich 
from before the start of the war but depreciation and 
upkeep were charged to the account and current and reserve 
were not kept separate but totalled and debited to current 
items. Records elsewhere were inaccurate and thus 
definitive criticism of other establishments were less 
easily sustained. The high capital cost of the Arsenal, 
due to the antiquated layout of the workshops, was used as 
evidence of its inefficiency. Raven, the CSOF from 1915 to 
1917, thought Woolwich 'altogether about the worst place 
that you could have a factory 1 (119). Sir Reginald Bacon, 
an Admiral and Managing Director of Coventry Ordnance 
Works, who sat on the McKinnon Wood Committee claimed that 
'it is a case of robbing the Admiralty to pay for the 
reserve machinery for the Army 1 . His conclusion was that 
it was 'practically impossible for a government factory to 
take up commercial business and that Woolwich failed to 
keep a check on the prices of Vickers and Armstrongs' 
(120).
The Times denounced the 'vague megalomania' which 
perpetuated the 'huge and acquisitive departments', of the 
government. It published the accusations of waste of an 
Australian engineer who had worked at the Arsenal (121). 
'Now that the Middle Class Union has started, let us have a 
Muddle Class Union, for the mutual protection of our 
Controllers and other war time bureaucrats' suggested the 
Star (122). The Economist held that prosperity required 
that the nation cease 'to pay people for putting 
difficulties in the way of private enterprise' (123). 
Almost every edition of the Economist for 1919 contained 
complaints against extravagant government spending. The
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May edition was explicitly opposed to the Ministry of 
Munitions and called for the greater Treasury control which 
occurred that month. G E Raine's The Nationalisation Peril 
(1920) gave the Ministry as an example of the inefficiency 
of state enterprise. The Times the Economist and Raine 
also mentioned the national ship yards at Chepstow, 
Beachley and Portbury (124). State ownership was 
considered to be an uneconomic throwback to mercantilism. 
During the three years of the existence of the national 
ship yards only two ships were produced (125). Nothing was 
said about how between 1889 and 1914 the state was the 
largest employer in shipbuilding, (employing over a quarter 
of all workers by 1914), with no recognised unions and very 
little industrial turmoil, when there was much in the 
private sector (126). The Admiralty argued that if 
mercantile ship hulls were built in the Royal Dockyards
then this would
seriously interfere with the balance of 
trades in HM Dockyards and entail 
further discharges of men (127).
The Admiralty would build merchant ships only if the trade 
unions waived demarcation rules and this the union members 
voted not to do (128). By early 1919 the yards which were 
still not completed, had cost £4 million. A little 
alternative work, the construction of a housing scheme, was 
done at Chepstow but soon the yards were dormant. The 
yards were offered to the unions and the shipbuilding 
magnates after the war but the offers were rejected (129). 
Eventually after £6 million had been spent on them the 
yards were sold for £600,000. In the face of such fiscal 
ineptitude the idea that the Royal Dockyards, part of the 
Arsenal, could be used for boat building, as the 
campaigners suggested, was unrealistic. Lloyd George 
denounced the press campaign as 'a kind of epileptic 
screaming 1 , but Woolwich, so close to Fleet Street was 
still vulnerable. Well-publicised scandals, gave the case 
for the continued use of the state Arsenal bad publicity
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through guilt by association. As Inverforth the Ministry 
of Supply, said of the Arsenal, 'of the Ministry's 
administration no part is likely to give more trouble or be 
more open to public criticism' (130).
In addition to being considered wasteful the Ministry was 
established for a period not exceeding twelve months after 
the conclusion of the war. Tawney argues that as the
'doctrineless collectivism 1 of the war was
not accompanied by any intellectual 
conversion... each addition... was 
brought into existence without the 
merits or demerits of state intervention 
being even discussed... it did not last 
long enough to change social habits 
(131).
It was sometimes the case that decisions regarding 
decontrol mirrored wartime regulation and were not taken as 
the result of pre-determined principle. However, the 
initial lack of a firm anti-interventionalist ideology also 
meant that some aspects of the state's role were maintained 
and that abolition was not always straightforward (132). 
That which Churchill, in August 1916, called 'war 
socialism' was followed by the establishment of post-war 
Ministries of Transport and of Health, state financial 
arbitration through the Industrial Courts Act and the 
Housing and Town Planning Act (133). The Wages (Temporary 
Regulation) Act was also evidence that, that the state 
could not easily be reduced in size and that support for it 
was not merely the province of the left (134). One
contemporary, J E Wrench, recalled that in 1918
government control was so much part of 
our lives that we found it difficult to 
jump back in our minds to the pre-war 
world... I was convinced that we were 
about to witness the greatest 
constructive job of social reform (135).
The Ministry proposed that it be given a peacetime role. A 
reconstruction committee of the Cabinet was established in
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March 1916. The use of munitions factories for civilian 
purposes and the continued central control of the railways 
were on the first agenda (136). The committee grew in size 
and importance and in 1917 a subcommittee, the Civil War 
Workers Demobilisation Committee, (CWWDC) was set up (137). 
In early 1918 due to a cancellation of orders from Russia 
and a shortage of supplies, a number of Ministry of 
Munitions workers were laid off in a summary and 
disorganised fashion. Addison, the Minister, accepted the 
validity of CWWDC proposals of aid to discharged workers 
and the use of national factories by the government to 
sustain employment after the war. He advocated that the 
government requirements be made at the national factories 
to help ease the problem of unemployment (138). In 
November 1918 Addison, then Minister of Reconstruction, met 
a deputation from Woolwich Arsenal and gave a clear 
impression that matters were progressing in ways which won 
the approval of the 'Peace Arsenal 1 campaigners. He 
established 260 local demobilisation committees for the 
three million men in the Services. He also made 
unemployment insurance non-contributory and promised a 
Ministry of Supply. On the conversion of factories he 
cautiously suggested that it might prove to be 'not a 
matter of days but of months' (139). Addison and 
Churchill, who took over at the Ministry of Munitions, were 
authorised by the Cabinet to prepare schemes for using 
national factories on public peacetime requirements. Sir 
James Stevenson, a Ministry of Munitions official later to 
chair a committee on the Arsenal, proposed that 'the 
quickest way to transform the munitions factories into 
producing peace articles was to discharge the workers now 1 
(140).
By the end of 1918 80% of Ministry of Munitions contracts 
had terminated and as millions of workers left its 
employment its power diminished (141). Further powers were
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relinquished when controls on strikes and compulsory 
arbitration was abandoned. By May 1920 over 3 million 
munition worker had been released and by June 1920, though 
it still had £300 million worth of goods, 83% of all its 
surplus products had been sold (142). The Cabinet decision 
in early 1919 that state factories could only produce for 
the state and then only if there were no private 
competitors for the contracts was contested by the Ministry 
of Munitions. In addition, according to one official, 
fifteen million yards of Irish cotton for which the 
Ministry of Munitions had no use were ordered after the 
contracts for the north of Ireland linen workers had been 
cancelled 'through the instrumentality of Sir E Carson 1 
(143). In March 1919 there was correspondence at some 
length on the subject of official policy regarding 
government mills making caseboards. These mills could 
either be converted or sold. Although the Cabinet's 
refusal to employ workers at the Royal Dockyards in October 
1919 has been seen as 'the first clear case of an explicit 
refusal to sacrifice economy to employment', in fact the 
question of unemployment was raised in the case of the 
caseboards but it was overridden because economy was deemed 
to be of more importance and because of a fear of probable 
criticism from the private manufacturers (144). No 
evidence of such criticism survives (145).
There was a market for state produced goods as the 
announcement in the press of the sale of refurbished ex- 
Government products led to the gathering of huge crowds
(146). The sale of what even the Daily Mail called war 
bargains was called 'a shameful thing 1 by a former Ministry 
official, Sir L C Money. He thought that the government's 
'deliberate purpose is to avoid reconstruction... after the 
greatest war in all history, the greatest bargain sales'
(147). However there were constraints on further state 
production at the Arsenal. The Canadians wanted British
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government orders for house building materials, even though 
such goods could be produced at the Arsenal (148). The 
Arsenal could also produce boots. The government had 
promised to purchase Indian Tanned kips up until the end of 
June 1919. It had by that date acquired about four years 
supply, 120,000 kips, at the 1914 rate of consumption. 
These kips were only good for boots and there were huge 
stocks of both commodities. In the circumstances, although 
there was an apparent need to increase boot production, and 
although the trade found that its wartime relationship with 
the state had been of value, the ability of Woolwich to 
produce boots was of little value (149).
The Kentish Independent noted 'From peace to war was swift 
and comparatively easy because it was controlled and 
directed by the government, but from war to peace is a 
matter of private enterprise and it looks as though the 
provision of work for all is going to be a slow business 1 
(150). In fact many private factories were converted or 
extended for war production and then swiftly reconverted 
following the Armistice. Some others, such as a brand new 
national factory in Burton-on-Trent, were built by the 
state but sold to and converted by private firms. That one 
became a Branston Pickle factory run by Crosse and 
Blackwell. Diversification by private firms outside 
Britain appeared to be straightforward. Krupps, the great 
German munitions concern, gained control of six large 
manufacturers during the twelve months immediately after 
the war. By 1920 they were able to employ more staff so 
that in the first quarter of 1920 the number of employees 
rose by 71% to 45,000. The Pioneer asked, 'would it be 
unpatriotic to suggest that the Arsenal, under a sane 
Government, could do something similar?' (151). The 
Cabinet did not conceptualise sanity in such terms. 
Instead it recognised the ease of conversion and concluded 
that there was a reduced need for a peacetime Arsenal. A
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year later the Pioneer again mentioned the 'transformation 
of Krupps' and detailed how, at the cast steel works at 
Essen, locomotive engines and wagons were being repaired 
and manufactured. 5,000 workers were employed in the 
construction of 500 locomotives and 2,500 wagons. The firm 
also converted to making motor vehicles, agricultural 
machinery and machines for the paper and textile industries 
(152). Snell, the MP for Woolwich East drew attention to 
this in his maiden speech but the comparison was not 
recognised as valid (153).
The campaign for alternative work at the Arsenal was 
sparked off not by Addison, Churchill or by the 
machinations of the Treasury but by the establishment of a 
committee. In early March 1918, the Munitions Council 
Committee on the Control of Woolwich Arsenal recommended to 
the Minister of Munitions that a committee of enquiry into 
the post-war role of the state factories be established 
(154). Later in March the Council Committee on 
Demobilisation and Reconstruction put forward the view, to 
the Ministry, that Woolwich Arsenal should be considered 
separately, that it stood 'by itself...by reason of its 
historical pre-eminence among the national arsenals' (155). 
By the end of March the Ministry had produced a report on 
the capacity of government owned munitions works. This 
drew attention to The special case of Woolwich Arsenal and 
proposed that 'special steps be taken to provide work for 
Woolwich 1 (156). In July 1918 a Committee of Enquiry was 
appointed with a brief to propose solutions for the post 
war fate of the Arsenal. It was chaired by the Liberal MP 
Thomas M°Kinnon Wood and comprised of a number of 
businessmen, civil servants and politicians, including Will 
Thorne and William Adamson (157). Sir Kingsley Wood, who 
by the end of the year was the Conservative MP for West 
Woolwich, suggested that the terms of reference of the 
McKinnon Wood Committee did not permit comparisons to be
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made between the private sector and the state munitions 
industry as the 'influential 1 Pioneer had argued. The 
Pioneer found this analysis 'superficial' (158). Sir 
Kingsley's support for the 'Peace Arsenal 1 campaign was not 
as fervent as that of Labour MPs. However, in April 1919 
he said that he favoured a minimum of 20.000 Arsenal 
workers and in May 1919 he looked forward 'with pleasure 
and gratification to co-operating with various 
organisations [in achieving] a great peace arsenal' (159).
The M°Kinnon Wood committee produced two interim reports 
shortly after the Armistice (160). The McKinnon Wood 
committee touched upon the subject of civil work but a 
handwritten footnote to the second interim report made it
clear that
we do not feel that it is within our 
province to put forward detailed 
suggestions as to the nature of such 
[non-munitions] work. We are glad 
however to learn that the question is 
already enjoying the serious attention 
of the Ministry (161).
The two Labour MPs who sat on the McKinnon Wood committee 
argued for alternative work for the Arsenal, but did not 
do attend meetings as assiduously as other committee 
members. For example, of the fourteen engineering sub- 
committee meetings Admiral Bacon attended on every 
occasion, Admiral Peirse thirteen times and Adamson turned 
up once (162). When the final report was submitted in 
March 1919 the two Labour MPs produced a series of 
reservations. The majority favoured an Arsenal with a 
reduced workforce run on business lines by a Managing 
Director. Adamson and Thorne felt that the workforce had 
not been consulted sufficiently with the regard to the 
proposed reorganisation of the Arsenal. They also felt
that the Royal Arsenal
should be used for the production and 
repair of such things as railway rolling 
stock, transport requisites and articles 
and appliances required in connection
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with municipal and electrical 
undertakings (163).
These, previously unrevealed, 'vast proposals' irritated 
M°Kinnon Wood but he did not pursue the matter (164). 
McKinnon Wood felt that the case for the Arsenal being 
retained was 'overwhelming' as research and development 
were better kept secret at a government establishment and 
as repair work was 'better undertaken under government 
control'.
The committee drew attention, once again, to the 
administrative structure of the Arsenal. This had long 
been considered a burden. In 1898 the Director General of 
the Ordnance Factories, William Anderson mentioned the 
'confusion and extravagance' and in 1910 an inquiry headed 
by Gracie mentioned the costly and 'elaborate system'. 
Although Addison twice described Donaldson as the Director 
of Woolwich Arsenal* he never had the same status as a 
Managing Director (165). A Managing Director was never 
appointed but in 1920 industrial magnate Holberry Mensworth 
was appointed DGF and thus ended two centuries of military 
command at the Arsenal. Even he was unable to control 
production as a commercial Manager might have done. In the 
face of demand the Arsenal was forbidden to produce certain 
items (166). According to Philip Noel Baker the M°Kinnon 
Wood committee 'had greater collective experience of the 
problem than any other body of men who have ever considered 
it' and it produced a study 'without equal authority 1 
(167). However, many of the recommendations were not 
implemented (168). Also the committee never completed work 
on its original brief in that it did not investigate 
Waltham Abbey and Enfield as well as Woolwich (169).
The Cabinet decided, after the Peace Treaty was signed, 
that there was no need for state armaments production, that 
foreign sales would be discouraged and that there would be
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no major war for a decade (170). There was, discounting 
the USA, no major external power strong enough to pose a 
military threat and there were social and economic reasons 
for a running-down of munitions production. The army and 
war preparation were unpopular. In Woolwich the officers 
at 'The Shop 1 (the RMA) withdrew into 'self-conscious 
isolation*. In Woolwich the most important subject taught 
was horse riding and there was a proposal to return to 
wearing traditional red coats. Bond has likened the 
atmosphere to that after a bad dream to be swiftly 
forgotten and another military historian, Connell, wrote of 
how 'a naive pacifism was preached in schools, 
universities, cathedral pulpits and the Press 1 during the 
post war period and how it was taken for granted 'that 
Regular officers were as bloodthirsty as they were 
cretinous'. There was a fall in the number of candidates 
for Woolwich and a reduction in the army vote was 
electorally and economically sound (171). As McKinnon Wood 
pointed out 'the real reserve for war is in the whole of 
the manufacturing reserve of the country which has been 
educated in the supply of armaments' (172). The employers 
journal, Engineering, used the peace treaties as a cudgel
with which to beat the Arsenal.
In peace Woolwich has been a source of 
trouble... It is the same today. The 
Government scheme to build locomotives 
and wagons there is intended to bolster 
a sick borough... Have we any real faith 
in the League of Nations? If we have we 
need not fear to tackle the Woolwich 
question on bolder lines.. (173).
The Pioneer argued that whilst the objective of a reduction 
in arms production was of value the 'sudden and 
indiscriminate sweep regardless of the different importance 
of the services is the worst possible way (174). In this 
respect the 'Peace Arsenal' campaign situated itself within 
this post-war pacific paradigm rather than seeking to 
construct a new alliance which specifically privileged
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workers. In doing this the campaign further bolstered the 
ideas of legitimacy and consensus.
The McKinnon Wood committee expected that all armaments 
would be produced in government factories, 'the country 
will insist on the production of all armaments being 
confined to Government factories' (175). This assumption 
was shared by the British Empire delegation to the 
Washington Conference on naval armaments limitations of 
1921-2. Wester Wemyss, the First Sea Lord during the war, 
advocated a policy of government control of armaments
production
the interrelation between foreign and 
home trade in armaments is one of the 
most subtle and dangerous feature of the 
present system of production. The evil 
is intensified by the existence of 
international armaments rings...so long 
as this subterranean conspiracy against 
peace is allowed to continue the 
possibility of any serious concerted 
reduction in armaments will be remote 
(176).
Lloyd George recalled that at the Versailles Peace 
Conference 'there was a feeling... that Krupps had had a 
pernicious influence upon the war spirit in Germany, and 
had stirred up a great deal for their own ends... There was 
not one there who would not agree that if you wanted to 
preserve peace in the world you must eliminate the idea of 
profit of great and powerful interests in the manufacture 
of armaments'. Sir Kingsley Wood also suggested that the 
future of the Arsenal would be decided at the Peace 
Conference (177). Even if it did not directly affect 
government policy, that Lloyd George spent so much time in 
Versailles was of significance for those who were left to 
domestic considerations.
The League of Nations agreed a Covenant which included the
following paragraph:
The members of the League agree that the
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manufacture by private enterprise of 
munitions and implements of war is open 
to grave objections. The Council shall 
advise on how the evil effects attendant 
upon such manufacture can be prevented 
(178).
The League created a Temporary Mixed Commission to prepare 
details. A sub-committee of this produced a report in 
1921. It contained six points about the 'grave 
objections'. These included the propositions that armament 
firms fomented wars, bribed officials, disseminated false 
information and organised trusts and rings (179).
A standing advisory committee was established to advise on 
the implementation of the McKinnon Wood proposals. This, 
Standing Advisory Committee on the Royal Ordnance Factories 
was known as the Woolwich Advisory Committee, (WAC) and was 
chaired by Benjamin Johnson. It met eight times between 
July 1919 and March 1920 in order to discuss four 
interrelated issues; the appointment of a Managing 
Director, the removal of dangerous explosives from 
Woolwich, the need for a change in lay-out; and alternative 
work. It received monthly reports from Woolwich. Adamson 
used his position on the committee to approach the PM at 
least three times on the issue of alternative work (180). 
The committee also passed a resolution favouring Woolwich 
having the first refusal on government contracts and it 
wanted 'the expenditure of the sum of several million 
pounds during the course of the next five years'. The 
committee wanted a clear Cabinet statement on the fate of 
Woolwich Arsenal and Adamson threatened resignation. 
Although there was no recorded response made to this 
Adamson did not resign.
Another committee, chaired by Sir Frederick Nathan, 
considered the issue of the safe storage of explosives 
(181). William Adamson, apparently undaunted by the cool
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reception of his proposals by the main body of the Mc Kinnon 
Wood committee, sat on the WAG. He produced a list of 
items that could be produced at the Arsenal without 
competition with British firms. A third committee chaired 
by Sir James Stevenson, considered the feasibility of 
moving the manufacturing functions of the Woolwich Arsenal 
elsewhere to a locality 'less exposed to attack from the 
air and better situated from a point of view of material 
and power, or in particular the private trader 1 . The 
committee also had to ensure that supplies would be 
adequate in the event of war and to consider the 
possibilities of the use of part of the Arsenal's space for 
private manufacture.
The Cabinet also received advise on the future of the 
Arsenal from the Geddes Committee, established in 1922 to 
propose how to make £100 million worth of cuts. Eric 
Geddes was a businessman who was appointed to be the 
wartime First Lord of the Admiralty. He was one of a 
number of businessmen who campaigned for both a publicly 
owned electricity supply and a Ministry for communications 
control. In December 1919 he drew attention to the change 
in the political climate which left public production and 
control out in the cold. He proposed that unemployed 
demobilised men be employed to produce railway wagons at 
Woolwich Arsenal, 'that was probably the best thing to do 1 . 
He met a storm of abuse from the private sector because he 
discovered 'everybody wanted to get rid of control 1 (182). 
He did not repeat this political error. In 1922 he had 
come to the conclusion that about half the cuts should be 
made from the army and navy and these should include the 
reduction of the Arsenal to 8,000 workers (183). This view 
of this committee was accorded more weight than that of the 
minority, amongst others Bevin, Sidney Webb, J A Hobson and 
W H Watkins who sat on the government committee on Trusts. 
They argued that concentrated large firms such as the arms
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manufacturer Vickers ought to be nationalised and that 
fragmented, inefficient industries would benefit from such 
action. The influence of the numerous committees whose 
briefs included considerations which affected the future of 
the Arsenal varied enormously. As the Pioneer suggested in 
July 1922 the Cabinet based its decisions on the criteria 
that until a committee produced conclusions which suited 
the private producers the government would ignore the 
findings (184).
In 1919 there were widespread calls for central 
organisation of trade and industry. There were also 
powerful voices within the private sector calling for a 
reduced role for the state. In 1915 the British Engineers 
Association demanded post-war decontrol. However, it also 
wanted better technical education and a Ministry of 
Industry (185). Although Sidney Pollard suggests that 'by 
the middle of 1922 virtually the whole machinery of 
government control was disbanded 1 , it was also the case 
that the post-war settlement included a role for state 
control of industry and transport in the nineteen twenties 
(186). The corporate economy developed unobtrusively. 
The Sun Insurance Co was used to cover the state rescue of 
Armstrong Whitworth and the Bank of England established an 
internal department, the Securities Management Trust to aid 
the reconstruction of the steel industry (187). The state 
was instrumental in the amalgamation of rail, 1921, 
airways, 1924, and electricity with the formation of the 
Central Electricity Board in 1926. It was also involved in 
the running of the British Broadcasting Company, which was 
incorporated in the same year. The British Dyestuffs 
Corporation was established by the state in 1918 and eight 
years later the state had a role in its amalgamation with 
other companies to form a large company with major arms 
interests, ICI. After the war Armstrong's received direct 
government financial aid and in 1924 Vickers received a
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government subsidy. In 1927 Armstrong Whitworth and 
Vickers were merged at the instigation of the government. 
They became part of the English Steel Corporation in 1929
(188). There was government intervention in the economy, 
but it was covert. Schwarz, drawing attention to this 
paradox, argues that 'there was an element of subterfuge 1 
and that 'it was remarkable that a bureaucratic and managed 
economy could be legitimated in this way. The fact that it 
could may highlight the peculiar forms of the transition'
(189). It also highlights that state production at the 
Arsenal, under Ministry of Munitions direction, was too 
overt and that private companies wanted a different form of 
corporate economy.
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(d)
Until the mid-Victorian era armaments supplies for the 
British army were, said Newbold in 1916, sufficiently 
'unimportant as to be allowed to remain a Woolwich and 
Enfield preserve 1 . Then in 1856 the companies which 
provided the shells for the Baltic Tleet charged £100,000 
more than the shells would have cost if they had been 
produced in Woolwich. 'From that day to this', the Pioneer 
reported in 1922, 'the Royal Arsenal has had to resist the 
machinations of the powerful Armaments firms' (190). 
Newbold argued that for 'for a whole generation* the arms 
companies had tried with 'unrelenting endeavour to reduce 
Woolwich Arsenal, to close down Sparkbrook and to injure 
Enfield and Waltham Abbey' (191). This theme was developed 
in the wake of the Boer War. Woolwich Labour mayor Gilbert
Slater wrote;
local energies were exhausted in vain 
protests and fruitless efforts to make 
the public understand that the Arsenal 
was being crippled not in the interests 
of the reduction of armaments, or of 
economy or efficiency, but merely to 
enhance the prosperity of the private 
munitions industry, the very existence 
of which is a potent factor tending to 
war (192).
When numbers employed at the Arsenal dropped from 26,000 
down to 8,000 workers, well below the pre-Boer War figure 
of 15,000, the WLP placed the blame for the redundancies on 
'the work of the Munitioneers'. It urged Woolwich workers 
to take up the issue of orders going to the private sector 
with their MP (193). The mayor blamed 'the pressure of 
private interests'. Munitioneers were 'certain employers' 
who wanted bigger profits and disliked strong unions. The 
notion of profit-making itself was not scorned, only the 
rogue employers who wanted the Arsenal reduced to being a 
'minimum establishment'. The Pioneer pointed out it was
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the job of directors and managers to make profits, 'Do you 
blame them? 1 (194).
The solution to the problem of the private manufacture of 
armament lay in tighter government control of the 
diminished and tarnished, munitions trade (195). The 
Pioneer in September 1919 argued that armaments production 
should be 'national and free from any inducement to 
artificial inflation'. The newspaper also referred to the 
case of H H Mulliner. He was the managing director of 
Coventry Ordnance Co and in 1909 he convinced the Cabinet 
that Krupps was building ships in order to enlarge the 
German navy and that therefore Britain ought to build more
Dreadnoughts. This tale has frequently been reproduced as 
evidence of the promotion of war for private gain. It 
appears in a number of other contemporary and modern 
sources as well (196). In 1922 the Labour parliamentary 
candidate for West Woolwich railed against the hard faced 
Tories with their fatuous foreign policy and their support 
of the Armament Ring (197). Moderate Reform Councillor 
Dawson, said that there was a need for a Britain to have 
arms in case the League of Nations failed, but that there 
was no need to pile up armaments upon armaments as this was 
to produce war as history had shown in recent years,and 
they were not prepared to do that (198).
The campaign appealed for peace, or in the event of war, 
efficient warfare. 'Our case against the Armament Ring 
[is] that while it intrigues and manoeuvres make for a war, 
they make also for defeat in war 1 declared the Pioneer. In 
block capitals it proclaimed that 'Woolwich Arsenal is your 
property 1 . It rhetorically asked, 'Shall what Munitions 
of War that are manufactured be manufactured in National 
Workshops or by capitalist profit-seeking firms? If you 
decide 'National Workshops' your answer leads to Peace: if 
'Private firms' your answer leads to War'. It was made
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clear that 'unbiassed and patriotic men and women 1 could 
only come to one conclusion, that munitions manufacture by 
private companies was 'the root of militarism' (199). The 
Conservatives were linked with 'the arms ring', the Labour 
Party with public ownership and peace (200).
The employers in the private munitions industry exerted 
their influence in order to undermine the Arsenal because 
they wished to counter the power of the unions, gain secure 
and profitable orders, use their expensive plant and not be 
compared to a producer outside their cartel (201). The 
Pioneer complained that 'the Rings and Trusts squeeze us at 
every turn' (202). The Arsenal was potentially a means by 
which comparisons might be made and a check, independent of 
the private companies, might be kept on costs and profit 
margins. As the Pioneer said of the 'Munitioneers', 'that 
costs should be ascertained in national workshops and used 
as a test for purchases from private firms does not meet 
with their approval 1 (203).
The private armaments companies perceived that a 
strengthening of the private sector meant a weakening of 
the organised workers in the public sector. It was the 
armaments firms which were central to the employers' 
offensive against the workers in the lockouts of 1897 and 
1922. On both these occasion the Arsenal workers were not 
directly involved in the disputes but acted as thorns in 
the side of the employers. Private firms were opposed to 
the existence of strong unions and felt that the engineers 
of Woolwich needed to be reduced in status. Just as it was 
convenient not to have any easy means of making comparisons 
about the size of profits so the efficiency of the workers 
in the private sector could not be so easily scrutinised if 
there was no major state armaments production. In the 
engineering industry the distinction between the skilled 
and the general workers was maintained into the 20th
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century. The former, the 'Labour Aristocrats' of the ASE 
received better pay, were in the largest and wealthiest 
(until the 1897-8 lockout) union, and enjoyed greater 
respect than the labourer. However new technology was used 
as a means to undermine the position of the skilled men. 
As Eric Hobsbawm noted of the distinction between the 
artisanate and other workers, 'every industrial and 
technical change tended, on the whole, to increase its 
unreality 1 (204). In the 1890s foreign competition, the 
invention of high speed steel, the use of new production 
methods in the new branches of engineering, the 
concentration of industry, specialisation by firms and 
standardisation of articles produced, reduced the need for 
versatile workers and machinery and increased the incentive 
to introduce of new technology. A company which did not 
innovate was at a disadvantage to one which did and workers 
in the ASE were 'deskilled 1 by employers introduction of 
specialised and accurate machine tools.
The strength of the union was further eroded by the 
formation in 1896, of the EFEA, an organisation designed to 
represent the employers, (it went through a number of 
titles but after 1899 it was the Engineering Employers 
Federation, EEF, and henceforth it will be referred to as 
such). The employers were determined to stop trade union 
interference with their prerogatives about new machinery, 
overtime, apprentices, and payment by piece or time rates. 
There was also a concern about the socialist revival. The 
48 hour week, instead of 56 hours, had begun to be 
introduced during the 1890s. Thames Shipbuilding Co 
introduced it in 1892, the War Office in 1894 followed by 
the Admiralty, the Post Office and a number of private 
firms, around the country. In May 1897 the ASE ceased 
overtime in protest at not getting a reduction in hours. 
At that time 159 London firms had conceded the 48 week and 
the union felt that the lockout was designed to 'cripple
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the ASE 1 (205). Around 91,500 workers were locked out from 
July 1897 until January 1898. EEF President, Lt Colonel 
Henry C S Dyer of Armstrong's, had been in the Royal 
Artillery and had worked as a superintendent at the Royal 
Small Arms Factory, Enfield. He 'conducted the struggle 
like a military campaign 1 (206).
The EEF demanded that employers be free to choose who they 
wished to work machines, whilst the union wanted to have 
some tasks reserved for those designated as 'skilled'. 
Dyer held that the ASE provoked the dispute on this issue 
in order to avoid the 'machine question 1 and to gain public 
sympathy. Certainly when the workers returned the Terms of 
Settlement made clear that machines had been an issue, and 
that the ASE had lost. Mechanisation continued from 1897 
at an uneven pace. New machinery was expensive and its 
introduction was liable to embitter industrial relations. 
One of the areas where the most rapid mechanisation went on 
was arms manufacture. It was the 'arms ring' which had 
spawned the EEF and which most wanted to destroy trade 
unionism which it perceived as the greatest inhibitor of 
the development of new production methods (207).
Although the 1897 EEF Terms were not binding upon the 
Arsenal ASE which had not been involved directly in the 
dispute and was run by the War Office anyway, the clash of 
interests was apparent. Arsenal workers formed the WLP in 
response to the 1897 dispute (208). Prominent in the 1897 
ASE campaign was Alfred Sellicks (Chair) and George Barnes 
(General Secretary). Both had worked at the Arsenal. 
Sellicks was a founder of Erith branch of the RAGS and 
later a national chair of the ASE (209). The Arsenal 
workers collected food and money for their fellow workers. 
Their weekly levies 'were one of the greatest difficulties 
of the Federation [the EEF] in beating down the men' 
(210). Dyer promised to turn the Arsenal into a repair
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shop, a threat remembered in Woolwich for at least 25 years 
and recalled again after the Second World War (211). A 
further reason for wishing to reduce the status of the 
Arsenal was that if it might act as a model for state 
production. Barefoot implied that the government was a 
good employer when he wrote that those who had spent a life 
time in the Arsenal were 'totally unsuited... for the 
competitive nature of outside work 1 (212).
Companies were eager for the security resultant from large 
arms contracts with the government. British firms, being 
squeezed in other areas by foreign competitors, turned to 
arms production. Government contracts removed the risk 
from mass production and gradually more orders went to 
private firms. 35% in the 1880s, then after the 1889 Naval 
Defence Act it became the custom to divide work equally 
between state and private yards (213). 46% of orders went 
to private firms in the 1890s, and an average of 59% during 
the first decade of this century (214). The absolute 
amount spent on private contracts increased as well. 
Defence spending had a high profile throughout the 19th 
century as it was the second largest item of government 
expenditure, behind only transfer payments of which debt 
charges were the main constituent. From 1885 it was the 
largest item on any reckoning and by 1913 it constituted 
between 35 and 39% of the total government expenditure 
(215).
The annual average British defence expenditure 1895-98 was 
£38.8m this rose to 68.4m during the period 1910-13 (216). 
Between those two periods there was the Boer War when the 
size of the defence budget grew, to over £250 million. The 
Arsenal increased output by working seven days a week three 
shifts a day and by the addition of £500,000 worth of 
equipment (217). The Boer War motivated private firms to 
increase their productive capacity for munitions and to
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become more deeply committed to armaments production. 
Between 1897 and 1914, the second largest armaments 
company, Armstrong's, consistently devoted around 90% of 
the resources of the company to the production of 
armaments. In March 1895 75% of the contracts for gun 
mountings went to Armstrong's at Elswick. Armstrong's 
profits grew, 15% return in 1898, 20% in 1899 and 1900 as 
the Boer War boosted output, and then 15% annually between 
1902 and 1907, dipping to 10% 1908 - 1910 and then picking 
up again immediately prior to the war (218). Armstrong's 
Motor Car Department never returned more than 10% and was 
generally a heavy loss maker, while a ring of armour 
plating companies, of which Armstrong's was one, kept the 
price up to £115 per ton rather than the £40 a ton it might 
otherwise have been. In 1920 there were 550,000 motor 
vehicles on the roads of Britain, and 952,000 by 1922 and 
there were very few orders for gunboats. Before the war, 
however, as the chair of Armstrong's noted, there was more 
money to be made building one river boat than 6,000 cars 
annually (219). By 1900 Vickers, the premier private 
armourer in the country, had a productive capacity in guns 
equal to that of Woolwich Arsenal and a strong incentive 
decrease state arms production (220). Marder has argued 
that 'Woolwich was crippled beginning with the Boer War 1 
(221). In 1901 the Arsenal received around £3.5million 
worth of orders, against £11.3 million worth which went to 
private firms. This division was the pattern for the next 
few years (222) .
Once expensive plant had been laid down it was important to 
use it. The need to be able to fulfil large, accurate 
standardised orders and to frequently change the pace of 
production and the product required expensive equipment. 
This was a relatively new problem. In his work on the 
history of the armaments company Imperial Chemical 
Industries Reader dates the application of industrial
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technology to warlike purposes on a large scale from around 
1885 (223). In 1902 Vickers which owned sites near 
Woolwich at Crayford, Erith and Dartford, was 'starving for 
orders' and 'on our beam ends' (224). By the end of 1903 
some 616 of the 1,508 gunmaking machines at Erith were idle 
and in 1906 Dickers reduced its plant capacity at Erith. 
In 1907 the Army Council decided to give the Ordnance 
Factories the pick of the few orders that were issued 
(225). In 1908, 'a thundering bad year' for the company, 
skilled workers from Erith and Crayford left to work in the 
expanding London automobile industry. 30% of the orders 
went to the private sector that year (226). In such 
circumstances the private firms became determined to secure 
the few orders for munitions that were available.
To demand from the laissez-faire government that it place 
its orders with private companies rather than at that 
product of the mercantilist era, the Arsenal, was to push 
at an unlocked door. There was an established idea of 
Commons control of military expenditure and the government 
wanted to reduce costs (227). Lord Stuart Rendel noted 
that 'Army and Navy Ministers have perambulated the country 
and given... open exhortation and encouragement to the 
creation of new and distinct sources of private supply' 
(228). In 1895 Campbell-Bannerman, the Liberal War 
Minister argued for £60,000 worth of orders to go to the 
Arsenal rather than the private sector because to dismiss 
men from the Arsenal 'would bring discredit on the 
government, cause the enemy to exult, and play into the 
hands of the Independent Labour Party'. At the same time 
Sir Andrew Nobel and Lord Armstrong 'vehemently accused the 
Admiralty of giving an undue proportion of orders to the 
Ordnance Factories to the great detriment of the private 
trade of this country 1 . Lord Rendel argued that 'the 
efficiency of the Navy is not to be made to depend upon the 
labour requirements of Woolwich Arsenal'. The orders went
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to the private sector (229). A trend towards greater use 
of the private sector was identified by The Economist in 
1901 when it said that the 'special point of interest 1 in 
the annual contracts was the extent of the trust the 
Admiralty had for private enterprise (230). When three 
firms already involved in the armaments trade combined to 
build Coventry Ordnance Works in 1905, they received War 
Office support for this entrepreneurial venture. In 1909 
Rear Admiral Bacon, (who was, in 1918-19, to sit on the 
M°Kinnon Wood Committee), became Managing Director. He had 
been Director of Naval Ordnance since 1907.
During the war the private armaments companies proved 
unable to supply sufficient munitions and control of the 
industry was placed under the Ministry of Munitions. This 
was run by businessmen and many armaments producers 
benefited from its grants and organisational abilities. 
The largest factories in the country were those of 
armaments firms. In November 1916 1 in 15 metal workers, 
140,000 people, were employed by either Vickers or 
Armstrongs at their main works. The largest single works 
was the engineering works of Armstrong's at Elswick where 
48,000 people worked. At the Woolwich Arsenal at that time 
there were 68,000 whilst nearby there were a further 5,000 
at Vickers in Crayford and 9,500 at Vickers 1 site in Erith. 
The war encouraged the rationalisation and standardisation 
and continuity of demand for supplies for the government. 
This in turn encouraged the rapid growth, mechanisation and 
electrification of plant, higher levels of productivity, a 
wave of mergers and the development of business trusts 
designed to minimalise competition and sustain prices. 
Arms companies were already large. In 1905 on Payne's list 
of the largest British firms 10% were defence contractors 
and almost all the major suppliers of defence contracts 
were listed. As he noted 'few other companies in the heavy 
industries could rival the great armament firms in size'
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(231). The Excess Profits Duty and the post war inflation 
encouraged companies to take over unprofitable concerns and 
invest in bricks and mortar (232). There was a certain 
irony to this in that the private companies presented the 
Arsenal as a threat to the survival of the economic system 
whereas it was the formation of armaments cartels and 
monopolies, spurred on by state contracts, which led to 
mergers, take-overs, informal agreements and the 
accumulation of capital in larger and more closely 
integrated units. This creation of the momentum for the 
growth of a large number of corporate organisations 
undermined the notion of laissez-faire in a more drastic 
way than the survival of the Arsenal (233).
The arms companies recognised that they could benefit from 
state activity. There was a two-way flow of people between 
the private and the state sectors. In 1915 Gilbert Slater 
claimed that around twenty important figures from the 
Arsenal were poached within just a few years and that the 
state sector was being used a cheap training ground (234). 
The Danger Buildings Officer, later supervisor in the Royal 
Laboratories, was the son of Sir Benjamin Browne, the 
Managing Director of Hawthorne, Leslie and Co, the 
Newcastle engineering firm (235). Sir William Anderson 
left the local engineering company, Easton and Anderson, to 
become Director General, Ordnance Factories. During the 
1890s he ran the Arsenal 'almost as a commercial venture 1 , 
fighting Vickers over the production of major artillery. 
This belligerence led Vickers to protest to the government 
at the failure of the Arsenal to observe the rules of 
laissez-faire. The company won the argument (236). 
However on another occasion Alfred Nobel advised the War 
Office on smokeless powders only to have Frederick Abel, a 
War Office chemist, patent cordite having relied upon 
Nobel's ideas. Nobel could not take the Crown to court so 
he took the Director General of Waltham Abbey, who ran his
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own cordite plant, to court. After three years of this 
legal 'obsession 1 , Nobel lost (237). In March 1919 the 
Pioneer noted that Col Vandaleur of Gun Inspection had been 
promoted to the Ordnance Committee and was leaving the 
Arsenal. It commented 'Students of Armament Rings will 
remember that some of the most brilliant officers of that 
body are now Directors of the Great Armaments firms' (238).
The Ministry of Munitions gave grants to private companies 
such as the London Small Arms Company which, during the 
course of the war, received £70,000 in order to increase 
production. It produced 2,000 rifles in a week, rather 
than the 250 rifles a week that it had produced in 1912 
(239). Arms firms loaned over 90 directors and managers to 
the Ministry of Munitions so that it was difficult within 
the Ministry 'to tell where business control ended and 
state control began' (240). Sir Percy Girouard Armstrong, 
a director who took up a War Office appointment in April 
1915 advocated that 'national' factories be run by private 
managers. Addison, the Minister, commented 'I suspect that 
the one reason for his favouring these factories is that 
they will not become competitors with the big firms... The 
only 'national' feature about these factories proposed by 
Girouard is that the Nation would find the money for them' 
(241). The Ministry aimed to aid the war effort by 
efficient organisation so that what were considered 
adequately run private companies were left outside its 
direct management. The National Projectile Factories, 
which employed 20,000 people by November 1917, were under 
the control of private armaments firms not the government. 
The radical New Witness of May 1917 commented, 'instead of 
arming the state with the wealth of the private employers 
they [the politicians] have persistently armed private 
employers with the powers of the state' (242). Douglas 
Cole, who worked for the ASE, thought that 'the capitalist 
was being robbed by the state of his useful function as
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merchant and was becoming a mere supervisor of manufacture 
(243). Cole also said of the Ministry, 'the whole attitude 
and tendency of the new ministry was bureaucratic 1 . He 
called the bureaucratic collectivism of state 
administration the 'sordid dream of a businessman with a 
conscience* (244). Eric Geddes and Allan Smith of the EEF 
were central to production and labour policies, and 
employers were key figures in the organisation of 
engineering capacity through their involvement in District 
Armaments Committees.
After the war individual private firms expressed interest 
in making use of the Arsenal, but this was forbidden by the 
government. The Phosphor Bronze Co. were told that as the 
government did not require drop stamping work such work 
could not be done at the Arsenal. R Hoe and Co enquired 
with regard to the production of printing machinery at the 
Arsenal. They were told that the installation costs were 
prohibitive. The request for heavy machinery to be 
manufactured for them, made by Smith Brothers and Co., was 
treated with some uncertainty while the Royal Mint orders 
were accepted (245). The railowners insisted on state 
ownership for two years after the Armistice as the wages 
bill had doubled during the course of the war. Lloyd 
George wanted to use the Arsenal to provide products for 
the rail companies and thus ease the transition to the 
peace time economy.
The government also controlled wages. Immediately after 
the Second World War Hurwitz suggested that 'the history of 
government labour regulation during the war is, in 
substance, that of an attempt to introduce controls 
approaching industrial conscription 1 (246). Although this 
view has been modified by further work, there was an 
extension of collective bargaining between workers' 
representatives and the government which had some benefits
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for employers. Similar industrial structures were 
envisaged for the post-war period and private armaments 
employers recognised that these arrangements might 
encourage Labour voting amongst workers who wished to 
secure a Labour politician on the other side of the 
negotiating table. Wrigley's summary of wartime industrial
relations is;
on the one hand the government 
frequently turned to businessmen for 
expertise... on the other hand the First 
World War was a frustrating, if not 
humiliating time, in regard to their 
relations with the government (247)
Following the Armistice private arms companies wanted the 
state to restrain unions, aid reconstruction and not 
compete with the private armaments industry for orders. 
Although the usual radical argument was that secret state 
work ought to be strictly controlled by the government 
Newbold inverted the argument and suggested that the 
companies' case for arms orders was aided by the fact that 
in total war subterfuge had become necessary to ensure 
vital supplies and that because private firms could 'serve 
the governments in secret [that] is one reason why no 
government will consent to the nationalisation of the 
armaments industry' (248). In addition the post-Armistice 
Commons was filled with businessmen and opponents of state 
production. Newspaper proprietors, bankers, and clergymen 
were well represented in both the arms companies and in 
support of the theory of the necessity for more armaments 
(249). The Pioneer suggested that donations to party 
funds and offers of directorships paved the way for the 
reduction in numbers at the Arsenal, despite the increase 
in Army expenditure (250). The private firms encouraged 
the popularisation of the belief that increased armaments 
made for increased national security. Their activities 
have been well documented (251). Vickers had three 
generals and five admirals on their shareholders list in
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1904 and 300 officers held shares then as compared to 44 in 
1898. The company also had on the board a number of 
diplomats, MPs, Ministers, Peers, and civil servants 
including a man who was to play a significant part in 
decision making at the Ministry of Munitions regarding the 
'Peace Arsenal 1 campaign, Sir Henry Fowler. Immediately 
after the war the Commons was filled with elderly, 
politically inexperienced, 'hard faced men who looked as if 
they had done very well out of the war' (252). Typical of 
the responses of the House to the problems of 
reconstruction and state control was the remark of Sir J 
Walton MP on the day following the Armistice. He told his 
Honourable colleagues that 'every trade and industry' 
touched by civil servants had been 'hampered and injured'. 
After the 1918 election many members were still eager to 
return to 1914. J A Grant proposed the reduction of public 
expenditure 'by all possible means' (253). This 
impressionistic evidence has been bolstered by R H Tawney 
and more recent historians, B B Gilbert and J Turner, who 
all note both the preponderance of business men within the 
Commons in 1919 and the ways in which the House tried to 
serve the interests of private firms by returning the 
country to a pre-war state (254). Armaments firms also 
recruited from the civil service. Both Sir Mark Webster 
Jenkinson and Sir J A Cooper left the Ministry of Munitions 
to become directors of dickers (255).
In outlining the national framework within which the 'Peace 
Arsenal' campaign was situated, and with which it was 
interlaced, it has been established that the political and 
industrial decision makers were divided amongst themselves 
as to how to secure their mutual interests. During the war 
after the fall of Asquith the government was an uneasy 
coalition, and its administrative response was ad hoc. An
official report commented on how
the Ministry of Munitions and War Office 
were concerned with the settlement of
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disputes on munitions work; the 
Admiralty as regards war vessels..the 
Board of trade as regards coalmining... 
the Air Ministry with the building of 
aeroplanes... All this has a tendency to 
result in a lack of uniformity and an 
absence of co-ordination (256)
Despite their unifying new organisation, the Federation of 
British Industries (FBI), businessmen held a variety of 
opinions as to the benefits of corporate bias and the best 
approach to the state. The President of the FBI observed, 
rather ambiguously in October 1918, 'we feel that the idea 
should be state assistance and not state interference 1 
(257). McKinlay and Zeitlin argue that the EEF was not a 
unified expression of class interests but was riven by 
regional specialisation, sector diversity and contractual 
and familial ties between firms which resulted in a 'potent 
localism' (258).
The 'minimum' number of workers required at the Arsenal, 
according to the appropriate Minister, was reduced to 
13,000 in 1921 and then to 6,500 in 1922. The lack of 
permanent alternative work at the Arsenal was in part due 
to its association with Lloyd George. Whether Lloyd George 
was one of the progressives, as Kenneth Morgan argues, or 
whether he was an opportunist, as others suggest, is of 
less significance than the fact that his abilities allowed 
his schemes to appear feasible (259). Lloyd George played 
a part in winning over the campaigners when he granted them 
their own committee, with AGO representatives upon it, a 
committee which the Pioneer said was of such importance 
that the McKinnon Wood committee was reduced in stature. 
Then in 1922 the Coalition fell from office, and two thirds 
of Lloyd George's Liberals lost their seats.
There was some support in the Cabinet for alternative work. 
The Arsenal could provide the expensive fixed capital 
necessary for the economy such as the locomotives. It was
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thought that Army orders could be placed at the Arsenal 
(260). Two former junior Ministers at the Ministry of 
Munitions were in charge of organising in the event of 
civil unrest (261). They argued that Woolwich could be 
used to provide the tanks necessary for the maintenance of 
order in the event of a popular uprising. There were also 
those in the Cabinet who saw the benefits, in terms of 
efficiency, of state production and others who thought that 
the provision of work would dampen the potentially 
revolutionary fire of the skilled engineers of the biggest 
munitions plant in the country. Against these forces were 
balanced the Treasury, the power of which Hall and Schwarz, 
following Middlemas, marginalise. Middlemas refers to the 
civil service as the repository of 'accumulated knowledge, 
expertise and hence residual power 1 . The 'Peace Arsenal 1 
campaigners' view reflected their experience, they 
applauded some civil servants, but also mentioned the power 
of the Treasury; the anti-national factory 'tea party' in 
the Ministry of Munitions, and the bias towards businessmen 
on the M°Kinnon Wood committee (262).
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Chapter III
in those days the name of Woolwich went 
round the earth, and went from the North 
Pole to the South Pole
J R MacDonald recalling campaigning for 
alternative work for Woolwich Arsenal, 
Pioneer 08/07/21
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The 'Peace Arsenal 1 campaign was framed by the perceptions 
that the centrality of skilled men in the town would be 
maintained through respectable, rational, individuals 
forming a geographically-based community network, headed by 
local men. These citizens would then ensure the election, 
to all the appropriate bodies, of people who favoured 
national state economic intervention for jobs and benefits 
and thus alternative work would be implemented at the 
Arsenal. This framework was not foisted upon Woolwich by 
progressive state intellectuals but developed from within 
the area.
The conventional view of new liberalism, as espoused by P F 
Clarke, is of an intellectual elite which provided an 
ideology of reform which was accepted by the Labour Party 
leaders, by Churchill, Lloyd George and Addison and by a 
large number of working class voters. Hall and Schwarz 
agree that new liberals and Fabians defined the Labour 
Party (1). However, whereas Fabians and new liberals could 
coexist in theoretical harmony, when they descended from 
abstract principle to concrete instance, the manufacture of 
consensus was more complex. Hall and Schwarz recognise 
that the passive regeneration required 'the containment of 
a rank and file activism in the labour movement by 1921' 
and that there had to be control of that 'organic social 
interest', the labour movement (2). The relationship 
between the centre and the periphery was symbiotic and not 
reducible to a conflict between bureaucratic leadership and 
a belligerent rank and file. Labour leaders had to win a 
measure of consensus from the localities (3).
Within certain boundaries, those who constructed the post- 
war order in Whitehall and Westminster keyed into, were 
affected by, and to some extent redefined, local events. 
The main constraints were the acceptance of the 
implications of the return to the Gold Standard and the
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rejection of deficit financing and the absence of an 
alternative economic strategy besides resistance to attacks 
on living standards through industrial action. The Labour 
Party nationally offered support for balancing European 
budgets and the stabilisation of exchange rates at Gold 
Standard parities. Between 1918 and 1920 wages rose by 50% 
and prices by 30% to three times their 1914 level. A 
return to the Gold Standard at the 1914 level required 
deflation and the reduction of wages.
The effect of the acceptance of this orthodoxy can be seen 
in the case of the 'Peace Arsenal 1 campaign in the 
acceptance by the campaigners of the government's notion of 
efficiency. In 1921 the Ministry of Labour informed the 
Woolwich Board of Guardians that, in order to aid 
'efficiency', the order of dismissals would be changed, and 
the ex-Servicemen would lose their privileged status (4). 
Councillor Harry Hart, an ex-Serviceman, said 'the one 
qualification in the future must be efficiency, I agree' 
(5). When Kingsley Wood the Conservative MP for Woolwich 
West, asked for men to be kept on at the Arsenal as an 
example to industry he was told by the Secretary of State 
for War that 'efficiency is now the first consideration', 
Wood accepted this (6). Beyond the idea of increasing 
foreign trade and a capital levy to pay the war debt, the 
campaigners had little notion of how to finance alternative 
work (7). They relied on a notion of a moral right to work 
or maintenance and this morality was reflected in one 
campaigners reference to the inclusion of overhead charges 
as part of the cost of Arsenal production. He decried this 
as 'wicked' and did not counterpose alternative economic or 
moral values (8). Frequently efficiency was perceived not 
as a negotiable concept but merely an aspect of capitalism 
which had to be accepted.
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The campaign was formed within this imposed economic and 
political framework. In addition Hall and Schwarz argue 
that 'the containment of labour... had international 
conditions of existence - the post-war proletarian upsurge 1 
across Europe as workers' councils, some of them 
revolutionary, emerged (9). In America shop committees and 
works councils sprang up in the war years with skilled 
craftworkers generally at the forefront of the movement 
(10). In Britain one of the largest and most influential 
forces in the labour movement was the ASE (11). Hinton 
says that the ASE shop stewards unlocked the subversive 
potential within the craft tradition and made a major 
contribution to the ideology of the British revolutionary 
movement (12). The swiftness with which this militancy 
died down was due in large part to unemployment. In 
Woolwich there was less fluidity. The workers' movement 
did not take enormous leaps forwards, nor did it die back 
so dramatically. This stability can be measured through an 
examination of the campaign for alternative work.
In this chapter, and the following one, the concerns which 
shaped the campaign and which derived from within the local 
social network are considered. The support for the 
constitution and the opposition to the 'direct action' of 
the left, came not from the speeches of Macdonald but from 
the campaigners understanding of history, from their 
experiences. Newer, national ideas of constitutional 
citizenship and efficiency had to be grafted onto 
particular local stocks in order to survive. This was 
possible through a campaign for the continued use of the 
Arsenal for the production of items for the state. The 
role of the Arsenal trade unions in this process will be 
examined in section (a), the WLP in section (b) of this 
chapter.
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By contrast to the militancy of others in regard to 
alternative work, the Pioneer reported the 'Woolwich men 
did everything that was possible - but they did not strike. 
That they would not do 1 (13). The core of Arsenal workers 
had longer experience of working for the state than other 
engineers. Furthermore a number of their union 
representative were integrated into the emergent corporate 
structure. Shop stewards were recognised at the Arsenal 
before the war, and had a large degree of control over 
dilution during the war. The status of the skilled men was 
less suddenly and dramatically threatened by general 
workers than was the case elsewhere. In addition one 
former Arsenal ASE member, Barnes, was in the War Cabinet, 
another, Rees, went on from being a shop steward to work at 
the Ministry of Munitions, and a third, Brownlie, was 
President of the ASE. The WLP emphasised the importance of 
maintaining a locally-based cross-class community dominated 
by working men. It promoted the idea of working within the 
political state apparatus for the promotion of alternative 
work. WLP county councillor, Guest, insisted on keeping 
the division between industrial and political issues and 
argued that in connection with alternative work campaigners 
'had to be loyal, disciplined and ready to take any action 
requisite in order to get their just demands into 
administration and legislation (my emphasis) (14).
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(a)
The relatively harmonious industrial relations of the 
Arsenal; the commitment of the members of the Arsenal 
unions to solidarity and the economic challenge to the 
Armaments ring of state production, together presented the 
private arms industry with a formidable threat. From the 
late nineteenth century the private armaments companies, 
threatened by increased competition, sought to undermine 
their workers' power in order to rationalise production. 
Maxim Nordenfeld of Erith gave the police beds so that they 
could lodge non-unionists in their homes during a strike of 
1889. By comparison, in the same year, links between 
employers and workers a few miles away in the Arsenal were 
less strained. There were no visible employers, and work 
was not obviously linked to capital or profit. This was a 
point stressed by the local conservative newspaper, which 
supported the claims for higher pay for Arsenal workers. 
It was indignant at the suggestion, made by a dozen former 
workers, that work at the Arsenal was arduous because of 
the pressures exerted by those in control of saddlery and 
harness making. The newspaper asked, 'where is the 
motive? 1 . The state sector, it was held, had no reason for 
oppressing the workers and so, of course, it did not 
oppress them. Officials were appointed to promote quality 
not quantity, whereas the situation was different in the 
private sector (15). During the 1897-8 national lockout of 
the ASE the RAGS in Woolwich contributed £500, and two van 
loads of provisions to be distributed among 'the 
necessitous labourers' who worked for the local private 
armaments companies. The Erith RAGS, which had many 
engineers amongst its members, gave £100 (16). The Arsenal 
ASE also hired a steamer to take members up the river to 
Hyde Park for a demonstration. Industrial relations in the 
private sector were in a different, harsher, category than 
those at the Arsenal. Nationally the ASE was set back
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considerably in 1897 it spent over £500, 000 and lost the 
dispute, but in Woolwich the workers had no direct part in 
the dispute and continued to enjoy a high status.
Confrontation between workers and employers continued in 
the armaments industry during the period between the Boer 
War and the First World War. Yarrows of Poplar lodged non- 
union labour on a barge on the Thames and then moved the 
company to Scotland, in 1906, in the hope of avoiding 
further industrial disputes. In 1907 a bridge was 
constructed to get blacklegs into the Erith Vickers plant 
without them meeting strikers at the railway station. By 
comparison the movement of 600 men from the Arsenal Torpedo 
Shop to Gournock in Scotland in 1910 was neither caused by 
industrial disputes nor did it lead to more than some 
relatively mild opposition to judge by the pages of the 
Torpedo Tatler which was the journal produced by socialists 
in the Arsenal for those workers most affected (17). From 
1909 the Arsenal shop stewards worked with the government's 
Advisory Committee on Wages, the secretary of this body was 
an Arsenal worker and the chair the Labour Party secretary.
There was another important distinction between workers in 
the private sector and those at the Arsenal. In the 
private sector, workers' expectations were that they would 
be laid off if the management decided that post-war 
armaments conversion was not a viable option. The 
superintendent of Wilkinson Sword Co of Acton worked for 
the Ministry of Munitions during the First World War. With 
his knowledge of engineering he thought that there was 'a 
great deal to do regarding the conversion and employment of 
the machinery in an extensive part of the factory 1 (18). 
The conversion of the factory was a managerial decision 
about strategy and so was not one in which workers in the 
private sector were involved. Many private firms felt 
able to shed staff and alter production with greater ease
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than was the case on the state-owned sites because their 
peacetime role was not disputed. Either they reconverted 
or they closed. A filling factory at Park Royal, Acton was 
sold into private hands and thousands of staff were laid 
off until only 800 women and 200 men remained. There was 
little concern about this as the war work was seen as only 
temporary (19). Arnots brought the site for the scrap 
value of the huts there and shortly afterwards opened a 
perfume factory. The curtailment of orders for D Napier & 
son, a company which worked on aero engines and other 
government war work, did not lead to closure. Indeed, 
despite two sympathy strikes, the company managed to make 
other products and to declare large profits and a 22%% 
share payment bonus in 1919 (20). Private firms which had 
adapted their product for the war, either reconverted or 
went out of business. Arsenal workers wanted to explore an 
option so far denied to the state sector, conversion.
A further difference between the private sector and the 
Arsenal was the peculiar strength of the core workers at 
the Arsenal, particularly the ASE, both in relation to 
other Arsenal workers and in relation to other engineers. 
Although the ASE was a centralised national union there 
was, as the Webbs recorded, a 'fanatical attachment 1 
amongst the engineers to 'an extreme local autonomy 1 . More 
recent studies also stress the importance of local autonomy 
and the significance of regional variations (21). The 
Arsenal ASE was unified, recognised and distinctive from 
the private sector branches of the union. The traditional 
method used by workers to increase wages at the Arsenal was 
by an appeal to the officer in charge of a particular 
department. The latter then made a recommendation to his 
superior officer. Wages tended to be lower than in the 
private sector, but this was offset by continuity of 
employment (22). Furthermore conditions and pensions were 
better at the Arsenal than in the private sector (23). At
-130-
the Arsenal there was some consultation of workers, in 
1889, the Director General consulted the workers regarding 
a new pension scheme because there had been a dispute 
lasting over 20 years on this issue. It was resolved, in 
favour of the men, after the intervention on their behalf 
of the Conservative MP for Woolwich, Colonel Hughes (24). 
The issue of pensions flared up again after the war. 
Workers at the Arsenal necessarily had a closer 
relationship with the state and their MP than other members 
of the ASE.
A wartime innovation was the introduction of new pay 
schemes instead of the previous system whereby workers had 
to beseech the appropriate officials to grant them their 
petition (25). This did not bind the Arsenal workers' pay 
to that of the private sector but it did modernise the 
structure. In 1915 Arsenal labourers received a payrise 
because the local EEF had conceded one in the private 
sector (26). However, Arsenal workers were outside the EEF 
collective bargaining procedures. Local union officials 
did not have to try to impose conformity to national 
agreements. Indeed, sometimes there were different pay 
awards within the Arsenal. In November 1918, engineering 
workers received a 5/- pay increase and piece workers got a 
rise of 12%%, but Building Work Department employees 
received no increase in pay.
The 'Peace Arsenal 1 campaigners relied upon an integrated 
union structure. Shop stewards of the ASE, union officials 
who represented the union at shop level, collecting dues 
and organising the membership, were recognised by the 
Arsenal management soon after their introduction in the 
1890s (27). Workers' representatives negotiated directly 
with the CSOF. The status of the stewards increased so 
that, instead of being engaged in low-level union 
administration, they rose to negotiating piece rates. In
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the early part of this century the shop stewards were 
recognised by the Minister of War, Sir Henry Campbell 
Bannnerman. During the same period the membership of the 
Arsenal ASE rose. By 1901 there were eight branches and 
2,000 ASE members in the Arsenal (28). The influence of 
the Arsenal engineers was widely noted (29). Douglas Cole, 
the wartime advisor to the ASE, and Wal Hannington, a 
contemporary engineering union activist, who met the 
Arsenal ASE representatives, both remarked on the pre-war 
strength of the Arsenal shop stewards organisation and the 
extent of their powers (30). In contrast to Woolwich, many 
shop stewards in the ASE on other sites were only granted 
recognition during 1917, following various struggles (31). 
When W R Watson got his job at the Arsenal in 1914, he did 
so by approaching the appropriate shop steward, and it was 
only once the job was settled amongst the men that Watson 
gave his personal details to the administrators and 
submitted to a medical examination. When Watson moved jobs 
within the Arsenal the first question his new workmate 
asked was 'Do you belong? 1 (32). Tom Mason, who started 
work at the Arsenal in 1913 and whose brother was a shop 
steward recalled that 'when the war come on... the 
management got scared of the unions, if the unions got and 
took anything up they gave way every time 1 (33). By 1915 
'there was no beating about the bush with managers, shop 
managers or foremen; they [shop stewards] went directly to 
the Supervisor or Chief Supervisor as required' (34). 
There were 130 stewards, one for each shop, meeting 
monthly. There was also a steward for every fifty men and 
an executive of 7 stewards who met directly with the 
management. The shop stewards had more autonomy than a 
District Committee elsewhere in the ASE (35).
When the shop stewards suspected the Ministry of Munitions 
of seeking to remove their negotiating rights (the CSOF 
started to negotiate through the London District Committee
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of the ASE), they forced Christopher Addison, the Minister 
of Munitions, to concede to them that they had the right to 
negotiate directly with the CSOF. There was a 'stormy 
meeting 1 between Addison and the shop stewards. Mills 
restored order and, shortly afterwards, Addison invited the 
shop stewards to the Ministry and promised to recognise 
them once again as official representatives of the workers 
on the issues of grievances and wages (36). Mills blamed a 
'minor official of Munitions who had referred local matters 
- which for many years had been dealt with directly by the 
shop stewards - to the head office of the ASE' (37). 
Addison said that he had never wanted to change the status 
quo but that a confusion had arisen due to the fact that 
Tom Rees was both chair of the shop stewards and also 
secretary of the London District Committee (38). It was 
in part because of Addison's bad relations with the ASE, he 
called them 'a nightmare', that he lost his post at the 
Ministry (39). Mills later accused the government of 
having failed the workers, but called Addison 'one of the 
most brilliant minds at the Ministry of Reconstruction who 
had insufficient powers and called for the skills which had 
been used to produce weapons to be used to produce 
ploughshares' (40). A myth arose about this event, which 
was to have implications for the 'Peace Arsenal' scheme and 
which throws some light on the ways in which the shop 
stewards of Woolwich were viewed. It was supposed that 
Addison had signed a unique 'Arsenal Charter 1 and that this 
proved both the strength of the Arsenal shop stewards and 
their distance from the struggle of other shop stewards. 
Employers wanted to break this uniquely strong group, trade 
unionists felt that upon such strength could be built a 
broader struggle (41).
In other munitions centres there were internal struggles 
between the upper echelons of the union and the shop 
stewards. The national union leadership actively co-
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operated with the government which inhibited trade union 
officials from supporting action which would have 
interfered with production for the war. Shop stewards 
often represented the disaffected workers. In Woolwich 
such divisions did not occur. This was partly because the 
ASE President, Brownlie, made determined efforts to ensure 
the smooth implementation of the Munitions of War Act. He 
returned to Woolwich to intervene in a dispute in 1919. He 
also sat with Addison and various industrialists on the 
Council on Priority After the the War (42). Of greater 
significance was the fact that workshop organisations, with 
full bargaining rights, had developed within the trade 
union structure before the war, so there was little scope 
for independent shop floor organisation by shop stewards.
An important part of the continued validity of the shop 
stewards was their control of dilution which was introduced 
in 1915. There was considerable dissatisfaction amongst 
skilled men in many areas, but not in Woolwich. Managers 
wanted to save money, speed production and undermine the 
authority union officials had over the rate for any 
particular job. 'The whole history of the shop stewards' 
wrote Sheffield engineer and shop steward J T Murphy, 'was 
a revolt against the new conditions imposed by the dilution 
of labour' (43). In Sheffield the imposition was 'sudden, 
arbitrary and acute' (44). In the Midlands, where 
'unionism was only skin deep', there were also hostile 
reactions to change (45). A straw in the wind indicating 
this is that, according to one Arsenal worker, the solitary 
'firebrand' at the Arsenal was not from Woolwich, but from 
Coventry (46).
By contrast, in Woolwich, the workers accepted the CSOF 
Brigadier General C P Martel as 'the final arbiter in all 
questions arising under the dilution agreement' and the ASE 
had considerable control over dilution (47). Management
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made its decisions in consultation with the workers' 
representatives. Martel engaged in many a smoothing of 
labour difficulties and had 'won the respect and esteem of 
the men' (48). The CSOF frequently met shop 
representatives who were guided by the shop stewards' 
executive (49). There was also a separate stewards' 
Dilution Committee of 24 men, at least one member of which 
was on the shop stewards' executive committee. The 
Dilution Committee had office facilities provided by the 
management and recorded pre-war practices so that they 
could be restored after the war. Martel recognised that 
the workers 'were very dependent on the amount of 
alternative work they received' and in respect of the 
'Peace Arsenal' campaign he argued that success was due to
gaining support in Whitehall;
we (sic) can claim to have made 
substantial gains and we owe this, I 
think, to the successive Director 
Generals of Factories who have 
interested themselves to such an extent 
in this matter (50).
The Arsenal shop stewards did not share the vision of 
Clydeside militant Gallacher, who aimed in 1916 for 'one 
powerful organisation that will place the workers in 
complete control of industry' (51). Rather, their vision 
was focused upon particular issues. The shop stewards held 
a meeting in protest at the food shortages. There were 
stoppages at the Arsenal when men were late for work 
through queueing. This was linked to a demand to curb 
profiteering. They wanted the RACS to handle food supplies 
(52). In January 1916 just 200 Arsenal workers of all 
grades supported a resolution in support of the Clyde 
Workers' Committee. There was an attempt to establish a 
London Workers' Committee on the lines of the Clyde 
Workers' Committee. It enjoyed a moment of success when 
Tom Rees was summoned under the Defence of the Realm Act
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for calling a strike. Once the dispute was peaceably 
settled the London Workers' Committee faded (53). In 1919, 
the Arsenal shop stewards turned down an appeal to assist 
at a 'Hands Off Russia' demonstration with the excuse, 'the 
activities of the [shop stewards'] committee are confined 
to industrial conditions' (54). In April 1921, the WLP 
presented solidarity with other unions in immediate rather 
than abstract terms. If the locked-out miners lost their 
struggle the engineers would be next to be attacked. The 
EEF had 'already given notice of its intentions to 
seriously reduce wages throughout the engineering trades, 
and it is more than possible that if the present attack on 
the miners is successful that wages in Woolwich Arsenal 
will drop by at least £1 a week by the beginning of June' 
(55). The Pioneer blamed a particular section of 
businessmen; 'the wasters have deliberately provoked this 
struggle, backed by a government of flinty faced men and 
supported by their own press' (56). To focus on the 
particular was not unusual within the labour movement. In 
the case of Woolwich because there was not the same degree 
of provocation as on Clydeside, the shop stewards movement 
evolved in a different fashion.
As the demand for munitions dropped after the Armistice, so 
the influence of the shop stewards waned. In Woolwich on 
the declaration of the Armistice on llth November 1918, 
night shifts ceased immediately and the Arsenal, 
symbolically, closed for the rest of the day. The Arsenal 
opened the next day to face 'the greatest problem of its 
existence' (57). Workers were advised to find other jobs. 
The Arsenal provided railway warrants for men dismissed 
from the Arsenal and travelling home (58). Women did not 
get a rail warrant until March 1919. The Australian 
Munition Workers Association, the South African Mechanics 
Club and the Canadian and Overseas Workers Association all 
demanded repatriation. The number of hours worked in a
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week was reduced by six to 48, it was further reduced to 47 
in January 1919, and an overtime ban was introduced. 
Similar measures were taken in other munitions factories 
(59). 'The speed with which women had appeared in these 
industries was surpassed by the speed with which they 
vanished from them 1 as Hyman put it (60). Barnbow Filling 
Factory in Yorkshire dismissed 1,000 women within a week of 
the Armistice, and the remaining 7,000 with the next month.
An order of dismissals from work at the Arsenal was 
established, with the most recent arrivals, at the top of 
the list. Even when the order was altered the core of 
workers remained most secure. The last to go were to be 
pre-war employees, the organised workers, second highest 
were the disabled, followed by the other ex-Servicemen, and 
the wartime employees. Those whose jobs were least secure 
were the few people taken on since the Armistice (61). The 
hierarchy established by the government regarding 
dismissals from the Arsenal was challenged. In February
1920 a WU steward argued that 'not one war-hand should 
remain while ex-Servicemen are dismissed 1 (62). In January
1921 the council decided that ex-Servicemen ought to be 
treated in the same way as civilian war workers and that 
'no single women should be discharged to make room for an 
ex-Serviceman 1 (63). In July 1921, the order of dismissals 
was altered so that the 995 workers who had been taken on 
since short-time commenced were laid off first, followed by 
war entrants, fit ex-Servicemen and disabled ex-Servicemen. 
Most secure of all were those pre-war men aged over 60 
(64). The Pioneer suggested that this order was being 
undermined by the use of suspensions. If no work was 
available men were suspended. Once they had been suspended 
for two months they ceased to be on the books at all (65). 
Whilst it was being reduced in numbers and status the 
workforce was divided amongst itself. The secure workers 
suffered least in these battles.
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In 1919 Solidarity, the weekly journal of the workshop 
committees of London, acknowledged that the engineers were 
no longer at the forefront of the struggle and Gallacher 
wrote in the Worker that the engineers were in the 'slough 
of despond 1 while the dockers, miners and railworkers were 
in the ascendancy (66). By contrast, the Arsenal engineers 
were carving themselves a new niche. The 6,000 skilled men 
maintained control of the leadership of the labour movement 
in the face of 28,000 women workers and about 36,000 other 
men at the Arsenal. The AGC secretary Fred Thomas told 
non-union labour and ex-Servicemen that for them 'salvation 
lay in the united ranks of industrial trade unionism and 
not outside' (67). In 1920 after they had put aside the 
claims of other workers Lloyd George and Bonar Law both 
reiterated the claim that alternative work would be 
provided in Woolwich (68). Jack Mills noted with pride the 
degree of integration and strength of the 'most powerful' 
stewards in the country, the Arsenal stewards. They were, 
he said, 'able to go past the managers of any factory and 
demand to be called into consultation not only with the 
superintendent of the various departments but with the 
Ministry of Munitions itself 1 (69). It was the maintaining 
of such confidence in the face of the slump that marked out 
Woolwich. By 1921, a quarter of the members of the 
Amalgamated Engineers Union (the AEU, a union made up 
principally of the ASE) were unemployed. There were over a 
million registered unemployed people in the country. In 
Woolwich the ASE still physically dominated the town 
centre. A visitor to the town commented; 'the essence of 
Woolwich is Beresford Square...[when] the Arsenal gates 
open upon it, it becomes the property of the ASE (70).
In 1922 there were two million unemployed, and a quarter of 
a million on systematic short-time. The status and funds 
of the AEU were seriously depleted, and interest in its 
members was so low on the agenda that Sir Allan Smith of
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the EEF had too remind the PM that 'the greatest tendency 
towards unrest...is to be found in the case of the skilled 
man 1 (71). The AEU suffered a serious defeat in a lock- 
out, which did not affect the Arsenal, where the union 
blacked work which was being denied their locked out fellow 
trade unionists. Engineers' wages were cut and the AEU was 
reduced to 330,000 members, (25% of its wartime strength) 
90,000 of whom were without work. A number of its militant 
members were involved in organising the unemployed (72). 
The older strongholds were reduced as heavy industry 
suffered recession whilst the AEU was also driven off the 
shop floors of the newer industrial areas, such as the 
Midlands (73). In Woolwich, as one former Arsenal worker 
recalled, 'we was going out in droves...and down the labour 
exchange there was a queue right the way round there about 
four deep every day' (74). The newspapers reported 
bankruptcy, marital desertion and suicide as a result of 
mass local unemployment (75). Despite these crises, shop 
steward-led collective action in order to ensure national 
government intervention remained central to political 
activity in Woolwich.
In the 1920s the authority of the Arsenal shop stewards was 
not threatened by workers at other nearby sites as the 
sites were smaller and the workers less well organised. 
Before, during and after the war the Arsenal remained a 
large-scale employer (76). The only comparable sites in 
terms of the size of the workforce were those of arms 
companies. In 1916 Woolwich had the largest munitions 
works in the country, 1 in 30 of the total metal working 
labour force were employed there, and even when it was 
reduced in size it dwarfed the other sites. The largest 
other government works were in Gretna, which had 1,133 
employees in February 1920 and Enfield and Waltham, which 
together had 2,978. None of the rest had over 1,000 
workers (77). In 1922 there were 7,000 at the Arsenal and
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in 1923 Enfield was reduced to 790 workers (78). Other 
companies in the area did not rival it in terms of numbers 
employed until the 1930s. Siemans was established in 
Charlton in 1863. By 1909 it employed 1,300 workers, 3,300 
by 1913 and a further 750 by 1921, including 400 women. By 
1926 there were over 6,300 workers there, many of them 
engineers. Collier's Motorcycles was established in 1899 
and employed 3,000 workers by 1922. The Kings Norton Metal 
Co employed 100 people in 1914, 7,000 at its peak and then 
it closed in 1922. Two tennis ball manufacturers employed 
women as did James, the shirtmakers which had a staff of 
400 at the height of the 1921 season. Western Electric in 
North Woolwich had 1,000 workers in 1909, (400 of them 
women) 2,100 workers in 1922 (79). Just outside the 
borough were Johnson and Phillips and the Albert Dock, 
which was extended in 1921, but neither of these were of 
enormous significance during the period immediately after 
the war. In 1921 8,000 (17%) of the 48,000 males over 12 
who lived and worked in Woolwich were metal workers, 7% 
were soldiers and 10% worked in transport. By 1932 
Woolwich was 'the centre of the cable trade' and Siemans 
engineers challenged the supremacy of the Arsenal AEU, but 
at the time of the 'Peace Arsenal' campaign the Arsenal was 
still central and, as the Town Guide said in 1925, 
'Woolwich is devoted to Mars and Vulcan 1 (80).
Another potential threat to the dominance of the Arsenal 
was from white-collar workers. Eltham, 40% of the acreage 
of the borough of Woolwich, was fast becoming a dormitory 
town for clerks (81). The population of Eltham rose by 
110% in the decade 1911-21. A further 11,000 people arrived 
in the decade from 1919 raising the population to 39,000 
(82). Although in 1921 the commercial, professional, 
financial and insurance workers, together with the clerks 
and civil servants, constituted a fifth of the working men
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of Woolwich, these workers did not constitute a coherent, 
organised, block in the way that the Arsenal workers did.
Neither was the engineers' position in Woolwich undermined 
by women workers. Over the Thames women left munitions for 
the clothing trade but in Woolwich in 1921 only 28% of 
women over the age of 12 had paid work. 18% of these were 
indoor servants, 15% were low grade white blouse workers 
and 9% were low grade workers (sewing machinists, tailors' 
pressers and dress and blouse makers) in the clothing 
trade. Teachers accounted for 9%, commercial canvassers, 
9% and there was very little else for women who sought work 
in Woolwich. In 1921, the proportion of women in paid 
employment in south London was smaller than before the war. 
The largest employment category for women in Woolwich was 
personal service. A decade later, in 1931, it was still 
the largest category, accounting for 32% of those women 
working. Fewer men from Woolwich had been killed in the 
war than was the case elsewhere. They constituted almost 
half the population of Woolwich, there were only 3% more 
women, which was not the case nationally (16% more women) 
or in London as a whole where there were 10% more women 
(83). The lack of work and the percentage of men helps to 
explain why although across England and Wales as a whole 
22% of 20-24 year old women were married in 1921, in 
Woolwich the figure was 32%.
A further potential rival to the Arsenal engineers were the
general unions. In 1909, H S Jevons noted how
the skilled man earning, say from 35/- 
to 40/- a week,... in an engineering 
shop finds his friends chiefly amongst 
men earning the same income.... There is 
much difficulty in the passage of sons 
of an unskilled or partly skilled class 
to work of a higher wage and status than 
their father (84).
The distinctiveness of the ASE and the RAGS was necessarily
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eroded by the success of co-operation and trade unionism. 
Nationally there was greater centralisation in the union 
movement with the formation of the TUG General Council in 
1920 and with a shift in the locus of power within unions 
away from shop stewards and towards national collective 
bargaining. Union membership was more common. In 1890 
there were a million trade unionists in Britain. There were 
over 8 million in 1920 (85). Go-operative membership over 
the same period rose from 962,00 to 4,505,000 (86). The 
superiority of the artisan elite, in terms of their 
material possession, was diminished by the affluence of all 
munitions workers during the war years. As a government
report of 1918 noted;
one of the most striking features in 
commerce has been the high purchasing 
power of the community... during the 
war... in munition areas, owing to the 
high rates of wages, combined with the 
increased population, the demand for 
goods has increased (87).
More generally, the levelling in working class earnings 
between 1915 and 1920 involved a relative fall in the 
earnings of many artisans, particularly those in 
engineering. The Board of Trade Committee on Industry and 
Trade carried out a Survey of Industrial Relations in 1926 
and found that skilled artisans in engineering whose wages 
had been 'considerably higher 1 than those of the unskilled 
in 1914 'are now no higher and in some case are even lower, 
than those of various groups of unskilled' (88). In 1918 
there were a number of workers representatives who were 
recognised by the Arsenal management. There were also 35 
unions at the Arsenal, only 8 of which had more than one 
branch (89).
The core of workers continued to hold sway over the others 
in part because many of the new workers were women and many 
women felt that they ought to resign from the Arsenal after 
the war. Women workers were pressured by the press and the
-142-
government which encouraged them to leave. Lloyd George, 
who as Chancellor introduced the Treasury Agreement, 
specifically wanted women to do the work that skilled men 
had done for the duration of the war. After his 
experiences of female staff at the Arsenal Lloyd George 
'determined never again to put his finger into any pie 
connected with women's war work' (90). He washed his hands 
of the Woolwich women and his government passed the 
Restoration of Pre-War Practices Act. The women received a 
month's pay and the promise of state benefit if they were 
made redundant. However maintenance payments were made in 
inconvenient locations, and stopped to women who refused to 
engage in domestic service (91). There was little training 
provided for women (92). In addition there was the 
persistent promotion of the idea that women ought to 'renew 
the homes of England, to sew and to mend, to cook and to 
clean and rear babies' (93). Women munition workers were 
taunted as thriftless and extravagant (94).
There were a number of women's meetings and marches during 
early 1919 which were organised to draw attention to the 
demand for the peacetime utilisation of the national 
factories (95). Flora Baker an Arsenal shop steward, 
demanded that national factories be converted for 
production and training for women and Jack Mills argued 
that women had a right to work under the government so that 
a fair rate of pay could be forced as a pattern to private 
employers' (96).
Locally women were encouraged to leave the Arsenal and 
enter domestic service. In January 1919 the Woolwich 
Gazette reported that there were 25,00 unemployed women in 
London and that 'Women slackers will not take jobs while 
the 25/- a week lasts' (97). Some women felt sad about 
leaving the Arsenal, but also that it was their duty (98). 
Others were resigned to their fate. A journalist described
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the women boarding the trams for the last time in Beresford 
Square, 'no longer the gay rollicking crowd of a few weeks 
ago, many sat still with eyes closed, and scarcely spoke 1 
(99). Many of did not want to return to domestic labour as 
it was badly paid, £26 per annum against between 45/- and 
£6 a week for Arsenal war work (100). Also it was socially 
isolating and there were fewer fringe benefits, such as 
creches, compared to the Arsenal (101). All women were 
supposed to get a fortnight's notice and the Ministry of 
Munitions was prepared to subsidise wages in the private 
sector during the winding up period of munitions work 
(102). The promotion of the notion that women ought to 
return to their pre-war roles may not have stopped the 
'march of the Woolwich women who rise like lions out of 
slumber in unconquerable number' as Woman Worker put it, if 
the national gender divisions had not been mirrored by men 
at local level (103). The ideas were transmitted locally 
by the Woolwich Unemployed Committee and the Dockyards 
Committee. The former, backed by the Workers Union and 
many Labour councillors, called for 'one man, one job', 
while the latter asked the PM to sack 250 laundresses so 
that men could do their work (104). Men's status was 
threatened when unemployment forced a reconsideration of 
their role within both the private and the public spheres. 
In the campaign for alternative work they sought, at the 
cost of exacerbating gender divisions, to regain their 
former status.
Once the women had been dismissed, they were a spent force 
compared to their potential whilst employed. The dominance 
of the remaining men was relatively easy to maintain in the 
face of mass redundancies of Arsenal workers. Lillian 
Barker the superintendent of the women workers at the 
Arsenal shook 30,000 hands in a week as workers left and 
had to wear her arm in a sling for a fortnight (105). In 
the wake of this in December 1918 Matt Horsburgh of the WLP
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told the PM 'the greatest problem was of course the women's 
question and of providing them with work (106). Jack Mills 
made it plain why this was a concern. He said that whilst 
the women workers had earned their jobs, they should not 
displace the pre-war men (107). Some employers did not 
want former munition workers (108).
By June 1919, across the nation 90% of all women workers 
and 48% of men had been laid off (109). The NFWW journal, 
Woman Worker, noted how Woolwich had been through some 
difficult times but that 'our shop stewards have never lost 
heart* and that dances were being held 'to keep the members 
together 1 (110). Within a year of the Armistice, the 
number of women workers at the Arsenal had been reduced to 
1,500. There were 17,500 men still at the Arsenal, and the 
influence of the women was slight. 90% of skilled men who 
left voluntarily after the war found other work within a 
year, whilst 3,500 women remained unemployed. Unmarried 
women were excluded from drawing upon the benefits of the 
Lady Superintendent's Benevolent Fund, which was restricted 
to the wives of servicemen (111). Although it was argued 
that women could rely on husbands or parents, widows were 
not given preferential treatment, despite a plea on their 
behalf in the press (112).
The NFWW was more concerned about the lowering of wages 
experienced by many women who entered post-war work and 
their long hours, rather than conversion or other issues. 
It also subsumed women into the wider category of workers. 
Woman Worker presented eight questions for candidates in 
the 1918 General Election. The questions were about war 
pensions, food prices, work, housing, the Poor Laws, the 
need for a Ministry of Health, indirect taxation and adult 
suffrage. With the exception of the last-mentioned issue, 
the other policies were not specifically related to women 
workers, but to workers in general (113). Many of its
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members had moved home to do munitions work, and 
experienced problems attempting to make payments for rent 
and other fixed charges after their pay was reduced due to 
their swift redundancy. This was a major problem in 
Woolwich, where hostel rents were high (114).
Florence Lunnon a shop steward of the WU said that what was 
done with the Arsenal was a problem for men and that for 
women unemployment was the problem (115). This view was 
shared in the NFWW. However, despite its other concerns, 
the NFWW 'asked to be set productive work 1 , and it 
mentioned 'the shadows of houses that have flitted before 
us for so long are not likely to materialise' (116). It 
pointed out that private enterprise was uncertain of the 
market, that export was difficult and prices were high. 
While the prudent private manufacturer was waiting, the 
government could intervene and use the labour employed 
during the war to make houses. There were shortages which 
the public sector could have alleviated. The blockade of 
Russia, which reduced the size of the market, and the 
attacks on the property of the Irish, which reduced the 
food supply were also mentioned by the NFWW (117). A 
government inquiry into the problem of women's employment 
was established. The Hills' committee suggested that 
national factories be used to remedy the main deficiency of 
women workers, their lack of training (118). In other 
areas of the country the NFWW favoured the idea of 
conversion, and worked with more mainstream bodies. 
Rotherham Chamber of Commerce joined the NFWW in proposing 
that the National Projectile Factory, Rotherham be turned 
over to the manufacture of clothing, bicycles and motors 
(119). In Woolwich women, says Thorn, 'were not by and 
large asking for Arsenal work, they were asking for work or 
maintenance' (120).
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The reiteration of the idea that leaders knew best helped 
to consolidate the stability of the key Woolwich workers. 
Councillor Hart referred to the 'gross stupidity of the 
workers at the recent by-election 1 when they did not follow 
the leaders advice and vote Labour (121). The Pioneer 
noted how 'trade unionists are ever critical of their 
officials and leaders, who seldom get the credit for their 
foresight and acumen in looking after the interests of 
their fellows'. It then went on to explain how Corrigan 
and Harris had secured unemployment benefit for an extra 
day for those who were on short-time when 'Beanfeast Day' 
(an annual paid holiday at the Arsenal) occurred (122). 
During the 1921 miners' lock out, the WLP proposed 'let us 
close up our ranks, trust the GHQ to control our movements 
with skill and effectiveness and do all that is necessary 
to resist the onslaught (123).
The position of the core Arsenal workers was also 
maintained through the fact that the Arsenal was one site, 
run by one management. Around the Arsenal there were only 
tiny, barely unionised, factories. Shop stewards did not 
have to link different sites as they did in Glasgow. Shop 
stewards in Sheffield had to contend with five firms, which 
employed 60% of arms workers, and there were fewer than 
11,000 workers at the main Vickers site when there were 
68,000 workers at the Arsenal.
Barrow was like Woolwich in that it was a single-industry 
town reliant upon the armament manufacturers, Vickers. 
From 1889 when the Naval Construction and Armaments Co 
gained its first considerable Admiralty contract, 'Barrow's 
fortunes followed the course dictated by international 
naval rivalries', the economy was reduced to reliance on 
shipbuilding, the largest concentration of workers was in 
engineering and machine making and it was 'a predominantly 
working class town with a large proportion of skilled and
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semi-skilled workers (124). However, unlike Woolwich the 
politics of Barrow, like Crewe, a railway company town, and 
St Helens, where the Pilkington family established a 
benevolent despotism, were significantly influenced by 
personal employer paternalism. In a study of the 
'structural supports' required for the development and 
maintenance of paternalism in another employment sector 
Filby argued that the greater the dependence on one or two 
employers or industry the greater is likely to be the 
degree of control over the workforce exercised by the 
management (125). In Woolwich the military bureaucracy of 
the Arsenal management operated in a different manner to 
Vickers.
An important difference was that Barrow was relative to 
Woolwich a newcomer to industry. The three decades before 
the First World War were the period when Barrow was 'a new, 
dynamic community, almost a 'Wild West frontier town of the 
industrial revolution'. During the war the numbers 
employed at Vickers during the war more than doubled from 
16,000 to 31,000, most of those workers lived in Barrow. 
After the war many of the surplus workers returned to their 
home towns but, even so, by February 1920, there were 
almost 4,000 registered unemployed in the town. At the end 
of 1920, when the steel works went on an involuntary 'long 
holiday', the emigration rate rose and the population fell 
to 76,561. Like the WLP the Barrow Labour Party had close 
links with the co-operative movement, and Barrow Co- 
operative Society, like the RAGS, originated amongst a 
handful of men employed in engineering and built houses for 
rent. The Barrow Pioneer (established in 1905) was 
published by the co-operative society (126). There was, 
compared to the events on Clydeside, a comparatively stable 
environment and industrial quiescent in Barrow and 
Woolwich.
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The effect of the novelty of industrial processes on Barrow 
was mirrored on other munitions sites. An important aspect 
of the sense of continuity enjoyed in Woolwich was that the 
Woolwich Arsenal had occupied the same site central since 
Tudor times. E P Thompson, Hobsbawm and Branca all note 
that the change urbanisation and modernisation affected 
people's mentalities, and that it was some time, perhaps 
three generations, has to elapse before people adjust to 
the modern industrial experience (127). The significance 
of the continuity of munitions production at the Arsenal 
can be gauged by contrasting it with the position in 
Glasgow. On the Clyde many of the workers were new to 
heavy industrial processes. Giddens argues that the 
working class is 'more likely to achieve a high degree of 
revolutionary class consciousness in the initial phase of 
the industrialisation process 1 . The process of capitalist 
development 'incorporates' the working class and its 
political organisations into bourgeois culture, thus 
stabilising capitalist social relations (128). Contrary to 
Marx's identification of revolutionary consciousness and 
praxis with the maturity of capitalist development, 
revolutionary consciousness in fact 'tends above all to 
characterise the point of impact of post-feudalism and 
capitalist-industrialism' (129). The working class of 
Woolwich had had longer to become deradicalised than the 
newly deracinated workers on the Clyde. Tom Nairn stresses 
that the existence of revolutionary praxis only during the 
earliest stages of modern capitalism; 'the great English 
working class, this titanic social force which seemed to be 
unchained by the rapid development of English capitalism in 
the first half of the century... after the 1840s it quickly 
turned into an apparently docile class' (130). Monds links 
the Clydeside shop stewards-led revolt to a tradition of 
revolutionary anti-capitalist activity and opposition to 
central government (131). Bourgeois political ideology, 
the extension of the franchise and the rise of social
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democratic politics, left the working class in Britain 
unable to carry 'in itself the power to be a class for 
itself .
When the Arsenal workforce expanded from 10,866 in 1914 to 
74,467 three years later many of the workers were new to 
the industrial experience. The woman in charge of the 
women in the workforce found the experience 'overwhelming' 
and the Arsenal 'like a town within a town', an image also 
used by the Christian Science Monitor of 1919 which called 
Woolwich 'a vast city of Arms' (132). Even to the core of 
workers there in 1914 the expansion was rapid and enormous. 
When Lloyd George wanted to give a single example of the 
'unprecedented and revolutionary extent' of the scope the 
work of the government during the war, he selected Woolwich 
(133). The population of Woolwich went up by 15.7% in the 
years 1911-21, and this does not measure the full extent of 
the growth, as many workers, and their families, left very 
soon after the Armistice. Woolwich had the greatest 
increase in population of all the London boroughs, in this 
period, both in absolute terms, 19,000 more people, and in 
terms of the rate of increase (135). In 1922 the local 
paper reported 'tens of thousands have left Woolwich since 
the war' (136). The growth was spectacular, but it was not 
as dramatic for the locality as the influx of munitions 
workers was to Gretna where there were 10-15,000 workers 
where there had been 4,500 in 1914. In Woolwich growth 
had occurred before. The population of the town leapt by 
22% between 1891 and 1901 due to production for the Boer 
War. There were whole new areas where these people lived, 
such as the Well Hall estate, which was, to an extent 
removed from the core of workers in Plumstead. It was from 
their established base that the stable population of 
Arsenal workers could make connections between work at the 
Arsenal and accommodation.
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Despite the growth in the size of the Arsenal there were 
very few permanent migrants in the town. In 1921 over 93% 
of the population of the town came from England and Wales, 
predominantly from London. This was in contrast to the 
East End of London where there were many Jewish immigrants, 
or Govan where there were a large number of Highlanders and 
Irish (137). In 1921 around 4% of the Woolwich population 
were born in Scotland. These included a number of 
radicals; William Ross a Glaswegian foreman from a Chartist 
home; James Cowie, who, on behalf of the workers, gave 
evidence to the Henderson Committee; John Wilson, the 
radical preacher; the Labour councillor James Turnbull; 
socialist publisher Robert Banner; and the trade union 
leader J T Brownlie. There were also Welsh activists Haden 
Guest, the Labour county councillor; Tom Rees of the shop 
stewards and 'Tubby 1 Hall of the Pioneer.
Around 2% of the population of Woolwich were Catholics of 
Irish extraction during the first two decades of this 
century. The first priest to be appointed in the area 
since the Reformation arrived in 1890 and proclaimed that 
'our programme will be a progressive programme' (138). 
Many were voteless soldiers but there were also organised 
republicans and the local priest announced that he was 
pleased to have the 'backbone of the Trades Union Movement 
of Woolwich behind him (139). One local labour activist 
recalled the great fervour of the pre-war struggle for Home 
Rule for Ireland (140). The United Irish Leagues Of GB 
recommended Irish nationalists to vote for Labour 
candidates Cameron and Crooks in Woolwich (141). Irish 
Nationalists took a dim view of the work carried out at the 
Arsenal. After the war, the Woolwich Irish Self- 
Determination League (ISDL) was founded and demonstrated 
in support of the Irish railworkers who were locked out for 
refusing to handle munitions intended for the destruction 
of their own countrymen. The WLP held a Town Meeting to
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inaugurate a publicity campaign about the death of Terence 
McSwiney, late Lord Mayor of Cork. The Labour council 
permitted meetings of the ISDL in the Town Hall (142). The 
ISDL President, Woolwich Labour councillor R P Purcell, 
told the Woolwich 'Hands off Ireland 1 League that the aim 
of the ISDL was to shatter 'the tottering Coalshevik 
government 1 (143). Radicalism among the Irish workers 
might have been linked to a nationalist opposition to the 
colonial ruler but, in Woolwich, there was also divisions 
exacerbated by nationalism. 'Phil', writing on behalf of 
the ISDL, recommended 'that the English workers support the 
Irish struggle for self determination and repatriate 'that 
gang of Welsh-Canadian-Jew-Scot-Irish political twisters [a 
reference to the Cabinet] to their own countries' (144).
Although Celtic immigrants may well have radicalised the 
local labour movement they had to adapt to the terms 
established by the workers who were already at the Arsenal. 
The Pioneer emphasised the importance of long service at 
the Arsenal by frequently reporting instances of men who 
had lengthy service records at the Arsenal. Two examples 
of this give a flavour of the genre. The newspaper cited 
how five brothers all worked at the Arsenal. They followed 
their father who commenced work there over a hundred years 
previously (145). Robert Byford, a founder of the Woolwich 
Radical Club, later a ward secretary in the WLP, an ASE 
branch Treasurer and active in the RACS and Oddfellows, 
worked at the Arsenal, though not continuously, between 
1866 and 1912. Two of his sons worked there (146). There 
was a great sense of continuity, particularly amongst the 
skilled men whose jobs were most secure, and who had a 
stake in the locality. They were able to maintain their 
grip on work at the Arsenal throughout the war, aware that, 
at the end of it, at least 80% of the workforce was going 
to return to commercial work (147). There were divisions 
between settlers and natives but the old hands, who had
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witnessed the effects of the wartime boom of 1899-1901 and 
the aftermath, kept their heads and kept control.
Another reason that the core workers at the Arsenal were 
able to maintain their position was because the government 
established a degree of competition between the different 
state sites which did little to harmonise workers' unity 
and tended to promote the status quo. National factories 
were graded into four categories, with Woolwich in Category 
'A 1 , along with a score of other sites designated for 
retention. Category 'B 1 contained about 85 factories 
suitable for conversion. Repairs and production work was 
carried out at these sites, sometimes with equipment from 
the lower category sites. There were 25 'C 1 factories, of 
value in breaking down ammunition. The other factories 
were returned to their pre-war owners. Despite the fact 
that work of a 'profitable character' was carried out in 
national factories, this was to cease at the end of the 
'transition period' (148). In March 1919 the Evening 
Standard listed 17 national factories which were for sale, 
including the National Aero Engine Factory, Hayes (149). 
Plans announced by the Straker Motor Co to convert the 
Ponders End Shell Works, which employed 6,00 workers during 
the war and was managed by H S Bickerton Brindley, who sat 
on the M°Kinnon Wood committee, but these were not realised 
and the site was closed in March 1919 (150). It was made 
clear that there were only a limited number of orders for 
workers in the state sector. There was some competition 
for orders for metal making between Enfield and Woolwich, 
won by the latter which had the more appropriate plant 
(151). In 1920, whilst the national factory at Lancaster 
received orders for railway repair work and some 
reconditioning of machinery, and there was work for 
Woolwich, Waltham Abbey received no orders (152). The 
campaigners continued to try to make such links, for 'the 
great factor of public opinion must be roused' as Barefoot
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put it when publicising a meeting in London on the 
preservation of the national factories, but they had little 
to offer workers elsewhere (153). Councillor Harry Hart 
visited Plymouth, with its thousands of unemployed, and 
compared the situation to that in Woolwich. He believed 
that the solution to the problem was that 'it is the rank 
and file that must fight... to give them all they deserve, 
that is a clean turnout at the coming General Election 1 
(154). As there were three Coalition MPs in Plymouth, 
building a network with such a limited agenda was 
difficult.
There were other towns where the Armistice spelt 
unemployment for skilled men. These workers often had 
greater similarities with Woolwich workers than differences 
from them and a similarity was that they also tended to be 
bound by economic orthodoxy in their perceptions, and 
unable to form close ties with each other. The closure of 
Pembroke Dock, in order to save £60,000, meant that the 
town was faced with bankruptcy. The pre-war core of 
Admiralty workers had numbered 2,500. They were reduced to 
1,400 by 1925. At least 300 shop keepers depended upon the 
dockyard trade. Weekly wages amounted to £195,000 and 
salaries to £250,000, much of which was tied up in 
property. Two thirds of the workers had mortgages. There 
was a resolution of protest at the closure passed by the 
county council, a petition and meetings in the town but the 
issue, as in Woolwich, was fought as one which concerned 
the locality (155). In January 1919 Robert Home, the 
Minister of Labour, told Portsmouth LAC that any fear of a 
forthcoming lack of work in the government establishments 
was 'entirely baseless' (156). This was untrue and the 
discharges from Portsmouth led to protests and the demand 
by the local MP that all the naval orders be given to 
Portsmouth, which meant that Chatham, Pembroke, Devonport
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and Haulbowline would have to be converted for mercantile 
shipping (157).
There were protests at the closure of the national 
factories but these were not very concerted. Frank Rose 
the Labour MP for Aberdeen, called the Ministry of 
Munitions a bureaucratic monstrosity but also claimed that 
the government gave the 'armaments ring 1 £50 million in 
1920 in order to maintain private plant. He argued for 
reform in the Royal Dockyards but failed to produce a 
coherent scheme (158). Another Labour MP, Young, and 
Coalition Labour MP Clynes both called for national 
factories to be used in the interests of the state, and to 
reduce unemployment, but nothing concrete was proposed and, 
when the Minister of Munitions, Kellaway, stated in the 
Commons that in peacetime 'it is a fallacy to suppose that 
the government can hope to compete, in ordinary terms, with 
private firms', there was no argument put forward to 
compete with this (159). Geddes suggested that trade 
unionists or co-operative societies should purchase 
factories and plans were drawn up, but the estimated costs 
of the national factories were high and the unions were 
unwilling to become owners (160). A conference of 
delegates representing nearly five million trade unionists 
and 3,500,000 co-operative members considered the matter 
and it was decided that the government was trying to sell 
them ' a white elephant' and that the yards should be used 
for building national ships and running a national shipping 
line 1 (161). It was not until March 1922 that a deputation 
of civic chiefs of industrial centres affected by the 
withdrawal of orders for battleships asked the PM to 
provide alternative work (162). By this point it was too 
late for an effective campaign.
The Woolwich workers maintained successful local links. 
The mayor of Woolwich and the NFWW lent support to the
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Association for the Removal of Restrictions at Deptford 
Cattle Market and the Pioneer promoted a meeting about the 
subject (163). The reversion of Deptford Cattle Market 
from being a War Office store to its former role would have 
provided work and cheap food in Deptford. The possibility 
existed that Woolwich would then be used for the War Office 
stores no longer in Deptford (164). The political culture 
in Deptford, which, like Woolwich, had a Conservative MP in 
the late nineteenth century who fought on the platform of 
being a friend of Labour, was similar to that in Woolwich 
(165). In addition there were fraternal links. In October 
1920 the Pioneer was 'delighted 1 because the Dartford 
Labour Party launched the Kentish Leader (166). The 
reopening of the Cattle Market was a concrete, local issue 
which fitted into the liberal framework within which the 
'Peace Arsenal' campaigners worked.
National labour leaders were able to build a body of 
support in Woolwich for the new order because important 
aspects of their case keyed into local concerns. The core 
workers at the Arsenal were paid differently to other 
munitions workers, which probably led to few disputes on 
the site, they were more firmly integrated into the 
corporate structure of the Arsenal, through the recognition 
of their shop stewards, which aided industrial harmony at 
the Arsenal, there was a high degree of mutual respect 
between union representatives and the CSOF. Both in 1897 
and 1922 the Arsenal was not directly involved in the 
acrimonious engineering disputes. As Bush says 'at 
Woolwich Arsenal the powerful shop stewards' committee 
remained obstinately non-revolutionary, due to continuing 
craft exclusiveness and a tradition of management union 
consultation' (167). The Arsenal workers did not attempt 
to create a vast new workers' network, but strove to unite, 
as citizens, on specific issues, such as rationing or the 
use of the nearby cattle market. The cautious development
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had the effect of aiding unity around the core workers. It 
also had the effect of undermining potential links with 
workers in similarly affected parts of the country. A 
broad-based unity might not have been easy to maintain. 
Shop stewards elsewhere in the country were more ambitious 
and of them only Sheffield's shop stewards movement was 
truly representative of all grades and occupations and even 
there shop floor unity was fragile and short-lived (168). 
Thorn argues that the precarious unity of organised labour 
at the Arsenal was 'irreparably broken by 1920 after the 
debacle of Ramsay MacDonald's election and the Labour 
Council's apparent similarity to its Municipal Reform 
predecessors' (169). The election was in 1921 and there is 
no evidence that unity elsewhere was any more firmly 
secured. The unity was based upon the core workers because 
the other workers were less secure in their employment, 
many being either women or unskilled, and were often new to 
Woolwich. There was one site and one management, the 
state, which had owned the site for centuries. Elsewhere 
there were many sites and newer, private employers. 
Despite the influx of new workers and the threat of 
dilution, the core of skilled workers maintained their 
authority within the town after the war because there were 
no other comparable work sites in the locality, those who 
kept their jobs there remained well organised and 
materially better off than unemployed workers or those at 
other sites. The success of this formula allowed the men 
to mould the local labour movement in their image, and to 
exert control over the Woolwich Labour Party. Through the 
WLP their ideas were taken onto the Board of Guardians and 
the council chamber.
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(b)
Schwarz and Durham propose that when the Labour 
Representation Committee was formed in 1900 it agreed to 
extend the struggles of the labour movement into Parliament 
but that there was no consensus on the forms and conditions 
of that extension. MacDonald and Snowden then fashioned a 
form of 'Labour Socialism 1 which, by 1921, was all but 
secured (170). Their use of the term 'Labour Socialism'
comes from Macintyre. His definition is that it was
concerned not with the working class, in 
the accepted sense of the term, but with 
the productive community, "every grade 
and section of producers by hand or 
brain", including entrepreneurs... 
progressive in its movement beyond the 
confines of ameliorative reformism yet 
conservative in its determination to 
damp down class struggle in all its 
forms (171).
Snowden claimed in 1922 that 'the Labour Party is the very 
opposite of a class party [as its object was] justice for 
all men and women who live by honest and useful work' 
(172). MacDonald said 'Socialism marks the growth of 
society, not the uprising of a class 1 (173). MacDonald 
also argued that community was of greater importance than 
class. Disputes did not just have two sides, labour and 
capital, there was also the 'side of the general community; 
and the general community has no business to allow capital 
and labour, fighting their battles themselves, to elbow 
them out of consideration'. To Schwarz and Durham the 
crucial development of the period 1910-24 was 'the 
emergence of Labour as a fundamentally constitutionalist 
force' and MacDonald's formulation about the nature of 
community was 'critical in determining the attitude of 
Labour Party politicians towards the state' (174).
Schwarz and Durham argue that MacDonald was 'profoundly 
influenced' by new liberals' (175). He was so influential
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that 'the grip of social democracy on the minds of the 
working class was much greater than the syndicalist leaders 
had bargained for. Schwarz and Durham add that 'the 
confrontation inside the Labour Party, however, cannot be 
reduced to straightforward conflict between a bureaucratic 
leadership and a belligerent and activist rank and file' as 
the leadership won a measure of consensus for 
constitutionalism (176). In Woolwich it was because the 
attitudes were locally grown, rather than because of 
MacDonald, that social democratic ideas took root. 
Macdonald, clearly, was not persuasive, He failed to be 
elected as MP for the safe Labour seat of East Woolwich in 
1921. Schwarz and Durham say that when the Labour Party 
was opened to individual membership, after the war, this 
aided the process by which new liberal and Fabian 
definitions were channelled into the Labour Party. They go
on,
the containment of rank and file 
activism in the labour movement by 1921 
[and] the rapid constitutionalization of 
the Labour Party... contributed to the 
'passive' regeneration of the state 
(177).
They also say that 'key' working class conflicts were
primarily defensive, and localised or 
sectional. They had three major foci: 
resistance to the dismantling of the 
staple industries, resistance to 
unemployment and resistance to the 
disciplinary and coercive core of the 
state system of welfare (178).
This recognises the importance of the experience of 
concrete struggles. The WLP had individual membership 
before the war. It was the local party which promoted 
constitutionalism and contained activism in its localised
resistance to unemployment. Macintyre says, that
the fundamental weakness of Labour 
Socialism lay not in its reformism but 
in the aimlessness of its reformism. If 
the task of the Labour Party, as 
interpreted by MacDonald, was to repair 
the ship of state for future voyages, it 
manifestly lacked any blueprint which
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might instruct the efforts of the 
repairers (179).
Despite its limited success, it was from the struggle for 
alternative work that constitutionalism and community were 
buttressed, and this occurred because the campaign provided 
the specific 'blueprints', drawn up with reference to the 
radical traditions and experiences which are outlined in 
this section.
In the nineteenth century in Woolwich working class 
radicals were organised as Chartists, or were in the Reform 
League, or were 'Advanced Liberals' (a separate 
organisation under the liberal umbrella). Some men were in 
all three, which ensured that continuity was both political 
and organisational. Although the working class radical 
liberalism was not 'a sign of independent labour or 
socialist consciousness', it was 'important in creating the
framework 1 for this (180). Crossick calls it
the radicalism of men who had come to 
terms with the basis of the society in 
which they now lived and aimed now at 
reforming it. The movement was 
dominated by skilled artisans... the 
radicalism was circumscribed by a broad 
social acquiescence... was not concerned 
with class power... did not grow from 
class conflict (181)
The Reform Act (1884), the Redistribution Act (1885), the 
Local Government Act (1889) and the abolition of plural 
voting for the Guardians (who were in control of local 
benefits provision), in 1894 gave skilled Arsenal workers 
both voting rights and, at least by implication, reciprocal 
duties towards the state. The Woolwich branch of the 
Reform League had, against the grain of the national body, 
stressed that it would be through continued respectable 
behaviour that some working men would be granted the 
franchise. The spirit of this idea of advance through 
respectable behaviour was maintained by the WLP. Crossick 
emphasises the devotion in Woolwich to a traditional
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radical analysis, that saw privilege and political 
inequality as the roots of social ills. He also notes the 
extent to which the high degree of political integration 
within a wider structure of formal politics, derived from 
the way in which national political issues and movements 
took shape within Woolwich (182). These elements were 
reiterated in the WLP's links with the unions, in it's 
concern for respectability and it's advocacy of gradual 
advance and working for a high turnout at elections. The 
WLP's ethos was of parochial cross-class communication, 
like the politics of those of the previous generation, 
'less a challenge to values, far more an assertion of them 
- in a specifically working class context' (183).
Woolwich was not unique in this respect. David Howell 
stresses how 'many spokesmen for the Independent Labour 
Party abandoned the Liberal Party as an instrument but did 
not abandon many of their Radical Liberal principles' 
(184). Crossick says that, 'Liberalism drew working class 
radicalism into the formal politics of the area', it was 
the WLP which kept it there (185). The WLP became the only 
Labour Party in London to absorb both socialists and Lib- 
Labs (186). George Bishop was a Progressive on Plumstead 
Vestry before becoming a Progressive and Labour Alderman on 
the first Woolwich Borough Council. Will Crooks received 
considerable Liberal support and worked closely with the 
Progressives on the London County Council. Both Fennell, a 
former Liberal and James Turnbull, a central figure in 
Plumstead Progressive Association became Labour 
councillors. John Wilson was a Progressive on the London 
School Board for the decade 1891-1901 before committing 
himself to Labour. The social reformer G P Gooch was a 
major shareholder in the Pioneer. In an article written in 
1906 he explained how he wanted a 'new Progressive party, 
with its Liberal and Labour wings' (187). Mainstream 
Liberals were viewed with suspicion by Arsenal workers
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because the Liberals were associated with a non-aggressive 
foreign policy and the closure of the Dockyards in 1869 and 
because the party was dominated by the middle class (188). 
Although, as Crossick notes, 'Liberalism never took the 
firm hold with Woolwich labour aristocrats that it did 
elsewhere 1 , there were elements of the 'essentially 
accommodationist liberal-radicalism' which were of 
significance within Woolwich Labour Party (189).
The WLP was built as a party for working men who wanted to 
have a greater part in local affairs. Following from the 
Arsenal union tradition of a reliance upon legislative and 
administrative procedures as the principal means of solving 
social problems, a primacy was given to formal political 
processes and the marshalling of the popular vote as a 
means of gaining Labour hegemony. The WLP developed from 
the Labour Representation Association, the object of which 
was 'to secure the representation of labour on all elected 
bodies'. Theoretical discussion, or even the co-operative 
commonwealth were not priorities. Crossick says of the 
Victorian period to 'a vigorously independent working class 
politics; a clarification of the involvement with 
liberalism [were] neither satisfying nor necessary' (190). 
This lack of theoretical clarity sometimes faded into 
opposition to politics in general. Militant shop steward U
Watson recalled that when he worked at the Arsenal
Everybody was talking, and the 
conversation of my companions was 
illuminating. The knowledge of 
football, cricket and racing was 
extensive, their fund of lewd stories 
seemed inexhaustible, but they spoke 
little about the significance of the 
European conflagration (191).
Helen Bentwich secured a post as an overlooker at the 
Arsenal, through her brothers influence, 'apparently it's 
the way things are done here', and noticed how war 'was
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seldom mentioned in the Arsenal. Mostly the talk was of 
money 1 (192).
In the late nineteenth century, high on the list of radical 
priorities were the selection of a candidate who was 
supportive of the claims of working men. From 1870 there 
were close links between the Arsenal unions and Advanced 
Liberals and then the WLP and the WL&TC (193). Barefoot 
was secretary of the WL&TC and then of the WLP. One of 
the triumphs of the labour movement had been to get 
Plumstead Vestry to pay union rates and to reintroduce 
union rates for work done for the borough when the WLP 
gained power.
The Advanced Liberals privileged the registration of the 
electorate (194). The WLP maintained this emphasis on 
encouraging individuals to vote for change. Individual 
Labour Party membership was pioneered in Woolwich. Street 
collectors, equivalent to shop stewards, were employed by 
the WLP and paid on a commission basis. Most constituency 
Labour Parties did not adopt individual membership until 
1925, though one of the earliest parties to do so was in 
another town dominated by the munitions industry, Barrow. 
There too there was an effective ward organisation and the 
regular collection of small sums from members (195). In 
1919 the WLP secretary from 1903 to 1941 and its leader on 
the council, Barefoot, argued that 'the gospel of labour 
must go forth to the workers of London, and this could only 
be done by a mass canvass 1 (196). When Fenner Brockway 
(the editor of Labour Leader 1911-16 and the ILP secretary 
1922-6) reported on the 1921 Woolwich East Parliamentary 
by-election he drew attention to the startlingly efficient 
organisational workings of Barefoot and the WLP in 1921 
(197). Herbert Morrison the secretary of the London Labour 
Party also noted, approvingly, the WLP's emphasis on 
building the party. After the 1921 Parliamentary by-
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election he concluded that, 'canvassing on the doorstep is 
of much greater consequence than holding forth at the 
street corner 1 (198). The London Labour Party was an 
affiliate body, a principle affiliate in terms of financial 
support was the RAGS, and there were close ideological 
links with the WLP (199). Both the WLP and the London 
Labour Party favoured house-to-house canvassing, indeed 
Morrison's model Labour Party member was not a fiery 
socialist but one with a 'mind like a card index' (200).
The encouragement of personal involvement established the 
WLP firmly within the locality because there was face-to- 
face contact when the collectors called for the penny a 
week. Whereas the President of the WU, Jack Beard, 
referred in 1919, to his members as passive receptacles 
upon whom ideas could be imprinted, the people of Woolwich 
were viewed by the WLP as potentially active citizens 
(201). When the Pioneer pointed out that the people who 
financed the Coalition 'are also calling the tune, and well 
the Arsenal workers know it 1 , it was drawing attention to 
the fact that Arsenal workers were not dupes (202). This 
also meant that they could be blamed for the consequences
of their actions. The Pioneer took the electorate to task
Think of it you hard headed free and 
independent electors who turned down 
Alternative Work on March 2 [1921, a 
Parliamentary by-election]. The amazing 
decision of the Cabinet is obviously a 
complete capitulation to their bosses - 
the private contractors ... We sold our 
birthright of stalwart championship in 
the House of Commons on March 2 for a 
mess of potage . . . And there has been a 
change in atmosphere in regard to 
Woolwich in high places ever since Black 
Wednesday (emphasis in original) (203).
The WLP asked people to 'assist us to make the world a 
brighter place for all to live in. First join the Party 
yourself and then become a missionary to bring others into 
our ranks (204). This focus upon the individual
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responsibility of electors had the effect of privileging 
the process of elections and marginalising the wider 
economic and social environment. The failure to secure 
alternative work was blamed on the victims, the electorate 
of Woolwich, as well as the private armaments companies, 
for the solution was seen to lie in the hands of the 
individual, not a matter for collective, direct action. 
Harry Snell argued that 'you in Woolwich can't complain 
about the state of things that exists 1 . The reason for 
this statement was that the WLP candidate had recently lost 
a Parliamentary by-election after having 'asked for a 
mandate from you to tell the government that the Arsenal 
was to be kept going on work of a civil kind. You sent a 
message back to the government that you wanted nothing of 
the sort and you were satisfied with what you'd got. 
Therefore it is not the government that is to blame, it is 
you that is to blame 1 (205).
In the key election text of the Pioneer in 1918 27% of the 
article was devoted to the liberal issue of Free Trade, and 
to a central issue in the 1903 by-election of Crooks, cheap 
white bread. A further 27% was taken up with a call for 
women to vote Labour. The campaigning for the extension of 
the franchise had received much support in the town. That 
only 30% of Woolwich soldiers would be able to vote, the 
record of the government and the need for the Labour Party 
to promote parliamentary political activity rather than 
promoting the value of industrial action, were also 
mentioned. A 'Parliament in which Labour is not fully 
represented spells chaos and possible revolution within the 
next twelve months' (206). This article reflected the 
constitutional, liberal concerns of the dominant strain of 
Labourism in the town. The Pioneer when calling for funds 
in order to fight the LCC elections of 1922 asked 
rhetorically 'Have you realised why the Coalition at 
Westminster so largely representative of the British
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Federation of Industries [surely the FBI?] is refusing work 
to the Arsenal? 1 (207). All questions could be solved by 
reference to Parliament.
The promotion of this idea of individual responsibility was 
tied to an idea of citizenship. Barefoot promoted the idea 
of the constitutionalist might of the local citizens, 
rather than the value of united working class action. He
announced that,
every shopkeeper, every ratepayer, is 
affected by the principle of direct 
labour and the sooner Woolwich is united 
on this principle the better it will be 
for Woolwich. And when we are united, 
when the government cannot turn round 
and say that on a recent occasion [the 
1921 by-election] you turned down the 
principle of alternative work and direct 
labour then we can see what we can do to 
secure more work for Woolwich Arsenal 
[my emphasis]
Councillor James Newman (Labour) made a similar point in 
response to a jibe by a Municipal Reform councillor that 
there was no evidence that the influence of the private
sector was responsible for the running down of the Arsenal.
Directly the war came to an end these 
workshops which had been so successful, 
and which had been fitted with the 
latest machinery, were shut. And who 
shut them? Parliament. And who was 
mainly represented in Parliament? 
Private enterprise.
The inference was that the transformation of social and 
economic structure could be accomplished through voting for 
the appropriate person to represent the locality in the 
Commons (208). This was aided by greater individual 
membership.
Critics on the left have seen individual membership as a 
means of diluting the fervour of the activists and 
increasing the authority of the leadership over the 
otherwise ungovernable mass. John Foster argues that the
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introduction of individual membership increased the scope 
for interference by those outside the labour movement and 
Thomas Bell, a contemporary Communist, suggested that it 
was introduced specifically so that middle-class members 
could counter working-class militancy (209). In Woolwich 
the effect was to encourage individual involvement in the 
construction of a community, not a class, consciousness. 
The WLP considered itself to be answerable to the people of 
the borough, not just the labour movement. The WLP 
inquired as to whom the Woolwich Unemployed Committee, a 
CPGB-dominated organisation, was accountable and it did 
this from the high ground of its own encouragement of 
participation. The effect of the WLP's efforts was that 
the turnout for elections - a great deal of WLP work 
involved checking the electoral register, - was almost 
always the highest in London throughout the interwar 
period. The Pioneer campaigned for readers to register to 
vote, carrying, for a number of weeks prior to the closure 
of registration, advertisements with slogans such as 'be 
certain that your weapon is ready with which to... strike 
the mighty blow! 1 (ie vote Labour) (210). In the year 
following the Armistice, the WLP was active in campaigns 
for elections to the Commons, the county council, the 
borough council, and the Board of Guardians. It conducted 
two registrations, and compiled two registers of the 68,000 
voters in the borough. It also reconstructed the ward 
organisation, conducted a rents campaign, held public 
meetings, aided strikers and by May 1919 had doubled its 
membership. In 1921 the Daily Herald 'push 1 prize of £50 
was awarded to the WLP on account of the fact that it was 
in the constituency of East Woolwich that the paper gained 
most new readers - 849 of them (211). The WLP raised 
money through printing on the Pioneer press and through 
approaches to local clubs (212). In 1919 the average 
turnout for the LCC elections was 16%, as compared to 1913 
when 52% of the smaller electorate had voted. The highest
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percentage turnout for any borough was East Woolwich with 
40.9%, over five times higher than the lowest turnout, 7.8% 
in North Islington. Between the wars Woolwich 
consistently had the highest turnout in London. In 
focussing upon the demand for legally constituted reforms 
made through the state apparatus, the WLP revealed its 
radical-liberal heritage and its interest in the 
involvement of citizens in electoral politics.
The corollary of the emphasis on electoral politics was the 
disinclination to engage in direct action. Snell argued 
that demonstrations did not get results, hard work and 
organisation did. He emphasised that even if he was not 
elected to the Commons he wanted to increase the membership 
of the WLP and the sales of the Pioneer (213). He also 
stressed that if 'the working class wanted a thing they 
could get it by political action, acting loyally and using 
wisdom in doing the right thing 1 . Haden Guest, one of the 
two county council members for Woolwich, replied to the 
criticism that the Labour Party was ill-prepared for power 
by saying that, in fact, the party had got a 'large number 
of men and women able to carry out the administrative and 
other duties' (214). He wanted the demands of the movement 
'translated into administration and legislation 1 (215).
A further aspect of the notion of radical community which 
was developed in Woolwich through the 'Peace Arsenal' 
campaign derived from an idea of citizenship. Hall and 
Schwarz argue that from 1889 there was pressure from the 
organised workers' movement for the expansion of democratic 
participation and that this challenge carried within it 'a 
new conception of citizenship. Furthermore 'the pressures 
for the expansion of democratic participation were not 
confined to the male working class (216). According to
Crossick from the late nineteenth century in Woolwich
the class hostility that was perpetuated 
by artisan radicals in Kentish London
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was not that between employer and 
employee, but between the industrious, 
productive classes as a whole, and the 
lazy and privileged... landowners and 
aristocracy (217)
The barriers to progress of the Arsenal workers, according 
to this nineteenth-century radical position, were not class 
privilege, or bankers with ultimatums concerning government 
spending or newspaper proprietors, rather they were 
corruption, privilege and unfair rules. Each section of 
society had its own proper functions and these could be 
made to run with greater efficiency. When Bernard Shaw 
mocked the 'Ideal of Citizenship' in a lecture in 1909 he
might have been describing the view of the WLP.
We will explain our good intentions and 
our sound economic basis to the whole 
world: the whole world will then join us 
at a subscription of a penny a week; 
then, the whole of society belonging to 
our society, we shall become society, 
and we shall proceed to take the 
government of the country into our hands 
and inaugurate the millennium (218) .
The notion of citizenship was developed by the WLP which 
offered 'straight talk to sensible citizens' as opposed to 
Communist 'blackguardism' (219). Snell, addressing women 
at a WLP meeting proposed that 'in the minds of the best 
women' the vote was never an end in itself. Women he 
contended, demanded the vote because it was 'a badge of 
citizenship... it had placed upon them the opportunity of 
entrance into the full heritage of citizenship'. The 
Labour Party, the Pioneer claimed, was 'the party of the 
people against these class parties' (220). Within Labour's
ranks were
doctors, parsons, barristers, 
historians, novelists, experts on 
education and economics... all the 
workers. And the workers, as John 
Stuart Mill said, are not a class, but 
the nation (221).
The reference to J S Mill recalled how in nineteenth 
century Woolwich working class radicals had sought the
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support of the middle class (222). The Pioneer noted that 
12% of the population owned 88% of the wealth but added 
that this minority did not include 'scientists, the 
inventors, the great engineers, the workers by hand or 
brain 1 (223). Fred Thomas, the AGO secretary, proposed in
1920 that
the question of class should in no way 
sway the minds of the workers of today. 
There should be no class, each member of 
the community being a factor essential 
to the whole... I do not believe that 
the present system of a strike is a 
successful means where by we can secure 
the objects for which we strike... there 
is no better method of dealing with 
direct industrial problems than the shop 
stewards movement. Shop stewards should 
have extended powers (224).
Citizenship was not handed down to the workers of Woolwich 
by the central government, it had a local component which 
emphasised the importance of working men's organisations. 
It also stressed public order and respectability. 
Throughout the 1922 local election campaign the Pioneer 
never used the words "socialism" or "working class" but 
rather characterised the battle as between "labour" and 
"anti-labour" (225). The Pioneer urged the electorate to 
vote Labour by reference to "the civic spirit" of the Party 
which would run the borough "wholly and solely on the 
interests of the citizen" (226). In reference to the 
'Peace Arsenal 1 campaign the Pioneer employed the language 
of citizenship; 'We men and women of Woolwich appeal to our 
fellow citizens, the electors of Britain. We do not appeal 
for pity or charity... We appeal for a hearing' (227).
The ASE, the RAGS and later the WLP, were institutions 
which expressed the artisans' faith in the ability of 
working men to make their own world by the removal of the 
obstacles in the path which led to just rewards. In 1921 
Jack Mills wrote a pamphlet denouncing the right-wing 
landowner, the Duke of Northumberland and the WLP denounced
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various groups established by the Duke in radical terms, 
'real constitutional government is not their concern, but 
government by persons who are privileged, economically and 
socially to exploit their fellows' (228). The WLP wanted 
Sir Kingsley Wood to be given a 'fair hearing' and it made 
sure that the former Tory mayor of Woolwich was 'graciously 
treated' (229). Probably the nearest that Barefoot got to 
a public display of intolerance of a fellow citizen was 
when he shook his fist at a MR councillor, Dawson, or when 
he agreed with another MR councillor, Campbell, that 
Communists were 'scum of other countries' (230). Sir 
Kingsley Wood in a speech which epitomised the new civic 
links, the Eltham Chamber of Commerce annual dinner, 
praised Barefoot and Labour mayor Richard Purcell and then 
said, 'people should not lose the old spirit and love of 
this spot in the new civic patriotism (231).
The concept of a civic community was further bolstered by 
the use of history to show that social regeneration 
proceeded in a gradual and organic fashion, to demonstrate 
the need for local Labour representation and leadership and 
to point out the ground that had been gained and was 
vulnerable to counterattack. Political recklessness could 
lead to the exclusion of Labour from the two-party 
constitutionalism which was being constructed and the 
destruction of all that had been won. Schwarz and Durham 
argue that 'the crucial factor in the strategic analysis of 
the constitutionalists was the perpetual anxiety that a 
political backlash would occur 1 (232). This critique 
sounded more convincing if it was aided by local historical 
examples. The WLP constructed a positivist account of a 
past when there had been a community in Woolwich and where 
workers, although they might be denied justice in the short 
term, would eventually benefit from general and inevitable 
progress. WLP council candidate Reverend Matthews wrote 
that 'the citizen whose time is limited... might well make
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his reading historical 1 (233). The men of Plumstead had, 
according to the Pioneer, 'presented a solid front to Bluff 
King Hal when he sought to restrict their rights...The 
'characteristic sturdy independence 1 and the 'grit and 
determination of Plumstead men' safeguarded Plumstead 
Common in 1876 when the enclosure of common land by 
businessmen was successfully resisted (234). Will Crooks, 
the first Labour MP in the town, was credited with 
persuading Haldane, the Minister of War, to establish the 
Henderson committee (235). Shortly after he lost the seat 
in January 1910 'feed and speed* was introduced at the 
Arsenal. Layoffs were suspended during MacDonald's by- 
election campaign in 1921. The day after Labour lost the 
seat plans were announced to reduce the number at the 
Arsenal to 14,300, a figure lower than that of 1914, by the 
end of the month. As MacDonald said, reiterating the 
importance of Parliament '6,000 of you are being 
discharged. That is the result of the election' (236).
Within this notion of a civic community, locality was 
stressed above class. This had its origins in the late 
nineteenth century. Sutton, expressly working within the 
framework provided by Hall and Schwarz, argues that from 
'the 1870s liberal discussions of citizenship revolved 
around the belief that it could neutralise class 
consciousness and play a crucial role in integrating the 
working class into the state' (237). In the 1870s the 
local MP, William Gladstone, became unpopular with the 
local working class because he spoke only eight times in 
the borough during the twelve years that he represented 
Greenwich. The Advanced Liberals paid close attention to 
local affairs, indicative of a sense of involvement and 
influence in the locality (238). As the Arsenal was 
central to the locality local MPs all tried to link their 
names to the well being of Arsenal workers. The 
Conservative MP for Woolwich until the turn of the century
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was Edwin Hughes. He made a point of elicting working 
class support and he had close ties with the RAGS. As he 
explained, 'on matters tending to improve the social 
condition of the people I have voted independently of 
party, and for that reason I consider myself a true 
representative of LABOUR' (239). His focus, on the Arsenal 
workers, adds weight to Hinton's summary of the position 
that; 'working class politics at the end of the last 
century were the politics of the labour aristocracy' 
(240). The Woolwich seat was divided in two in 1918 with 
Crooks taking the East seat uncontested and Sir Howard 
Kingsley Wood becoming the MP for Woolwich West from 1918 
until 1943. The latter frequently raised the issue of pay 
for Arsenal workers in the Commons, and had a record of 
arguing for the fair treatment of Arsenal workers in regard 
to their pensions and when there were layoffs (241). He 
was 'staunchly in favour of the claims of labour', arranged 
for Arsenal workers to meet the Financial Secretary to the 
Treasury and, in his capacity as a solicitor, represented 
tenants evicted from the Arsenal's housing estate (242). 
He said that 'the Unionist of today was not the hidebound 
Tory of prewar days', that 'he would always support any 
effort to get alternative work to supplement the necessary 
war work'. He called himself 'a social reformer, not a 
socialist 1 (243).
Labour MPs also emphasised their ties to the locality. The 
first thing which the Pioneer reported about Harry Snell, 
when he became the prospective Parliamentary candidate for 
Woolwich East, was that he was 'one who is really a 
Woolwich man' (244). His maiden speech in the Commons was 
about the Arsenal. Jack Mills, elected as MP for Dartford 
in 1920, spent the morning prior to his introduction to the 
House in the Arsenal and intended to make his first speech 
about the Arsenal (245). The Pioneer could not claim that 
MacDonald had any ties to Woolwich, especially as he was
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promised to Aberavon at the following General Election. It 
did claim that his opponents were 'a gang of carpetbaggers 
from the Tory headquarters' (246). MacDonald stressed that
Woolwich interests will remain my interests, Woolwich 
concerns will remain my concerns'. The Coalition made its 
only electoral gain in the lifespan of the government 
because MacDonald's brand of constitutionalism could not be 
imported wholesale. Unlike his opponent he lacked any 
empathy with the working class. The victorious Coalition 
candidate, Captain Gee VC, like Crooks, was born in the 
workhouse. Of the 51 official Labour MPs before the war 
MacDonald was the only one whose parents were not of the 
industrial working classes and one of only three who did 
not begin his working life as an industrial labourer. He 
divided workers and blamed victims when he tactlessly said 
that the trade unions stood in the path of ex-Servicemen 
and forced their dismissal from the Arsenal (247). Ross 
McKibbon blames the lack of union support for MacDonald's 
failure (248).
MacDonald had not got a record of support for the war, 
indeed a meeting of his in July 1918 in Woolwich was 
disrupted by an anti-pacifist crowd. This was in stark 
contrast to Gee who spent 29 years in the ranks of the 
army. Gee reminded voters that the Arsenal workers had 
passed a resolution during the war stating that MacDonald, 
due to his pacifism, had foregone the right to speak for 
Labour. Gee argued that the German air raids, (Woolwich 
Arsenal had been a target), were the responsibility of 
pacifists. The Woolwich Herald suggested there was 
discontent in Labour's ranks because a major, Haden Guest, 
had not been selected as a candidate and Snell reported 
that the WLP was 'half -sullen' about the candidate (249). 
The Woolwich Herald called the contest one of 'pacifism vs 
patriotism'. Crooks had been the MP who had led the 
singing of the National Anthem in the Commons when the war
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broke out and on Gee's victory the Woolwich Herald reported 
that 'a patriot succeeds a patriot 1 . Gee had the Reverend 
C P Edwards MC 'the fighting parson' on his side and the 
demagogic Independent MP Horatio Bottomley intervened 
against MacDonald. He paid for trams to pass through the 
town advertising that MacDonald was a traitor and ran a 
campaign in his journal John Bull. Gee, copied the WLP and 
established his own newspaper, the North Kent Argus (250). 
Maurice Cowling attributes Gee's victory to Bottomley and 
similarly Chris Cook blames pacifism (251). Snell blamed 
both (252). Gee promised 'to do his bit for the Arsenal 
workers' in regard to pensions and firmly stated, 'I 
certainly do not want to see the Arsenal closed. If we had 
taken Mr Ramsay MacDonald's advice it would have been shut 
down long ago' (253). Within a month of his election Gee 
had occasion to meet with Lloyd George. He made sure that 
he "put in a word for Woolwich Arsenal and its workers' 
(254). Both parties recognised the centrality of the 
Arsenal to the campaign, Gee was better placed to exploit 
it. As soon as the WLP had a more appropriate candidate, 
Snell, it recovered the seat. The Communists in Woolwich 
rejected MacDonald and the Commons and looked to a working 
class dictatorship as 'the sole salvation'; the WLP's 
accepted the Commons but MacDonald only grudgingly because 
he did not accord with its conceptualisation of a local 
civic community (255).
The notion of a strong local community was reinforced in a 
number of other areas. The applicability of the concept 
provided a broad base from which the 'Peace Arsenal' 
campaign could be launched and then maintained. When the 
Pioneer argued that a local wood ought to be saved from 
development it focused upon cross-class links. It listed a 
number of famous people who supported the view of the paper 
and then added rather patronisingly that 'all the great 
mass of the toiling population have felt instinctively that
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these great heights [Shooters Hill and Castle Wood] must be 
saved 1 (256). The rational leaders articulated the 
instincts of the people in this as in other fields. The 
campaign to save Castle Wood on Shooters Hill was supported 
by the secretary of the shop stewards, Voce; the WL&TC 
chair, Jackman; the WCC President, Eley; high-ranking local 
Army officers; elected representatives of both parties on 
the local and the county councils; the MPs; and the chair 
of the Polytechnic governors, and funder of the Pioneer, 
Grinling (257).
The campaign for alternative work was developed within, and 
bolstered, a particular view of the state as the political 
expression of the community. The WLP posited the state as 
a free-floating device, above class politics, which could 
be seized, or at least influenced in the legislature, so 
that appropriate solutions could be imposed. It was the 
state which had introduced 'one of the greatest changes' at 
the Arsenal, according to a man who worked there from 1877 
until 1922. It introduced the eight-hour day in 1894, 
three years before the large-scale dispute in the 
engineering industry over the issue (258). MacDonald 
argued for the conversion of the Arsenal into a 
specifically 'national civil workshop' and the Pioneer 
argued that the national organisation of industry is the 
alternative to anarchy and red chaos' (my emphasis) (259). 
Snell proposed, as he had done for over twenty years that 
just as there was a standing army so there ought to be a 
'standing Arsenal'. He also thought that the Arsenal 
should be used for 'the production of things that the 
community does need', and stressed that unemployment should 
be dealt with nationally, not on a local basis (260).
The WLP gained control of the offices of the local state, 
the council and the Board of Guardians, in the 1919 
elections and the campaign for alternative work became part
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of a broader campaign for the government to take 
responsibility for unemployment. The WLP' s time in office 
was characterised by cautious, constitutional, action on 
behalf of the those who were perceived to be part of the 
community. The WLP when running the council reduced the 
rates and emphasised in its election material that to vote 
Labour was to 'tell the Coalition that you stand for real 
economy 1 (261). The chair of the finance committee was 
proud that 'we not only preach economy, we practice it... 
we promised true economy in administration and I challenge 
anyone to show that we have broken that promise (262). A 
Fabian publication of 1929 subtitled 'the case for 
municipal housekeeping 1 focused upon Woolwich because from 
it one might deduce 'the perfect arsenal of facts which 
prove that its Labour councillors can mind their own 
business' (263).
As Christopher Nottingham notes, during this period 'much 
care was taken over the dispersal of state functions' so as 
to allow Ministers to evade responsibility when it suited 
them (264). Specifically the cost of unemployment benefit 
was raised by the council and the benefit distributed by 
the Guardians. If adequate provision was to be made for 
the unemployed there was a heavy rates burden in the area 
where the unemployed resided. The more unemployed people 
there were, the less that could be raised and the greater 
the calls upon the council's services. The number of 
people eligible to claim the council's free milk rose as 
unemployment rose. 20,000 households paid rates in 
Woolwich, at least 75% of which were working class houses. 
By September 1921 there were around 10,000 unemployed in 
the town, about 50% of whom paid rent. Most of the 11,000 
on short time at the Arsenal paid rent. Rent payers also 
paid rates and, under the Rent Acts, every rates increase 
above that which prevailed in 1914 could be added to the 
rent. If 60% of the unemployed - a low estimate - could
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draw £2 a week for their families the total required from 
the rates would be £12,000 a week. A penny (Id) rate 
raised £3,900 in Woolwich, £3,000 in Poplar and £31,000 in 
Westminster. For Woolwich to have raised £31,000 an 8d 
(3%p) rate would have had to be levied (265). In order to 
raise £12,000 a week the occupier of a house rated at £12 
(the working class average in Woolwich) would have to find 
an additional £7 16s (£1.80) a year (266).
In response to this inequality the WLP lobbied for the 
equalisation of the rates across London, but stressed that 
the relief of the overburdened ratepayer 'must await the 
coming of a Labour government 1 (267). The WLP argued that 
as the Arsenal had provided arms for the nation and as it 
was the government which had induced people to move to 
Woolwich during the war and as the Arsenal workforce were 
paid from the national coffers, the burden of unemployment 
ought to be taken off the ratepayers. Specific remedies 
were proposed: the government to reimburse the Woolwich 
Borough Council for the cost of the benefits that it had 
paid, public works, a house building programme, trade with 
Russia, credits for central Europe, and the use of the 
Arsenal 'for the production of useful articles' (268). The 
WLP also called a town meeting and demanded a 'special 
grant to relieve Woolwich 1 , from the Ministry of Health on 
account of the fact that unemployment in the town was 
distinctive (269). In addition the Woolwich Borough Council 
provided a charity, the Mayor's Fund, for the unemployed 
and sent Barefoot, along with a number of the London 
mayors, to lobby Lloyd George when he was in Gairloch, 
Scotland (270). Following the publicity resultant from the 
Gairloch confrontation the Minister with responsibility for 
local government, Sir Alfred Mond, met WBC representatives 
and promised further house-building. The War Office agree 
to meet a deputation from the Joint Town Committee (271). 
Representatives from the council, the Chamber of Commerce,
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the unions (the ASE, WU and NUGW) and from the Ministry of 
Labour Local Employment Committee, went to the War Office. 
Led by Voce the delegation pressed for an end to the 
discharges and government aid for the borough as the town 
was 'almost wholly dependent on the national factories for 
work 1 . The Service orders ought to go to the Arsenal, 
because the Arsenal could not diversify and because the 
McKinnon Wood committee had concluded in favour of a 
national arsenal in Woolwich. The War Office countered 
the delegation by stating that the question was one for the 
Cabinet, not the War Office. Sir Kingsley Wood said that 
the Cabinet should decide the on the matter and Barefoot 
said, 'it was a Cabinet decision that 300 men should be 
discharged weekly and therefore a Cabinet decision would be 
required to stop the discharges'(272). Those who 
campaigned for alternative work, and on the related issues 
of work and local government finance, abided by the 
constitutional conventions as well as employing a notion of 
community.
The role of the Guardians in Woolwich was not to provide a 
platform for an attack on the government, rather the 
Guardians were to provide voluntary, constitutional 
solutions, which involved a degree of collective self-help. 
They were to help 'towards making the lives of many 
thousands of those who have fallen upon hard times a little 
brighter' (273). The WBG held a 'whip round' and provided 
a 'meat tea' unemployed men and their children (274). The 
WLP looked to another part of the community network for 
support. Coupons which could be exchanged at the RACS were 
also provided by the WBG and the RACS itself provided food 
at wholesale prices to the council's Unemployed Committee 
(275).
Protests at the level of benefit were levelled at the WLP 
and the problems of unemployment fell upon it rather than
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central government. In September 1921 The WBG was locked 
in its offices overnight with a group of people who 
demanded that the Guardians make further payments to the 
unemployed. The WLP called this 'disgusting treatment... 
by those not resident within the area covered by the 
Woolwich Board 1 (276). The protestors were deemed to be 
physically be from outside of the community and thus of 
less account. This was not an isolated incident. There 
was a similar event in Erith Council Chamber in October 
1919 (277). In 1921 WLP organiser Charles New was pelted 
with onions because, in his capacity as a Guardian, he gave 
evidence which led to the conviction of a man found guilty 
of obtaining relief whilst his wife had a job (278). In 
February 1922 Barefoot and New were locked in with 
protestors at the Town Hall, the Woolwich Guardians were 
locked in their offices, a meeting of Erith Guardians was 
invaded by 500 people and an attempt was made to rush the 
gate of the Lewisham Guardians' office (279). The Times 
reported that 'processions of the unemployed to Boards of 
Guardians are now a daily occurrence in London 1 (280).
There were five London Boards with Labour majorities in 
1919 but Poplar and Woolwich were the only London boroughs 
where there had been a Labour administration had held power 
before the war (281). Both had their own newspapers; the 
Pioneer urged readers to buy the Herald (282). Poplar was 
characterised by casual dock labour and the rag trade. The 
Labour council in Poplar made the same complaints about the 
unfairness of the rating system as the WLP made; but won 
its case through an intransigently unconstitutional 
campaign (283). George Lansbury, a Poplar councillor and 
Guardian, said that it was their duty to provide 'decent 
treatment for the poor outside the workhouse and hang the 
rates!' (284). In 1921 Poplar Borough Council resolved, 
without prior consultation with the London Labour Party or 
other Labour Councils, only to raise a rate for itself and
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the Guardians, and not to raise a rate for London-wide 
matters such as the police, water and asylums. Following 
legal proceedings against them, in September 1921, 29 
Poplar councillors were fined and gaoled for their 
activities on a specific charge of contempt of court. 
Schwarz and Durham argue in respect of the 'key class 
conflicts in the 1920s 1 that 'many of the fiercest 
struggles were concentrated within and against the 
apparatuses of the local state', and that, as in the case 
of Poplarism, 'on specific issues the constitutional/non- 
constitutional distinction was simply inoperative* (285). 
In Woolwich the prognosis that to achieve either work or 
maintenance constitutional action was required was 
reinforced by the WLP's analysis and activities. It was 
against the background of the WLP's response to Poplarism 
that the 'Peace Arsenal 1 campaign was developed.
The WLP did not condemn the Poplar councillors outright but
neither did it support them through either the Guardians or
the Council (286). The WLP called the imprisonment of the
Poplar councillors a
mere incident which does not affect the 
problem of unemployment in the slightest 
degree beyond calling attention to its 
urgency (287)
Councillor Newman told his fellow members of Woolwich 
council that the time was rapidly approaching when Woolwich 
might have to follow Poplar's example but he hoped the 
necessity would not arise (288). Councillor Harry Gilder 
(Labour) was the representative of the Joint Shop Stewards 
of the NUGW and the WU and represented the lowest-paid 
workers. He explained to the Communist-backed Woolwich 
Unemployed Committee that even 'supposing that you do get 
the Guardians to do what you want you will find that the 
Government will still be top dog and refuse to allow the 
Guardians to pay out the money. They may go to prison and 
you will still be out of work' (289). When the Poplar
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councillors were released there were still the precepts to 
pay and there was still no rate equalisation but the 
Minister hurried through legislation, the Local Authorities 
(Financial Provisions) Act of 1921. This allowed the 
council to borrow money, dependent on Ministerial consent, 
and it spread the cost of pauperism, proportionate to the 
rateable value of the area, over all London. The 
equalisation required the collation of the accounts of the 
appropriate Poor Law Unions.
In 1921 control of the Guardians reverted to Municipal 
Reform (MR). In June 1922 the Woolwich MR Guardians 
declined to take advantage of the Finance Act which would 
have allowed them to save £40,000 from the rates. The 
Labour-controlled council refused to pay the Guardians the 
money which the WBG could have saved (290). The Guardians 
then took the council to court (291). The WBC were 
prepared to go to court to ensure that the rates did not 
rise to lOd (4%p) in the pound but were unwilling to go to 
court for the same reasons as the Poplar councillors.
In January 1922 the Minister of Health, Mond, imposed new 
scales of relief which the Poplar Guardians refused to 
implement. They avoided further legislative battles by 
using their own definition of 'cases of emergency 1 and thus 
effectively ignored the intentions of the Minister. Four 
Labour representatives from the Guardians, four from the 
WLP General Committee and four from the official Woolwich 
Unemployment Committee met to consider the Poplar scale of 
relief of £2 per week for a married couple compared to 
Mond's level of £1.5s (£1.25). There were similarly 
proportioned increases for other claimants. If these more 
generous allowances were paid in Woolwich it would have 
added over £2,600 a week to the cost of unemployment 
benefit in Woolwich and added £2.12s (£2.60) to the annual 
bill for a person paying £12 a year in rates. The WLP
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resolved that the WBG would not pay the same rates as the 
Poplar Board to the unemployed (292). The meeting decided 
that the local authority would 'go as far as possible 1 on 
the issue but would 'centre agitation on the National 
administration' rather than agree to pay the money (293). 
'Surely the work of the Guardians in relieving the 
destitute under present conditions was more of a national 
than a local question' said Councillor Newman. He added 
that at present the government paid 85% of the cost of poor 
relief and that it 'ought to be more like 98%' (294).
The WLP, when in office, paid union rates, as did Poplar c 
ouncil (295). In 1924 both Woolwich council and Poplar 
council were, after a lengthy legal battles, surcharged for 
this by the District Auditor (296). In 1925 Woolwich 
council paid £5,000 towards the Poplar Councillors Defence 
Fund and the struggle continued until 1927 when, after an 
emergency conference in Woolwich between trade unionists 
and councillors, the WBC were again surcharged for paying 
illegially high wages. Shortly afterwards new legislation 
clarified the issue (297). On this union-related matter 
the WBC was defiant of the government. That the WLP was 
prepared to defend trade unions and low rates in the courts 
reflects the ties between local radical-liberalism and the 
unions. The continual co-operation was unique in London, 
and it lasted until the Communists gained control of the 
WL&TC (298). In 1921 the WL&TC fell under Communist 
control and in 1922 the WL&TC, though still affiliated to 
the WLP, supported non-Labour Party candidates in the LCC 
elections, and the WLP drew apart from it (299).
The WLP wanted an increase in state employment in Woolwich 
but if orders for the Arsenal were not forthcoming it was 
prepared to implement government relief work schemes. 
Lansbury thought relief schemes institutionalised casual 
labour and that the municipal work should be done by a
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regular workforce, not by the unemployed (300). Woolwich 
council was more willing to acquiesce with public works, 
seeing them as a temporary expedient before the imposition 
of a socialist solution by a national Labour government. 
73,000 jobs had been promised in Minister of Labour Dr 
Thomas Macnamara's Public Works programme of 1921 (301). 
The 'thoroughly scientific 1 WBC approach was to provide 
full-time work for 20 men and part-time work for 160 
painting public toilets and street signs, breaking up 
stones and performing a number of similar tasks. With the 
aid of some LCC money a sewers scheme was initiated which 
provided work for another 80 men, and road widening, using 
government funds, provided a little more work (302). The 
WBC had a grant for £30,000 worth of road works and wanted 
to repair the sewers but the materials were not available. 
A total of £152,000 worth of work was found in the first 21 
months of the post-war Labour administration, all but 
£4,000-worth of it from outside the borough (303). In 
addition to the idea of alternative work at the Arsenal the 
council proposed schemes to 'absorb on half-time 
practically all the unemployed men in the borough 1 (304). 
Woolwich was prepared to accept the Coalitions' political 
agenda and to discipline the struggles of the unemployed, 
Poplar tried to harness them (305).
The Woolwich Local Advisory Committee (LAC) was also used 
as a platform from which to launch appeals for a centrally- 
financed, constitutional, solution to unemployment. The 
LAC was established by the Ministry of Labour to be the 
local body to deal with unemployment. There were similar 
bodies all over the country, they were an example of how
the wartime expansion of the state created
theoretical possibilities for political 
solutions to social and economic 
grievances, it also put in place 
institutions whose raison d'etre was to 
devise and implement such solutions 
(306).
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Each LAC had wide discretionary powers and individual 
applicants had no right of appeal. In general LACs were 
composed of people sympathetic to the Coalition government 
and as the Minister in charge of them put it in 1923, 
'could in the main be trusted to see that the unemployed 
did not get more benefit than was strictly necessary 1 
(307). The unemployed had to prove to the LAC that they 
were 'genuinely seeking work', even if work did not exist. 
Many skilled men were unwilling to use the employment 
exchanges, seeing them as an attempt to weaken the union 
control of the hire of labour. However in Woolwich the LAC 
chaired by Will Crooks, became a vehicle for the promotion 
of the views of the Arsenal's skilled men. In June 1918 
it passed a resolution, forwarded to the Ministry of 
Munitions, which called for a minimum of 20,000 post-war 
jobs to be maintained at the Arsenal. It also urged 
strongly that, if necessary, non-ordnance work be 
introduced at the Arsenal. The Woolwich LAC presented the 
Ministry of Munitions with what the latter described as 'a 
most valuable document', about the conversion of the 
Arsenal. In evidence to the Mc Kinnon Wood Committee, the 
Woolwich LAC suggested a number of items which the Arsenal 
could have produced after the war, and stressed the 
reliance of the towns people upon the Arsenal for 
employment. The LAC deputation consisted of two local 
employers; one, Edwin Thomas, a past president of the WCC, 
the other, W C Fitter was chair of the Gauge Manufacturers 
Association. There was also a skilled Arsenal worker, Voce, 
and Macnamara of the WU. The Woolwich LAC chair, Crooks, 
and vice chair, Edwin Thomas, also appealed in the press 
for work for ex-Servicemen (308). Despite the work of the 
Woolwich LAC, many still viewed the LACs with distrust, 
particularly after the 1919 local government dispute when 
exchanges were used to supply blackleg labour the LACs were 
viewed as creatures of the government (309).
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The context in which the 'Peace Arsenal 1 campaign was 
developed can be seen from the WLP manifesto, produced in 
September 1921. The WLP called upon 'every citizen 1 to 
back its five-point plan, it held meetings to publicise the 
plan, it distributed copies of the plan house-to-house and 
the plan was reproduced in the Pioneer. The manifesto 
blamed capitalism, though not capitalists, for 
unemployment. It did not call for the overthrow of 
capitalism but for the government, having brought people to 
the town, to provide work in the form of orders for the 
Arsenal, or to finance maintenance for the unemployed of 
Woolwich. It demanded that Parliament be recalled to
consider the issue of unemployment
not in any party spirit but with a 
common determination, [for] Parliament 
is the proper authority and the 
government the active agent for tackling 
a serious national emergency (310).
The manifesto was locally specific, constitutional and it 
called upon citizens to unite to persuade the government to 
alter its plans.
The campaigners' acceptance of the need for efficient 
national solutions reflected the lack of a local economic 
strategy of greater complexity that seeking government aid 
with road building and swimming pool and house 
construction. Alternative work faded from the agenda to be 
replaced by 'foreshores waiting to be reclaimed, roads 
waiting to be made' (311). The WLP submitted schemes for 
the unemployed to the value of £1 million, £600,000 worth 
of which was arranged. Thorne and Adamson contributed 
suggestions as to that which might be produced at the 
Arsenal for the McKinnon Wood committee, but they made no 
economic contributions beyond echoing the list of items 
which the Arsenal had or could produce which the Henderson 
committee had compiled in 1907. Beyond the idea of a
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capital levy to pay for the war debt, the Labour Party had 
little notion of how such schemes were to be financed.
Lloyd George resisted restraint and cutbacks in 
reconstruction until there were signs of recovery and a 
rise in unemployment. He allowed 1919, 'the year of 
indulgence and generosity 1 as the Webbs put it to pass. 
When 'the prospects for better days had dwindled... the 
zeal for new things glowed dim' the Treasury pressed harder 
for deflation and decontrol (312). Lloyd George was 
cautious about Woolwich, as late as Spring 1920 he stated 
that the government was sticking to its pledge to provide 
alternative work (313). After all the 'most serious strike 
of the war', according to Basil Thomson, the head of the 
Criminal Investigation Department, was the one that 
involved Woolwich workers being unable to produce munitions 
(314). By the early 1920s the danger from Woolwich, if it 
had existed, was deemed to have passed.
The WLP, and the unions, promoted alternative work as the 
solution to unemployment because such work was in keeping 
with the traditions of state work in the town; it would be 
organised and financed nationally; it required efficient 
administration, rather than a overturning of the social and 
economic order and it benefited the locality as a whole, 
particularly the men at the Arsenal. In addition that 
which Hall and Schwarz call the 'sometimes frenzied 
reconstruction of liberalism* required a specific 
paradigmatic dimension (315). The campaign was a means by 
which generalised radical notions of individual 
responsibility, local community and a neutral state could 
be focused and grafted onto the newer, and at first also 
nebulous, concepts of efficiency and constitutional 
citizenship in an age of mass electoral politics.
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Chapter IV
the story of munitions is not so much 
one of shot and shell...it is rather one 
of the men and women behind the scenes
Addison, Minister of Munitions Addison C 
Politics from within Volume I 1924 p63
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The 'Peace Arsenal 1 campaign, initiated within the labour 
movement, derived not only from the local radical political 
tradition. It was also shaped by the experiences of the 
working-class in running the Arsenal Football Club, the 
RAGS and the Pioneer, and from the local businesses which 
thrived on the prosperity due to full employment at the 
Arsenal. The contribution of business methods is 
considered in section (a). Section (b) is about the 
contribution of the Churches, particularly nonconformity. 
A number of local clerics and Christian organisations had 
links with the skilled men and contributed to the campaign 
for alternative work. The notions of individual 
responsibility, community self-help, and national 
solutions, determined the shape of not only the WLP but 
also another organisation which contributed to the Peace 
Arsenal 1 campaign, the Woolwich and District branch of the 
National Federation of Disabled and Demobilised Soldiers 
and Sailors (NFDDSS). It's role is examined in section 
(c). The important and close ties between the campaign for 
alternative work at the Arsenal and tenants on the estates 
built for Arsenal workers are examined in section (d).
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(a)
The 'Peace Arsenal 1 campaign made use of the well- 
established links between trade unionists and the local 
social elite. Geoffrey Crossick notes that in mid, and 
late, nineteenth century Woolwich as there was no strong 
employing class there was little incentive for economic 
class conflict. The professional and military men who were 
resident in Woolwich were closely involved, with the 
workers, in social relationship based around community 
affairs. The local elite were active participants in the 
defence of Plumstead Common when there were protests over 
its enclosure in 1876. Furthermore 'the apparent identity 
of interest in towns of government employment between the 
workers and social elite over economic matters is a wider 
manifestation of this 1 . As higher wages led to increased 
purchasing power 'we find the local social elite actually 
petitioning and using its influence to obtain higher wages 
for a large number of the workers'. There was 'little 
immediate economic hostility between the social leaders and 
the workers'. For the upper stratum of the working class 
the mid-Victorian economic and social structures 'helped 
create a situation where in addition to being not 
antagonistic to the social leaders of the area they 
outwardly shared... their values' (1).
The constitutionalism which was being constructed after the 
war relied upon there being two national parties, one of 
'business 1 and one of 'labour* and that both recognise the 
validity of the other one. Schwarz argues that the process 
by which the constitutional arrangements of the mid- 
Victorian period were rebuilt on the new foundations of 
universal suffrage, 'was exceedingly precarious for the 
dominant classes'. Both Baldwin and MacDonald aimed for 
two-party constitutionalism built around Labour and 
Conservative (2).
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The installation of such a notion at the level at which 
people lived their lives was aided by social contacts. In 
Woolwich the chair of the Board of Guardians and a MR 
mayor, Henry Smith Syer JP, was an active Freemason and 
Friendly Society member. He also spent 20 years as an 
engineer working in the Royal Carriage Department of the 
Arsenal. He could rub shoulders with fellow Freemason and 
Friendly society activist Arthur Beechey, a turner in the 
Royal Carriage Department who worked for the ASE for 30 
years and was one of the first Presidents of the ASE 
Institute in Plumstead (3). James Boyle, an ASE activist 
and half-back for Arsenal was also a Freemason with Syer. 
A sense of the continuation of the social ties between the 
local elite and members of the working class can be gauged 
from the fact that MR councillor and Guardian, Leon Charles 
Chasteauneuf, E Dixon JP (the WCC President) joined Labour 
Party activists, Tynemouth (the mayor in 1919), Radford and 
Charles Langham, (who worked in the Royal Laboratories from 
1889 was a Labour councillor and on the AGC) in the 
Freemasons. The last five men named were also members of 
the Independent Order of Oddfellows. Chasteauneuf was 
branch Treasurer and district trustee for 35 years. For 
balance, whilst the Masons Thanksgiving Service was held in 
the church, St Johns, where the chair of the Conservative 
Association, Dawson was warden, the Oddfellows annual 
service was held in the labour-orientated Baptist 
Tabernacle (4).
During the run-up to the National Insurance Act 1911 Sir 
Kingsley Wood was part of a formidable campaign to ensure 
the status of the largest insurance companies and to 
undermine the Friendly Societies. Yeo calls him 'an active 
antagonist of labour's forms on behalf of private 
property'. Wood maintained this interest, he wrote a book 
about insurance and was Private Secretary to Addison, the 
Minister of Health 1919-21 and then Parliamentary Secretary
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to the Minister 1924-9 (5). Wood also thought it politic 
to maintain his membership of both the Oddfellows and the 
Freemasons. He was also a circuit steward for the 
Wesleyans (6).
In 1900 Edwin Fennell, a local leather dealer, son of a 
Chartist and a former Secretary of the Liberals, stood for 
Labour on a ticket of trade union rates for council 
employees, and beat mayor and MP Edwin Hughes in a council 
by-election in 1900. Fennell helped to run the business 
side of the Woolwich Labour Journal (the forerunner of the 
Pioneer). He also helped secure a place for Barefoot on 
the council and was acknowledged as the mentor of Thomas 
Macnamara (1870-1919). Macnamara gave evidence to the 
Henderson committee, became General Secretary of the 
Woolwich WU but he worked for Fennell before entering the 
Arsenal. Another personal link which broadened the view of 
the Woolwich labour movement was forged when a retired Army 
officer, Conservative G R Hunter, who chaired the council's 
Finance Committee was offered the opportunity to be an 
Alderman by the victorious WLP in 1903. Although unpopular 
with the town's paupers he was a very effective accountant. 
Arthur Bryceson (1863-1944) was a lawyer articled to Edwin 
Hughes, the Conservative MP for Woolwich. As an agent he 
helped to organise the Moderate Reform victory on the first 
Woolwich Borough Council in 1900, then became the Town 
Clerk and, as the Pioneer put it, 'a propagandist for 
Labour principles' (7). He was Honorary Secretary to the 
Conference on the Discharges convened by the council in 
1906 and involved in the running of a large number of 
charities. His efficiency in campaigning for 
municipalisation and in controlling his staff were praised 
by the Pioneer. As 'a businessman serving the 
municipality' he provided a personal link between the Town 
Hall and the labour movement and a model of administrative 
precision (8).
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The labour movement's understanding of business was also 
enhanced by the involvement, in the mid-, and late, 
nineteenth century, of the Arsenal workers in their own 
business ventures. The RAGS developed out of a workers 
co-operative movement which had existed in Woolwich since 
1760 (9). The movement died back after the closure of the 
Dockyards in 1869. This allowed the RACs, formed in 1868 by 
a handful of Arsenal engineers with a capital of just over 
£7, a space in which to operate. The first secretary, 
Alexander McLeod, originally worked in the Arsenal repair 
shop. Other members of the full-time committee also 
worked there as did William Barefoot (10). By the time 
that McLeod retired in 1902 there were 17,000 members and 
seven stores. The RACS was the 20th largest co-operative 
in the country and the largest in London (11). The second 
largest society in the capital was in Stratford and it was 
less than two thirds of the size. So dominant was the RACs 
that the quiet of the streets where many of the Arsenal 
engineers lived was explained by the fact that 'not even a 
tallyman goes round, for they find no room in co-operative 
Plumstead' (12). Edwin Hughes, was solicitor to the RACS 
and later Sir Kingsley Wood was supportive of the RACS. 
The first civilian director of the Arsenal, Sir William 
Anderson (1834-98) was keenly interested in the co- 
operative movement. Prior to his appointment at the 
Arsenal in 1889, he was instrumental in the foundation of a 
co-operative shop in Erith, which was where he ran the 
engineering firm Easton and Anderson (13).
The RACS was an important base from which core workers of 
the Arsenal could develop their business acumen, and their 
links with the community outside the Arsenal. During the 
Boer War when earnings were high and regular rents rose by 
as much as 50%. The RACS purchased Borstall estate and 
commenced building 1,052 houses in 1900 (14). The RACS was 
interested in peaceful economic change, it twice tried to
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establish a local co-operative dockyard, in 1869 and again 
after the First World War. In 1926 it purchased 15 acres 
of the Dockyards and used the site for garment production 
and food processing (15). Also the RAGS was financially 
supportive of trade unionists, Progressive and then Labour 
electoral candidates (16). It was affiliated to the 
national Labour Party and the London Labour Party. It 
supported charities, and a great deal of local educational 
work, 2^% of the trading surplus was earmarked for 
education and in 1920 this came to £250,000 (17). In 
addition it ran its own dairy, engineering works and 
funeral directors and saw its work in terms of aiding 
working class collective self-help (18). The RAGS stressed 
the need for working class advancement not through class 
conflict but through social harmony.
The effects of such a strong co-operative movement were 
considered by Shaw in Major Barbara, 1905. In the play an 
enormous arms factory dominates a Middlesex hillside and 
features a 'huge cannon of the obsolete Woolwich infant 
pattern 1 pointing towards the town. There are 'various 
applications of co-operation' which encouraged local 
loyalty and distanced workers from class practices in which 
they might otherwise have been involved (19). Through many 
RAGS activities ran a thread which stressed the neutrality 
of the state, collective peaceful self-realisation and, to 
cite the name of the RAGS journal, Comradeship. When there 
were food shortages during the war RAGS established its own 
rationing system and Arsenal workers demanded of the 
government that food distribution be done through the RAGS. 
After the war the Labour-dominated Woolwich Board of 
Guardians distributed food coupons which could be exchanged 
at the RAGS. The RAGS was used to alleviate discrete 
social problems through constitutional activity. It was a 
means by which artisans could become involved in the 
recomposition of politico-legal structures. In 1921 it had
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80,000 members and 92,000 members in 1922. They were in 
51 branches and 39 women's and men's co-operative guilds 
(20). The success of the RAGS perpetuated the idea of 
community self-help, and specifically, it converted part of 
the Arsenal. In addition it promoted the notion of 
national solutions, in that it had closer ties to the 
Labour Party than any other co-operative society in the 
country.
The Arsenal workers also had direct understanding of the 
structure of private firms through their involvement with 
the Arsenal Football Club (AFC). From the late nineteenth 
century football was very popular amongst the working class 
of Woolwich (21). There was Royal Ordnance FC, which 
existed for a year 1893-4, Erith FC, formed in 1885 at the 
local engineering works of Easton and Anderson, Erith 
Wednesday, Erith Rovers, the Grasshoppers and the Maxim 
Nordenfelt works team. Blundell Mission FC, formed during 
the Boer War and later called Charlton Athletic, was the 
only one of these teams to rival the principal team formed 
inside the Arsenal, in 1884, which came to be called 
Arsenal FC. Recruitment to the team was through the 
Arsenal and there was also support from the garrison (22).
Although the founder thought that limited liability would 
cause the club 'to degenerate into a proprietary or 
capitalist club', in the face of pressing financial 
incentives the team turned professional in 1893. Players 
received payment from local working men, who bathed in the 
reflected glory of a team victory (23). Over 1,500 of the 
4,000 £1 shares were held by 860 shareholders. 'A great 
number of gentlemen were £1 or £2 shareholders', and many 
of the shareholders were Arsenal engineers (24). The game 
was like work at the Arsenal in that relied upon male 
bonding and stamina. Teamwork was required for both and an 
absence through illness led to loss of pay and adversely
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affected the pay of others. For both a collective response 
was required to improve pay or conditions. The team was 
tied to the fate of the Arsenal. During a depression it 
played a benefit match for the unemployed and during the 
Boer War it suffered low attendances (25). A local paper 
in 1913 argued that it was 'one of the most steadying 
factors in the social reform of the masses 1 and 
industrialists and the Home Office agreed (26). There were 
protests when AFC left the area just before the war (27). 
The team was the result of collective local action in which 
the artisans were central. William Dawson, who was a 
director of the club, was prominent in the WCC and was 
Conservative leader on the council. The Pioneer reported 
that the Labour councillors 'who knew him well regard him 
as being in many respects very much a Labour man... 
essentially a Manchester Tory Democrat'. It was said that 
he voted for Crooks in 1903 (28). Barefoot was another 
director. Both of these men were active in the campaign 
for a 'Peace Arsenal 1 .
Another business venture in which local skilled men held 
shares was the Pioneer. It bridged the gap between 
business and labour. This newspaper was supported by its 
shareholders. These included the wealthy, Joseph Pels, the 
millionaire American Henry Georgite, Frederick Pethick 
Lawrence, a Liberal who had other newspaper interests and 
May Tennant, the middle-class Treasurer of the Women' 
Trade Union League. However, almost 42% of the 
shareholders were engineers or machinists (29). The 
Pioneer claimed the credit for sparking off both the post- 
Boer war campaign for work and the campaign after the First 
World War (30). It sought to unite local readers within a 
Labour Party framework and in this it was probably more 
successful than most other labour newspapers (31). One 
example of the way in which it both informed and corralled 
its readership occurred in 1920. The Pioneer explained the
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effects of the imminent housing legislation and placed this 
information under a headline which suggested that readers 
be passive spectators of the central political activity 
rather than participants, 'Tenants - Watch Parliament! 1 
(32). The Pioneer criticised 'lumbering 1 local firms and 
those workers 'living in a fool's paradise of temporarily 
inflated wages because neither had cooperated with 
'organised labour 1 . It saw its role as to adapt to new 
conditions, get officials and workers to 'move with the 
times' and to encourage 'loyalty'. Loafers and all 
parasites will have to be cleared out of the Arsenal 1 it 
warned (33). In fact it was the EEF president, not Arsenal 
officials, who vowed to reduce the Arsenal to a repair shop
(34).
The Pioneer supported the campaign by local traders to turn 
Woolwich into a local shopping centre. It vigorously 
promoted the inaugural 'Shopping Week 1 in the summer of 
1921; it was the subject of a frontpage headline in April
(35). The event taught traders about the 'necessity for 
unity amongst themselves... The welfare of the borough and 
not of the individual trader must be the object in view, 
for the fate of the various traders is bound up with the 
larger issue* (36). The Pioneer was in competition with 
the Kentish Mercury, which was 'devoted to the maintenance 
of the true Protestant Faith [and] the elevation of the 
working classes'. There was also the largest circulation 
local paper, the Kentish Independent, 'the Conservative 
and Unionist' Woolwich Herald, the Woolwich and Plumstead 
Gazette, and a newspaper notorious for its anti-union bias, 
the Eltham Times (37). The Pioneer did not have the 
circulation of these other newspapers, circulation was a 
problem for much of the labour press (38). It might have 
been helped if there had been a London wide Labour 
newspaper with localised editions, as the Pioneer proposed, 
adding 'there is a nucleus for such an organised effort at
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Woolwich 1 (39). However the eventual launch of the London 
Labour Party Citizen which did just this, came too late for 
the Pioneer.
In 1922 the Pioneer ceased publication on a weekly basis 
and asked for donations to make good its financial losses. 
The enormous debts were not paid until 1936. A free 
Pioneer was published in May 1922. It carried a large 
number of advertisements. The edition which followed after 
was distributed during 'Woolwich Shopping Week 1 and, once 
more, 15,000 free copies were distributed. Other issues 
appeared, full of advertisements. At the height of its 
success the Pioneer carried an advertisement for a tavern 
which boasted that the WU held weekly meetings on the 
premises and offered 'accommodation for working men at 
dinner time 1 . This was local businesses adapting to the 
strength of labour. In the absence of links with other 
Labour Parties, the WLP formed alliances with the local 
business community and by August 1922 the WLP found itself 
reduced to carrying a full page advertisement for the shop 
owned by Councillor Cuff (40). The last issue of the 
Pioneer to be sold carried an editorial on the engineers 
lock-out, then in progress, and also the information that 
Sir Charles Higham MP was to address the WCC on the subject 
of 'more business for Woolwich traders'. The final appeal 
was articulated in the political language of mid-nineteenth 
certainty. As if those who were correct would necessarily 
be victorious. 'Let Labour, united in determination and 
moral fervour, bring victory from seeming defeat. Labour 
knows not defeat. As Will Crooks so often told us, a 
temporary setback is but a victory deferred* (41).
In the welfare of the workers was 'bound up the prosperity 
of those who depend upon their spending power', but that 
did not render the local traders quiescent and ready to 
fall in line behind the skilled men (42). Whilst the
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engineers were developing the RAGS, other traders were 
moulding their own organisations. Chambers of Commerce, 
representing the common interests of merchants and 
manufacturers in a particular locality, had first appeared 
in the eighteenth century. One was established in London 
in 1881 and in 1889 the Woolwich and District Traders 
Association, later WCC, was founded. By 1902 it had 144 
members paying 10/6d (52%p) a year each, about as much as 
an engineer could earn in a one to two days.
The WCC President was Sidney H Cuff whose own drapery 
emporium 'romped ahead 1 during the Boer War (43). 
Commentators who visited the town during both the Boer War 
and the First World War noted how the presence of troops 
and war work improved trade (44). During the post-Boer War 
depression the Conservative mayor William J Squires argued, 
in his evidence to the Henderson Committee of 1907, that 
the discharges ought to be stopped and that the government 
orders ought to go to Woolwich not to private firms. 
Squires was active in the WCC, and he was a Guardian, and a 
JP. The Pioneer said of Squires that his Conservatism, 'to 
many London County Councillors, was indistinguishable from 
ordinary Progressivism' (45). Squires proposed that the 
Chamber of Commerce, the borough council and other public 
bodies 'ought to be up and doing* on the issue of the 
discharges. The idea that part of the Arsenal could be 
released and the land used by private firms was suggested 
to the Henderson committee by George Bishop, the Woolwich 
Equitable Building Society secretary from 1880. The WCC 
also promoted the idea of alternative, private, use of the 
riverside location within the campaign for work for 
Woolwich. In 1908 the WCC argued, in a letter to War 
Minister Haldane, that to reduce the numbers at the Arsenal 
to 8,000 would intensify local distress, be uneconomic, in 
that the overheads would not be reduced, and would 
undermine national security. It recommended a workforce as
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large as that which had been employed before the Boer War, 
be employed 'in the National Service 1 (46).
During the First World War local shop-keepers had close 
contact with the Arsenal workers not only because they 
'minded pipes and baccy 1 for them, but also because they 
knew that, as the Medical Officer of Health reported in 
1915 that there was an 'abundance of money and food' in the 
town which benefited the traders, because of the Arsenal 
(47). However, in 1917, with thoughts of the post-Boer War 
depression in mind the WCC established a committee to 
consider the postwar fate of the Arsenal. The committee 
called for 20,000 Arsenal jobs, the same figure that the 
'Peace Arsenal 1 campaigners later demanded. In 1918 the 
'Peace Arsenal* campaign commenced, and initially Sir 
Kingsley Wood accused the campaigners of wishing to 'cause 
disturbance in the Arsenal 1 (48). When Sir Kingsley 
addressed the Woolwich Chamber of Commerce on 'Trade After 
the War' he made only one specific reference to Woolwich 
Arsenal, and that was to say that the reduction in the 
numbers there before the war was not due to competition 
between private firms and the state but because of the 
disarmament lobby. The Pioneer argued that if the traders 
of Woolwich had 'a real grasp of the situation they would 
be getting busy in defence of their own interests' (49). 
The traders chose to focus their concerns in the way that 
the Pioneer suggested. In 1918 the 260-strong WCC sent 
representatives to give evidence to the M°Kinnon Wood 
Committee. It wanted the site used, preferably 
commercially, but it accepted that there could be state 
production at the Arsenal. In Spring 1919 E G Dixon, the 
'most popular, efficient and hard working President 1 of the 
WCC took up his office and membership grew to 288 (50).
Among the WCC's Honorary Vice-Presidents were Conservatives 
Wood and Syers (the mayor) and Labour Party members Crooks,
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Haden Guest and Snell. Later Herbert Morrison joined them 
(51). In December 1919 Dixon suggested that the WCC donate 
£50 to the AGO and the WCC unanimously agreed to this (52). 
The Pioneer noted the 'energy, ability and enthusiasm 1 of 
the President of the WCC. The Kentish Independent claimed 
that the interests of the Labour dominated council and the 
conservative WCC were 'as near as possible identical' (53). 
When management was criticised it was made clear that this 
did not refer to local employers. In 1906 Crooks said that 
there were too many officials at the Arsenal, 'private 
firms would not keep that number for 20 minutes' (54). 
Harry Hart echoed this in 1921 'I am convinced that 
alternative work will be a failure unless a clean sweep is 
made of the management in government establishments' (55). 
In July 1921 MR Councillor Campbell said that whilst the 
former MR leader had taken 'a prominent part in the 
movement for alternative work at the Arsenal 1 Campbell 
himself thought that the Arsenal should not get 
preferential treatment and ought to compete, in the open 
market against private firms, as far as it was able given 
that it was 'overstocked with officialdom* (56). The 
Kentish Independent focused on the workers. It suggested
that
if Woolwich is tided successfully over 
the dangerous period that is before us, 
history will place on record that that 
result was largely due to the wise 
handling of the Executive of the 'all 
grades' movement of a problem that 
literally bristles with difficulties 
from whatever point of view it may be 
regarded.
The paper encouraged readers 'to co-operate in this 
movement of vital importance to the Borough'(57). On 
another occasion it called the AGC executive 'skilful and 
tactful'. Dixon called for the conversion of the Arsenal, 
and Government aid for Woolwich. The call was echoed at 
the WCC AGM (58). The WCC was part of a broad alliance 
which campaigned for alternative work along with the AGC
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and LAC. These three bodies then formed the Joint Town 
Committee which lasted until 1922 when the Town Committee 
was reconstituted without the WCC. In 1921 the Pioneer 
provided a fulsome obituary for the late President of the 
WCC and for one of his predecessors who died within a few 
days of each other (59). The new President, Eley, blamed 
'the war and the waste entailed 1 for the 1921 depression. 
His solution was honest hard work and increase in 
production. He also thought that it was the duty of the
WCC
to impress upon the government the 
necessity of utilising the enormous 
workshops, machinery and river front of 
the Arsenal for the production and 
manufacture of goods needed in 
peacetime, as well as for munitions of 
war, so that our citizens may be fully 
employed and secured from the evil 
effects of short time and uncertain 
wages which are the causes of deep 
seated unrest (60).
The Pioneer noted in November 1920 that
The work that the Chamber accomplished 
especially in conjunction with other 
organisations on behalf of the 
commercial and industrial interests of 
the borough whilst Mr Dixon was at its 
head was of an extremely valuable 
character, though perhaps the general 
public is not in a position to regard it 
from its true perspective (61).
Although in June 1920 the WCC urged the government to 
enforce 'the most stringent economy possible in every 
department of state 1 it was anxious to maintain that it was 
not a rival of the council, even though the latter was 
Labour Party dominated (62). The WCC worked closely with 
the council on the Joint Town Committee and in close co- 
operation with the members of the AGC, with the ex- 
Servicemen's organisation, the NFDDSS, on other schemes 
besides the campaign for alternative production at the 
Arsenal. These included a successful campaign for the 
extended use of a hostel for women; formulating demands
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together for further road building schemes in the area and 
the extension of out of work donation to allow ex- 
Servicemen to be trained (63). In 1924 a joint deputation 
from the council and the WCC went to Southern Railways in 
order to persuade it to improve the town by roofing over 
part of its trackway and both bodies expressed satisfaction 
when in the 1920s part of the Dockyards was taken over by 
Swan Mill Paper Co (64). The recognition of the symbiotic 
relationship between local businesses and the labour 
movement strengthened the concept of a civic community, 
fighting together in order to persuade central government 
to change.
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(b)
The thread which runs through many reports on the impact of 
Christianity upon Woolwich in the period from the mid- 
nineteenth century up until the end of the First World War 
is that whilst there was a degree of hostility towards the 
Church, it was the widespread indifference which was more 
marked. Nevertheless the relationship between Arsenal 
workers and the traders of Woolwich found an echo in the 
relationship between many of the institutions and leaders 
of Christianity and the Arsenal workers. To some extent 
Church and chapel were employed in an immediate, temporal 
manner in order to bolster the respectability of the 'Peace 
Arsenal 1 campaign, while, on the other hand, clerics took 
up labour issues in order to counter the apathetic 
reception that their message received. However, in 
addition, nonconformity did effect the campaign in that it 
framed the perceptions of the leading campaigners.
According to the religious census of 1851 the Woolwich area 
had the second lowest church attendance in the country 
(65). This lack of enthusiasm continued throughout the 
rest of the century and in 1902 Booth wrote that the 
skilled engineers of the area, 'thank Cobden and Bright and 
everybody but God for their prosperity' (66). CFG 
Masterman in a study of religious life in the area written 
at the turn of the century noted that the clergy of south 
London were not very sympathetic to labour (67). 
Attendance at church and chapel was only for a small 
minority, less than a quarter of all adults, and a further 
breakdown reveals that on the day in 1902 that all of 
London was surveyed only 5.4% of adults in Plumstead 
attended a place of Christian worship (68). In 1902 one 
churchgoer at the Arsenal reckoned that of the 100 men who 
worked with him, 8% of the workers attended church on a 
weekly basis and 12% were members of a chapel (69).
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Charles Booth thought these figures 'unusually high 1 and 
the same year Rochester Diocesan Society thought that the 
figures were more likely to be 2% and 3% (70). In his 
recent study Hugh McLeod concluded that working class 
areas, particularly those which had a lively neighbourhood- 
centred working class culture such as Woolwich, had 
rejected the church. There was a fortnight-long Church of 
England 'Crusade 1 to Woolwich by the Chaplain-General to 
the Forces in 1917. Bishops, canons, parish, clergy and 
laywomen arrived in the town and met with 'prejudice and 
suspicion 1 from the Arsenal workers, according to the 
Church Times (71). There was a little overt hostility, 
rather the Church was damned with faint praise. In 1902 
the Rochester Diocesan Society found that 'amidst the 
indifference there is little or no ill-will'; in 1917 in 
reference to the 'Crusade' the Woolwich and Plumstead News 
referred to 'mild friendliness' and the Pioneer said that 
there was 'no hatred of the Church by the people' (72).
When the church offered individualistic solutions to sin, 
or condemned lack of self-discipline rather than lack of 
sympathy it was received with suspicion. Sometimes there 
was open conflict with the labour movement. The RAGS 
purchased a farm but it made a loss in its first year and 
the RAGS decided not to pay the tithe-rent, which was that 
part of the annual produce of agriculture devoted to the 
support of a local vicar, McAllister. The Reverend 
McAllister declined to meet the RAGS but instead went to 
law. A broker seized two wagons from the farm and held an 
auction to raise the money owed to the vicar. Four months 
later a similar auction took place and once more McAllister 
was condemned by the RAGS (73). Others in the Church felt 
more ambivalence towards labour. The Bishop of Woolwich 
said that after having seen Walworth's slum housing he 
'sympathised with the labour programme from beginning to 
end' (74). The Bishop also addressed a meeting on
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Blackheath with Labour politicians (75). However, he did 
call trade unions 'truly selfish organisations' and added 
that 'trade unionism was responsible for the appalling 
conditions in which workers were living in parts of South 
London and other cities' (76). Reverend A M Pickering, the 
rector and rural dean to Woolwich, mediated, rather than 
taking a partisan position, during the 1911 Dock Strike 
(77). Others found the Church stifled their radicalism. 
Snell met Grinling when the latter was a radical curate in 
Nottingham. Through this connection Grinling, on being 
appointed as secretary of the Woolwich Charity Organisation 
Society, (COS) invited Snell to join him in his work. 
Grinling and Snell tried to make the Woolwich COS 'a centre 
for social endeavour' but this was considered 'woefully 
unorthodox' and both were forced to resign (78).
Some of the 'Peace Arsenal' campaigners wanted to draw upon 
local Christianity and local entrepreneurs in order to 
further the integration of the skilled men. Jack Mills' 
remarks are indicative of this. In June 1919 Mills and 
Miss Elliott (NFWW), both of the AGC, attended a Ruri- 
decanal Conference on 'Industrial Problems'. Mills took 
the opportunity to state that religious movements, though 
he did not include individual Christians, had failed the 
workers and that 'had it not been for a determined fight 
put up locally we should have been in a bad position in 
Woolwich today. RAM Walters, an MR councillor was a 
member of the conference in 1920 and in 1921 the Ruri- 
decanal Conference noted the 'apathy and hostility on the 
part of large sections of labour towards the church'. 
However, institutions and value systems although here 
portrayed as external to the interests of Woolwich men, had 
a greater influence than Mills allowed (79).
In general the focus of loyalty in Woolwich was the local 
labour community; it provided a keen sense of communal
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morality and solidarity and the success of other ethics 
were circumscribed. Vicars could gain social approval 
through activity for the collective good, in a material 
sense, and few of them engaged in such work. An exception 
was J W Horsley an Oxford graduate, freemason, former 
prison chaplain and a member of the Christian Social Union 
(a group of radical Christians, founded in 1889). He 
became vicar of Holy Trinity a church just outside the main 
gates of the Arsenal and the congregation was mostly 
Arsenal officials and employees. Part of the parish was an 
area of poor housing, St Saviours, known locally as 'the 
dusthole 1 and described by a police magistrate as 'the 
worst plague spot in London'. Horsley became active in 
campaigning for better housing and sanitation for the local 
working class. He served on the Board of Health from 1893 
until 1894. He supported the Woolwich and Plumstead 
Tenants Defence and Fair Rents League which did 'a grand 
job in searching out all insanitary defects and forwarding 
them to me 1 (80). The tenants' league successfully 
campaigned for the creation, under the 1891 Public Health 
Act, of a Board of Health in Plumstead which would be 
responsible for local sanitation. Horsley recalled that he 
got 'not a word or act of sympathy' from any member of the 
clergy bar one, but he did gain the support of the 
energetic local Medical Officer of Health. His work aided 
the integration of the local working class into the new, 
elected, structures of local state. Arsenal workers were 
presented with a respectable solution to their problems, an 
appeal via the vicar for an elected body (81). When the 
church acted on behalf of local workers it was well 
received but there was a degree of wariness as Horsley 
recognised (82). The United Trades Labour Friendly and 
Temperance Societies of Plumstead Charlton and District 
called him 'a terror to slum owners, rack renters, and 
other exploiters of the poorest and most defenceless of our 
class.' It went on to endorse sentiments expressed in
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Horsley's last sermon, that 'to preach temperance, sobriety 
and chastity to dwellers in insanitary dens, without 
attempting to ameliorate their condition, is a canting 
absurdity'.
The chair of the London branch of the Christian Social 
Union, was Charles Ernest Escreet, (1852-1919), the Rector 
of Woolwich 1892-1909 and the rural dean 1905-6. He was 
chair of the Woolwich Board of Guardians and took an 
interest in the local hospital and the Polytechnic (83). 
It is likely that in his capacity as chair of the Charity 
Organisation Society he secured Grinling as secretary. He 
was a member of the left-wing Guild of St Matthew and 
chaired a committee for the wives and children of striking 
miners on which Snell was secretary and Canon Horsley a 
member. In December 1906 Escreet explained in a letter in 
the Times that in three years 7,500 workers had been laid 
off from the Arsenal, that there were 12,000 fewer workers 
than 11 years ago and that 'Woolwich is suffering from 
acute depression which is unparalleled during the last 
twenty years'. The council had arranged for 70-100 men to 
emigrate to Canada in the Spring. Escreet appealed for 
funds. The joint Treasurers of the fund were Squires, a 
Conservative and Slater, the Labour mayor (84). In 
January 1907 Escreet repeated his appeal for funds for 
emigration for Arsenal workers. Donors included the Bishop 
of Woolwich, a canon and Armstrong's Lt Col Gironard (85). 
In April 1907 Reverend W F Bailey of St Margarets, 
Plumstead appealed to congregants to help one another for 
the 'Plumstead distress is very acute' and there was a need 
for all the clergy to meet with each other (86).
The Church of England, in Woolwich, was not actively 
opposed to the labour movement but there was a gulf between 
the two which led Booth to report that amongst Arsenal 
workers, 'it is bad form even to nod at a parson in the
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street 1 (87). This gap can be highlighted by reference to 
the exception. The 'most remarkable feature 1 of St James 1 
Church, Plumstead according to Booth, was the fact that 
the congregation, 'artisan or lower middle class', managed 
the finances of the church. 'They are trusted, and they 
are loyal 1 (88). Chasteauneuf (Conservative) was a 
sidesman at St James and Keeble (an Arsenal foreman, RACS 
committee member, councillor and Guardian) attended there 
(89). When the church made an effort to involve the labour 
movement, on its own terms, then it met with a greater 
degree of acceptance.
St Lukes Church, Eltham was erected in 1902 for use by the 
Boer War munition workers who lived on the surrounding 
Corbett estate which was built 1900. The parish grew as 
more house were constructed. The population tripled in the 
first year of the First World War to 15,000 people. The 
church grew in size and staff and the local Conservative S 
H Cuff donated the alter rails to the church. In 1919 the 
vicar of St Luke's wrote in the Pioneer that 'there is a 
strong feeling among Clergy that the ownership of such 
places as the Dusthole at Woolwich [the slum area] by 
Baronets [he was referring to Sir Spencer Maryon Wilson] is 
incongruous... anti-social and anti-Christian'. He went on 
to say that many clerics thought that 'if landlords own 
this type of property they should try and live in it 
themselves' (90). St Luke's hosted a League of Nations 
Sunday which was preceded by a procession where the banners 
of the GHTPL (tenants) and the ASE the WL&TC, the WU, the 
Pioneer Circle and the band of the LPL were to the fore. 
The event was arranged by the secretary of the Well Hall 
Tenants Association (91).
The idea that the church was used as vehicle for social
advance was suggested in the Church Times report of 1917;
many working men, it said, 'look upon the Church so much as
-209-
a 'business 1 that they naturally think that we are out for 
our own profit and advantage 1 (92). In practice the chapel 
was probably a more fruitful route for advance. Contacts 
founded in a common interest in Christian observance helped 
the career of George Bishop (1847-1914), the Arsenal 
wheelwright who went on to become the secretary of the 
Woolwich Equitable Building Society (WEBS) for 35 years and 
on its executive for 26 years. Bishop chaired Plumstead 
Vestry, became a Labour councillor, an Alderman and a JP.
According to the Pioneer
he has never forgotten his early 
prentice and Arsenal days. This is the 
key to his public work. In his inmost 
heart he is not a businessman but a 
staunch trade unionist (93).
He met the son of the WEBS director Joseph Wates at the 
Rectory Place Chapel. Bishop, the treasurer of the Free 
Church Council, chaired the meeting at which Crooks was 
adopted for Woolwich, threw his support behind Crooks, and 
later became a Progressive and Labour town councillor and 
an Alderman. Thomas Mason who started work at the Arsenal 
in 1913 mentioned that, 'if you was a church goer, the 
right church, our assistant manager he was a Methodist, and 
if you were on that side, you got a job'. Mason and the 
assistant manager attended the same church, St John the 
Baptist, Plumstead. Mason had other links with the 
Arsenal, which also might have helped; his father, both his 
grandparents, his uncle and his two brothers worked there. 
He went on, 'I know someone who because they was 
churchgoers or knew the boss... they come in and got a 
foreman's job... He was useless... He used to make pianos! 
[This was in the carpentry shop at the Arsenal], I 
remember one of my pals saying to him 'I didn't get me job 
by going to church' (94). This latter remarked echoes that 
of the Congregationalist who told Booth that in the Arsenal 
a religious man was despised for setting himself up as 
superior to others (95).
-210-
It was with the nonconformists that the labour movement had 
the closest ties. The Reverend Frederick Pickering was an 
itinerant Primitive Methodist preacher who wrote articles 
in Primitive Methodist Leader supportive of the labour 
movement whilst he was in Woolwich between 1905 and 1909. 
The first nonconformist on the Eltham Vestry was an Arsenal 
machinist William Marks. Unitarian the Reverend L Jenkin 
Jones was on Plumstead Vestry and a Progressive before he 
followed Fennell onto the council as the second Labour 
councillor, and then became one of the first Labour mayors 
in the country, a county councillor and a Guardian.
The following year Crooks, a Congregationalist, became MP 
for Woolwich (96). One of his advocates was the local 
Guardian, the pastor of Woolwich Tabernacle and President 
of the Baptist Union, John Wilson (1854-1939). He was not 
the only Baptist pastor who was supportive of the WLP; the 
Reverend Francis Matthews was a Guardian, arid he stood for 
the LCC in West Woolwich for Labour. Wilson was very 
influential. Crooks said 'I was returned by Woolwich 
Tabernacle... the 'only man who represents Woolwich is John 
Wilson 1 (97). Wilson's 2,500 seat Baptist Tabernacle, was 
enormously popular with artisans, 'such as save and buy 
their own homes in Plumstead, and live comfortably... men 
with a trade, not labourers; men who earn good wages and 
spend them on their homes and wives and children'. Wilson 
attributed his success to his sympathy with workers, 'His 
spare time and surplus energies he gives to public work. 
[He] takes a keen interest in all local affairs... an 
ardent Progressive'. One of his Church of England 
neighbours suggested that the success of 'the Tab 1 with the 
local working class lay in Wilson, 'being more of their 
class and can say things which somehow we cannot' (98). At 
the opening, in 1896, the Commander of the Royal Artillery 
attended, but the Tabernacle was a working-class 
institution, 'largely erected through the efforts of
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workers in the Arsenal 1 . Wilson's words and acts were 'a 
common theme of discussion in the Arsenal 1 (99). All the 
deacons were working men (100). The 'Tab 1 was used as a 
refuge for the unemployed and 'many times Arsenal workmen, 
fighting for their rights, have made it a meeting ground' 
(101). Wilson was said to have written more letters to 
help men find work than any other man in Woolwich and he 
was successful because he had the favour of managers of 
works (102). Barefoot attended Wilson's Bible Classes, 
where Wilson inspired him to 'make economics his business 
in life 1 (103). He also chaired the Tabernacle 
Brotherhood. Mabel Grout, the assistant secretary of the 
WLP and later mayor, also attended the 'Tab' (104). Haden 
Guest was sympathetic and William Adamson MP was closely 
associated with both the Brotherhood Movement and the 
'Peace Arsenal' campaign (105).
Alfred Hall was another Baptist prominent in the Woolwich 
labour movement. He was the son of a Baptist Minister and 
was sacked from the Arsenal when he took leave to organise 
the election of Fennell in 1900. He was appointed to work 
full-time for the labour movement. He joined Fennell on 
the council in 1903. Yeo has argued that working class 
organisations, specifically branches of the ILP, because 
they lacked money and sometimes felt obliged to employ 
sacked activists, turned to wealthy patrons, which meant a 
client relationship, or to 'business modes' which meant 
that they suffered 'displacing effects' from their original 
goals (106). This can partly be applied to the WLP. It 
was formally established after the election of Crooks, in 
1903, who, being an unpaid MP, received payments from it 
until 1911, when MPs were paid by the state. In November 
of the same year the WLP won power on the council and it 
had to find its election expenses. Hall's first post was 
as advertisement canvasser and circulation manager for the 
Labour Journal. The centrality of raising money meant that
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the WLP looked to nonconformist Frederick Pethick Lawrence 
for funds (he owned £1,000 worth of Pioneer shares), and to 
Grinling, who owned £500 worth. This did not lead to the 
WLP being displaced from its goal of securing the election 
of working men.
Support for the 'Peace Arsenal campaign also came from the 
Reverend W E 'Comrade 1 Lee of Plumstead who called for the 
abolition of capitalism and encouraged labour speakers at 
his meetings. At one Haden Guest took the opportunity to 
promote alternative work. Specifically he noted that the 
government offered £150 to builders as an inducement to 
build homes and suggested that the items required for 
reconstruction be produced at national factories (107). 
Another of Lee's meetings was advertised as being about 
'unemployment and the way out'. It was suggested that 
'capitalism has no plan. Jesus has one. Come and hear 
what it is' (108). The Comrades were also addressed by 
the Presbyterian, the Reverend John Cairns MA, the Honorary 
chaplain to the Territorial Force and acting chaplain to 
the forces in Woolwich. He lived in the town between 1904 
and 1924 and he was on two advisory committees of the War 
Office.
Possibly the frequent portrayal of the 'Peace Arsenal 1 
campaign in religious terms can be attributed to the 
influence of non-conformity. The men who visited Lloyd 
George on order to convince him of the merits of 
alternative work at the Arsenal were 'missionaries' who 
went with a scheme for 'conversion' which would lead to 
'salvation'. The 'peace work was not a new shibboleth for 
Woolwich workers', the law that said that the Arsenal could 
only be used for war was not as unalterable as that of the 
'Medes and Persians' and the Arsenal was not to receive any 
further orders for alternative work because the electorate 
had, in the election of Gee, deserted 'the path of virtue'
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(109). People the Pioneer reported, were driven to 
desperation because 'there is no opportunity of effecting 
Cain's curse and earning their bread by the sweat of their 
brow 1 (110). The employment of such language was not 
uncommon amongst nonconformists or former Christians on the 
left. J T Brownlie, the Arsenal engineer who went on to 
become President of the AEU, was noted for his oratorical 
style (111). He was a nonconformist and listening to him 
at a meeting has compared to being at 'a great religious 
revival' (112). Snell said that, 'we glory in the 
religious impulse behind our work' and stressed the 'sound 
moral basis' of the Labour Party. The effect was to 
emphasis non-class links and the place of the 'Peace 
Arsenal' campaign within a traditional morality. 
Communists, on the other hand, were not only a 'sinister 
force' intent on 'smashing the Labour Party' but also 
'carping critics whose eternal theme is that no good can 
come out of Nazareth' (113). Through a job at the Arsenal 
a workers gained the opportunity to build social 
relationships, engage in collective activity and be 
assigned status. Un- and underemployment led to a loss of 
participation, income and status. Mills expressed this in 
rather nonconformist terms, 'enforced idleness meant moral 
degradation* and made people into 'mere degenerates' (114).
There were social links between the leaders of organised 
labour, traders and the church in the management of local 
educational and charitable bodies. Involved in the 
Woolwich Invalid Childrens Aid Association were the RACS, 
trade unions, the Pioneer staff, and local businesses 
(115). In 1890 Woolwich Polytechnic Young Men's Christian 
Institute, the inspiration of Arsenal fitter Frank Didden 
opened (116). The Board of Governors included Edwin 
Hughes, William Anderson, Charles Grinling, Charles Escreet 
and Councillor Fred Chambers, the first Labour chair of the 
Finance Committee, and a Guardian. There were a
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sufficiently large number of ties, of sufficient strength, 
between workers and clerics that even if those mentioned 
were atypical the sense of local community upon which the 
campaign was built was was enriched.
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(c)
Service personnel, including the Territorials, were a 
significant part of the population of Woolwich. In 1902 
Booth described the principal aspect of Woolwich as being 
that it was a garrison town, 'dominated by the barracks and 
the military 1 . Every Sunday there was a church parade 
"held partly in the interests of recruiting* and the 5,000 
soldiers spent freely in the town on drink and prostitution 
(117). Following the retirement of Colonel Hughes in 1902 
Lord Charles Beresford, a naval officer who was 'the 
nation's idol', according to the Kentish Independent and 
whose platform was that he 'had the utmost contempt for 
politicians; he always put his country before his party 1 , 
was returned, unopposed, as MP for Woolwich (118). He 
refused to meet a delegation from the Trades Council who 
wished to discuss the discharges from the Arsenal. After 
four months he retired from the House. The Conservative 
candidate who stood against Crooks in 1903, and beat him in 
1910, was Major W A Adam and the Coalition candidate in 
1921 was Captain Gee VC. When the Duke of Connaught 
visited Woolwich in order to unveil a memorial to the 
British who died in the Boer War, the Labour mayor, 'pro- 
Boer* Slater, explained why so many of his colleagues were 
absent. This was taken as an affront to the Army and has 
been given as one reason why he lost his seat on the local 
council that November.
A sufficient number of former Service personnel had settled 
in the town to form an active branch of the National 
Association of Ex-Naval and Military Men (119). There was 
also considerable support for the voluntary military 
institution which ostensibly existed in order to guard 
against the invasion of Britain, the Volunteer Force. 
This, after 1908, was the basis of the Territorial Army.
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Initiated nationally in 1859 and founded in Woolwich in 
1860 the Force was at first a middle-class activity. In 
order to join an individual had to be able to afford the 
time, the expense of a uniform and had to have the 
inclination to carry arms (120). In his study of the 
Volunteers Cunnirigham concludes that in general the 
Volunteers embodied; 'many of the canonised values of 
Victorian Britain. Patriotism, self-help, local 
initiative, discipline order, health giving recreation and 
class mixing in an approved manner 1 (121).
There may have been a fear of an invasion in a nearby part 
of Kent, or a professional interest, if not actually an 
inside knowledge, of the relative merits of the armouries 
of the potential enemies but in Woolwich a central reason 
for joining the Volunteers was that it presented an 
opportunity to the urban working class to forge links with 
the local elite of regular officers from the Royal Military 
Academy, Woolwich (122). The 10th Kent Artillery (formed 
1868) was made up of artisans from the Arsenal shot and 
shell factory and the 14th Kent was so closely associated 
with the Royal Dockyards that shortly after it closed in 
1869 the corps was disbanded (123). Until it was forbidden 
from the practice, a few years after its formation, the 
Woolwich Volunteers elected its officers. Even then a list 
of officers nominated following a ballot was sent to the 
Lord Lieutenant of Kent, the person who appointed the 
officers subject to Royal approval. The list was rejected 
as it consisted 'of an indiscriminate amalgamation of the 
names of some of the superior officers of the departments 
and the mechanics without due regard to their 
classification 1 . Eventually a commission was given to a 
head foreman of one of the Laboratories, but Woolwich was 
clearly an exception as when a similar case arose in 
Chatham a commission was withheld from the keeper of the 
garrison canteen (124). The force continued to attract
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Arsenal workers and the throughout the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century. The Pioneer remarked that the 
Volunteers were 'a chance to retain your job [at the 
Arsenal] and, in some cases, where the wife was a daily 
woman to a superior person, a little promotion might come 
your way'(125). In general, as Beckett suggests the Force 
enhanced respect for authority. He calls it 'a cohesive 
factor in that it tended to draw the differing classes 
which composed its strength together 1 and cites how members 
were thought to be more loyal and patriotic than other 
civilians. Some nonconformists disapproved of the 
Volunteers on the grounds that the Force drew youth away 
from teetotal pledges towards the influence of military 
ardour (126). This was not the case amongst the prominent 
Labour temperance campaigners in Woolwich, such as Crooks, 
whilst a local Marxist who worked in the War Office, George 
Moore Bell, argued positively for the Territorials (127).
In March 1906 Labour Leader carried a article 'Down with 
weapons', and the April ILP conference denounced military 
training. The ILP also opposed the creation of the 
Territorial Army in 1907, with only one Labour MP voting 
with the government, Crooks (128). In 1908 the Woolwich 
volunteers became part of the 2nd London Brigade RFA (TF) 
of the Territorial Army, under direct War Office control. 
From 1912 its HQ was in the house of the turn of the 
century local Conservative MP, Edwin Hughes. The other 
local regiment was the 2nd, later 9th, Kent Artillery which 
during the war became the 65th (8th London) and was 
commanded by Lt Col E H Eley. He worked both privately as 
a surveyor and did surveying on behalf of the Woolwich Home 
Owners' Association. After the war he became a president 
of the Woolwich Chamber of Commerce (129). The WLP 
continued to support the Volunteers and the Pioneer, 
carried obituaries of local Volunteers (130). In 1921 Eley 
proposed that a war memorial to the 65th (8th London) be
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constructed on Plumstead Common and Barefoot aided the 
processing of the application through the council (131). 
The labour movement did not recoil with liberal horror from 
the military because members were involved in a community 
activity, the Volunteers, because the solution that it 
sought to unemployment was a standing army equipped by a 
standing state arsenal in Woolwich.
During the war the government promised to restore pre-war 
practices which had been undermined by dilution and to 
provide work for former Service personnel. Those soldiers 
who had worked at the Arsenal expected to be able to return 
to their jobs after the war, and those who had been 
invalided out of the Forces and had started work at the 
Arsenal did not expect to be sacked. The ex-Servicemen 
were sufficiently well organised to present a threat to 
social order if their demands were ignored. In October 
1918 the Civil Demobilisation and Resettlement Department 
was established. At its head was Sir Stephenson Kent. 
When he refused to meet dissatisfied ex-Servicemen, they 
invaded his office and pinned him to his desk (132). In 
the light of this and other, more violent incidents 
involving mutinous and recently demobbed Servicemen, such 
as the burning down of Luton Town Hall and the occupation 
of the barracks on Horseguards Parade, the ex-Servicemen of 
Woolwich were treated with some respect, or at least with 
caution.
The government provided some training exclusively for ex- 
Servicemen and disabled ex-Servicemen and subsidised 
particular work if the employee was a former Serviceman. 
The Woolwich LAC demanded that the Arsenal be used for 
training veterans (133). Mills also agitated on this 
issue, and the Minister responded that the issue was 'again 
under consideration 1 but little came of this plan for this 
alternative use of the Arsenal (134). There was some
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training in state factories, Birtley Government Instrument 
Factory was used for this purpose, and in September 1920 
the Minister of Labour promised that any man who completed 
his training and still found no work would be retrained 
again on full allowances. However, the factory was closed 
in July 1921, the men without work discharged and 
unemployment benefit for disabled ex-Servicemen was reduced 
from £1 to 15/- (75p) a week (135). The government also 
encouraged the employment of ex-Servicemen by means of a 
quota system. If 5% or more of the workforce were disabled 
ex-Servicemen the firm's name was entered on the Kings 
National Register. Local firms advertised if their names 
were on the Register (136). 8% of governmental staff had 
to be disabled ex-Servicemen (137). In Woolwich the 
Arsenal was well over quota and there was a promise made in 
1919, (and revoked the following February), firstly that no 
ex-Servicemen would be discharged from the Arsenal and then 
that the ex-Servicemen would be among the last to be 
dismissed (138). This meant that the cost of production at 
the Arsenal was greater than it could have been. The CSOF 
announced that 'we are employing disabled soldiers in every 
way we can' but then complained to the Ministry that this 
burden, which did not apply to private firms, was 
'manifestly unfair 1 . It was expensive to employ men 'for 
work which can be done at a much lower rate by young 
girls'.
In June 1919, in a speech which must have sounded ominous 
to the ex-Servicemen, the Minister of Munitions, Churchill, 
said that all men of pensionable age were being replaced at 
the Arsenal and that the order in which discharges were 
taking place was based 'entirely on efficiency' (139). 
This was reiterated in 1921 when the Financial Secretary to 
the War Office told a deputation from the Joint Town 
Committee that the previous order of dismissals had been 
inefficient and that henceforth people would be dismissed
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or employed depending on the requirements of the Arsenal at 
that time, not upon the status of the individual. 'Every 
effort is to be made to employ the most efficient men and 
to provide the maximum amount of employment by the further 
recruitment of skilled men 1 (140). In February 1922 the 
Ordnance Department at the Arsenal took on a few extra 
workers and it was reiterated that it was government policy 
was to give preferential treatment 'other things being 
equal' to ex-Servicemen (141).
The government also offered free passage to the Empire for 
ex-Servicemen and their dependants, on the proviso that 
they had the approval of the appropriate foreign government 
or a job awaiting them. Government loans for farm land, 
stock and implements were available (142). In October 1921 
the PM promised a £300,000 to help ex-Servicemen to 
emigrate (143). There was considerable publicity about the 
opportunities for emigration and the local Distress 
Committee assisted the passages of 15,000 local men, many 
of them with records of twenty years service at the 
Arsenal, in addition to their being ex-Servicemen (144). 
In February 1922 eight hundred unemployed former skilled 
Arsenal workers who between them owed £4,000 in back rent 
formed the Eltham Migration Committee and asked the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies for assistance with 
their passages to the Empire (145).
There were other specific aids for ex-Servicemen in 
Woolwich which marked them out from others campaigning for 
secure employment in the town. There was a Disabled Ex- 
Servicemen's sub-committee of the Woolwich council's 
Woolwich Employment Committee (WEC). Woolwich tennis 
raquet manufacturer A & G Gardiner arranged, via this sub- 
committee, to take on disabled ex-Servicemen. The sub- 
committee also toured local employers seeking appropriate 
occupations for the disabled. The WEC gave loans to ex-
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Servicemen to enable to start their own businesses. In 
addition it pressed the CSOF to allow ex-Servicemen 
suspended from the Arsenal to be able to claim benefits 
without prejudicing their chances of re-entry into the 
Arsenal (146).
There were a number of organisations specifically for ex- 
Servicemen. In Woolwich there was a small number of 
members of the Comrades of the Great War. This body was 
founded and funded by big business, it had War Office 
sanction and senior officers and Unionist MPs on its self 
appointed executive (147). As the Chief of Scotland Yard's 
Criminal Investigation Department, Basil Thomson said, 'it 
never gave cause for anxiety 1 (148). It existed partly to 
stop ex-Servicemen forming political links with munition 
workers and the Woolwich branch had no links with the 'All 
Grades' committee. The Communist Party made appeals to 
discontented ex-Servicemen, but without any noticeable 
success (149). The ex-Servicemen's organisation which was 
sympathetic to the Labour Party was the National Union of 
ex-Servicemen, known at the time as NUX. It had a branch 
in Woolwich from December 1919. At the time of its 
creation there were 19,208 workers at the Arsenal and 3,500 
unemployed in the town of whom 1,000 were ex-Servicernen 
(150). It was committed to stopping the discharges through 
constitutional means including the promotion of alternative 
work. The NUX Men's Labour Club had a procession in 
December 1920 in order to ask a factory to work a three 
shift system rather than employ men on overtime. It 
received support from the Woolwich Labour Institute, and a 
number of Labour activists and councillors including Harry 
Gilder, C H Langham and Jack Sheppard (151).
Larger than either the Comrades or the NUX was the Woolwich 
and District National Federation of Demobilised and 
Disabled Soldiers and Sailors, (NFDDSS). Within six months
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of the Armistice it had got 20 branches within a 6 miles 
radius of Woolwich, including a separate branch on the Well 
Hall estate and within a year it had 4,000 members and 
representatives on the local War Pensions Committee, the 
LAC and the AGC (152). The nearby Dartford and Crayford 
NFDDSS had 1,700 members by that point (153). The Woolwich 
NFDDSS proclaimed itself to be 'non-political 1 (154). As 
the Sidcup & District NFDDSS secretary declared, 'there is 
no Bolshevist or Red Flag element in the Federation or its 
branches' (155). The organisation was narrow in its 
outlook. The secretary of the Tottenham branch of the NSSF 
(a local equivalent of the NFDDSS) told Acton NSSF that 
munition 'flappers' should not receive 25/- out-of-work- 
dole whilst soldiers wives only received 12/6d separation 
allowance each (156). The Woolwich NFDDSS looked to the 
government which had conscripted many of its members for 
help with unemployment. It sought special treatment for 
its members, in October 1919 it told the Ministry of 
Munitions that ex-Servicemen ought to be offered housing as 
a priority (157). The chair of the Woolwich branch, W G 
Kiddell, called the organisation 'strictly constitutional' 
and he said that it had 'no use for direct action 1 (158). 
A typical action was that of April 1921 when the NFDDSS 
appealed to the King for the retention of 1,900 ex- 
Servicemen at the Arsenal. This was followed by a delay in 
the layoff of the ex-Servicemen (159). The Woolwich 
NFDDSS's General Secretary, Thomas Crutcher, told the 
Conservatives that he had no use for politics and he 
praised the efforts of Sir Kingsley Wood to gain pensions 
for NFDDSS members (160). Sir Kingsley Wood promised to 
aid the organisation in an inquiry into pay and dismissals 
from the Arsenal (161). In September 1919 the NFDDSS held 
a joint memorial service with the Conservatives (162).
The Woolwich NFDDSS asked the other parties to withdraw and 
allow four of its candidates to stand unopposed in the 1919
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borough elections. The MRs did not stand against the 
NFDDSS in 4 wards in Woolwich but the WLP refused such an 
arrangement, despite the fact that ward Labour parties in 
Battersea withdrew candidates in order to allow the NFDDSS 
to stand unopposed (163). The WLP suggested that Crutcher 
stand for Labour but he declined, stood for the NFDDSS, and 
lost. The generosity of the Conservative Party in not 
standing in seats it was unlikely to win might have been 
related to the fact that during the war the local 
Conservative party 'fell to pieces', according to the 
Conservative Woolwich Herald. The party had not got an 
agent in 1919 (164). The NFDDSS stood in four safe Labour 
seats and came bottom of the poll in three of them. In the 
other the candidate came in just ahead of one of the 
Tories, and a long way behind the successful Labour 
councillors (165). The co-operation between the NFDDSS and 
the unions was limited. In September 1919 during the rail 
strike the Woolwich NFDDSS organised a civil guard of 
1,000 men. 'It is to be distinctly understood that no 
circumstances whatsoever will be grounds for 
strikebreaking* the NFDDSS said, adding that it wanted to 
maintain law and order and to protect property (166). A 
Labour municipal candidate in Stepney and a member of the 
NFDDSS accused Woolwich NFDDSS of scabbing during the rail 
dispute, despite the NFDDSS policy of neutrality. His 
resolution to expel Woolwich was defeated 74 to 3 and he 
resigned (167).
The higher status of ex-Servicemen at the Arsenal was 
effectively removed in early 1920. At this time there were 
388,000 ex-Servicemen in receipt of the donation and 39,000 
of them were disabled. In February 1920 some ex- 
Servicemen at the Arsenal were threatened with the sack. 
There was a huge demonstration in Beresford Square with 
speeches from councillors and ex-Servicemen's 
representatives. The demand was for alternative work.
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This demand was of central importance to men in Woolwich 
whether they were traders, skilled artisans or ex- 
Servicemen. The opposition it was frequently reiterated, 
was not the government nor an individual manager but as one 
councillor who addressed the crowd on this particular 
occasion put it, 'they were up against the representatives 
of vested interests'. Another speaker, an ex-Serviceman, 
stressed how the fight had to be taken to the floor of the 
House and how 'Seven million men trained in arms could beat 
the politicians' (168).
A deputation of seventy discharged, disgruntled, disabled 
ex-Servicemen went to see the PM who refused to meet them. 
The response of the men was to say that they would camp in 
Downing Street if necessary, but they then decided to see 
Kellaway at the Ministry of Munitions. They told him that 
the disabled were unemployable in capitalist firms and the 
government had a duty to provide work, not making munitions 
but 'productive work for the nation 1 . Kellaway 
sympathised but blamed the more general crisis. he said 
that he had 'a duty to the public purse* Councillor Hart 
compared Kellaway with the Minister who had been 
responsible for the reduction of the size of the Arsenal 
workforce after the Boer War, Haldane. Whilst the 
deputation were seeing the Minister a large group of like 
minded protestors were trying to march on Downing Street. 
Some reports put the number at 5,000 (169). The 
demonstrators were joined en route by ex-Service personnel 
from other areas of London. Councillors and 
representatives of local traders swelled the ranks. They 
got as far as Westminster Bridge where the police, using 
what the Pioneer labelled 'Prussian' tactics, dispersed the 
crowd. There were 500 injured people. Thomas Mason an 
ex-Serviceman at the Arsenal who went on the march 
described how the police set about them with batons and 
went on 'You should have seen some of our fellows, head
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wounds, bandages around 'em 1 (170). In April 1920 at the 
annual conference of the Socialist Party the battle of 
Westminster Bridge was cited as an example of the 
fierceness of the class war and as evidence of how the 
'governing class would stick at nothing to uphold its 
dominance (171). The Pioneer explained that the 'battle of 
Westminster Bridge brought prominently to the fore the 
question of alternative work not alone in Woolwich but in 
the country generally' (172). As an outcome of the 
'battle' the government established a new committee 
comprising of civil servants from the Ministry of Munitions 
and the representatives of ex-Servicemen who were employed 
at the Arsenal including a highly articulate Woolwich 
councillor, Hart. In addition discharges were postponed 
for a fortnight (173). This committee met Martel (the 
CSOF) the next day and he suggested that the responsibility 
for the discharges lay with Given at the Ministry (174). 
Once the anger and fear which had been responsible for the 
establishment of the committee had dissipated, 
departmental officials offered almost nothing to the ex- 
Servicemen, not even the promised training schemes for the 
disabled (175).
Ex-servicemen rallied a week later in Beresford Square and 
their representatives met General Martel. They handed a 
petition on behalf of the disabled men, to Princess May, 
asking her to pass it on to her father, the King. Jack 
Jones, the Silvertown MP, publicised the cause of the ex- 
Servicemen at the Arsenal in the Commons (176). At this 
time ex-Servicemen from the First World War, not previous 
campaigns, were second behind only pre-war employees in the 
order of dismissals (177). On behalf of the King Sir 
Robert Horne replied to the petition saying that ex- 
Servicemen received 'special consideration' at the 
employment exchange, that work had been provided ' to the 
fullest extent that has been found practicable 1 and that if
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uneconomical work was provided then that threw people out 
of work elsewhere (178). Within days of the petition 
dismissals were again proposed, 120 able-bodied men and 116 
disabled were to be laid off over a four week period. The 
ex-Servicemen's committee were furious, as the PM had 
promised consultations would occur prior to any decisions 
being made (179). The policy of discrimination in favour of 
those who had fought in the First World War continued in 
name for some time. By June 1920 there were 195,000 
registered unemployed ex-Servicemen and 24,600 of them were 
disabled (180). A month later there were 143,000 ex- 
Servicemen in receipt of the donation, this cost about 
£168,000 per week. In 1922 however the Woolwich Workers 1 
Unemployment Organisation was established and its five 
point programme included the demand for no discrimination 
between the unemployed (181).
Although distanced from the core Arsenal workers by their 
experiences of the war; their privileged treatment at the 
hands of the state, and their particular demands, the 
Woolwich NFDDSS did contribute to the 'Peace Arsenal' 
campaign. The NFDDSS had a representative on the AGC and 
when ex-Servicemen at the Arsenal were given work in the 
dangerous Arsenal TNT factory the shop stewards and the 
NFDDSS worked together to protest against this treatment 
(182). The NFDDSS had its own, recognised, steward at the 
Arsenal and, working in close co-operation with the other 
stewards, the organisation claimed responsibility for 
appealing on behalf of hundreds of dismissed ex-Servicemen 
and winning their jobs back for them. In August 1919 of 
the 176 dismissals from the Arsenal of ex-Servicemen, all 
but 34 had been re-instated (183). Ex-Servicemen were a 
potentially disruptive force. In Woolwich their 
organisations were harnessed to the campaign for 
alternative work. Through such activity they were brought 
into the new civic order.
-227-
(d)
One of the demands of 'Peace Arsenal 1 campaigners was to 
produce house building materials at the Arsenal. This 
linked the campaign to housing, an issue of great local and 
national pertinence. Many Arsenal workers were tied to 
their work because if they were laid off they faced 
eviction from the accommodation especially built for 
Arsenal workers and, at a time of a national housing 
shortage, there were few other places to go. Others had no 
wish to leave their homes, as most tenants had controlled 
rents, and owners would have had to find buyers for a 
property in an area without prospects of work. In 
September 1919 a small house on the Well Hall was for sale 
for £350, 18 months later a similar house cost £210 (184). 
If the Arsenal was used to make items used in house 
construction, the dilemmas of a housing shortage and 
unemployment could be resolved. In addition the campaigns 
over housing were linked to the campaign for alternative 
work because they reinforced the values which were central 
to the 'Peace Arsenal 1 campaign. There was private housing 
and a well-organised tenants association for the artisans 
which aimed to encourage a sense of local community, and 
inferior housing for the less successfully organised new 
arrivals at the Arsenal. The government made promises, and 
then influenced by the Treasury and the Commons, reneged on 
them and tried to offload its responsibilities onto the 
Woolwich council.
In the late nineteenth century as there was well-paid, 
regular work and little competition from a commercial and 
professional strata artisans were able to purchase their 
own houses. The Arsenal and Dockyards 'produced a home 
loving and thrifty class of mechanic and artisan, 
responsible for Woolwich having more owner-occupiers than 
any other locality in the UK in proportion to the
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population 1 . From the late nineteenth century at least a 
quarter and possibly as much as a third of owner-occupiers 
in Woolwich were working-class (186). In the WEBS there was 
an adequate institutional means by which money could be 
channelled to property in Woolwich. Based on a 
nonconformist firm founded in the 1840s the WEBS grew to 
own assets of £1.6 million by 1920 (187). In 1925 it had 
assets of £2 million and the first person not from Woolwich 
was appointed to the board (188). In 1900 George Barnes 
noted that the constituency 'needed a milk and watery man 
unidentified with socialism... there are a lot of 
houseowners in Woolwich. The poor chaps... believe in the 
the rights of property 1 (189). Booth recorded the demand 
for small houses, the 'broad wave of prosperity that 
springs from employment at the Arsenal' and that the money 
went into housing; 'the aquisition of property is the 
dominant idea in Woolwich and the sole object of life 
seemingly to buy a house'. It was 'one of the few districts 
in London where the workman has made the sides and crests 
of the steep hills his own 1 (190).
The influx of munitions workers during the war led to a 
tremendous pressure on accommodation. Sales rose and eight 
estate agents reported that they had not got a single 
vacant house between them (191). The council had built a 
few houses in the past but there had been difficulties in 
producing accommodation for workers which could also be let 
an economical rent (192). In 1901 Woolwich had the lowest 
density of occupation per house anywhere in London and in 
1911 there were 1,300 unoccupied houses in the borough. 
The council did not wish to be saddled with empty 
properties once the population declined after the war 
(193). It lobbied for a national solution, house building 
by the Local Government Board (194).
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The government intervened in two ways. It controlled rents 
and it built accommodation. Before the war rent 
legislation was 'a modern Frankenstein 1 as Labour Leader 
put it, because 'a rent strike at once involves a thousand 
laws that safeguard property 1 (195). The 1914 Court 
Emergency Powers Act meant that landlords needed a court 
order before they could seize goods in lieu of rent and the 
1915 Rent Restrictions Act stabilised rents for those in 
controlled accommodation. This legislation was passed 
after much agitation, some of it in Woolwich. The Fabians
suggested that this local interest was in part because
landlordism was easier to attack than 
capitalism where the only large industry 
is government work (196)
There was also the background of the campaigns of Horsley 
for improvements in house sanitation and for tenants' 
rights and a WL&TC demonstration which was part of a 
campaign in 1900 which called for municipal housing and 
fair rents (197). In 1915 the campaigning was framed in 
terms of patriotic activity to end profiteering. The War 
Rents League continued to campaign after the 1915 Act, the 
outline of its work being summarised by its mainstay, Dan 
Rider, as 'no evictions during house shortages, no rents 
for slums no increase in rents without repairs' (198). The 
1915 legislation was 'framed in the interests of the 
working class elite 1 and reflected 'the biases of these 
eminently respectable militants' of the Arsenal (199). The 
Pioneer explained its implications and advised readers to 
consult the WLP office in the event of any difficulties 
(200).
The divisions at the Arsenal were perpetuated on the 
estates and in the different tenants associations. Wohl 
suggests that the artisan class persisted as a stratum 
after 1890 because of the difference between 'accommodation 
regarded as "artisan standard" and the abysmal dwellings of 
labourers, casuals and outworkers' (201). The Office of
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Works (OoW) provided 1,290 houses for artisans and 2,654 
four-roomed wooden bungalows, known as hutments on nine 
sites around Woolwich (202). This was provision on a far 
greater scale than for state munitions workers, or those in 
the private sector, elsewhere (203). The second largest 
amount of state housing in one area was an estate of 708 
dwellings in Sheffield (204). The architect who had 
designed Letchworth and Hampstead Garden Suburb, Raymond 
Unwin, designed the houses of the Well Hall estate, in 
Woolwich and despite the cost, he received widespread 
praise for his work (205). The Garden City and Town 
Planning Magazine thought Well Hall 'wonderful... there is 
not a colony of workmen's houses in the world which 
approaches the general excellence of the Woolwich scheme 1 
(206). The Pioneer said that 'it will approximate very 
closely to [Walt] Whitman's ideal of the great city' and a 
worker who described it in the Pioneer asked 'who wouldn't 
be a munitions worker in Woolwich nowadays?' (207).
The Well Hall Garden City Tenants Association (WHTA) was 
formed and soon had 700 members. The chair, Jack Mills, 
said that it aimed not to 'oppose the powers that be [but] 
to promote the happiness and wellbeing of the residents'. 
The Vice-President, Crooks, saw the WHTA as a means of 
encouraging neighbourly behaviour. As Arsenal workers 
could neither strike for more pay nor leave work without a 
certificate, one of the few ways by which they could make 
material gains and not be undermined by blacklegs or 
dilutees, was by not paying the rent. One of the first 
actions of the WHTA was to organise a successful rent 
strike in 1915. The money which was saved was pooled and 
spent on a new social centre. The estate had no shops, 
churches, doctors or schools; it relied upon the workplace 
as the social centre. 'RB 1 wrote in the Pioneer, 'a 
stronger material tie could hardly exist. When it is 
quickened by comradeship and a growing sense of our garden
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citizenship, then might our community show a better way of 
living to many another industrial centre 1 (208). The WHTA 
continued to campaign. In 1920 it defied the 1920 Rent Act 
when members decided to refuse to pay a rent increase to 
the OoW. There were court proceedings, and eventually the 
arrears were paid and the case went to arbitration (209).
Even after Well Hall had been constructed it was impossible 
for Arsenal workers to find accommodation in the locality 
and the existing transport arrangements were inadequate for 
mass commuting so the hutments were built and hostels which 
provided accommodation for 7,000 people by 1917, were 
built. The hutments inhabitants lived in what a Ministry 
of Munitions Inspector called 'literally human packing 
cases' made from inferior materials, without adequate 
foundations, ventilation, drainage or access by road. 
Furthermore, 'the external aspect is hideous' and one of 
the sites, according to the Lewisham Board of Guardians, 
was 'fit only for use as a preserve for wildfowl and water 
fowl' (210). One resident recalled that 'it was a dismal 
area... The names of the roads weren't inspiring, rather 
gloomy echoes of war: Rifle Road, Torpedo Terrace 1 (211). 
Another remembered being summoned to work by the ringing of 
a brass shell case hanging outside one of the huts and 
being 'up to my eyes in mud and water'(212). Even the 
Evening Standard in an article written during a rent 
strike, which pointed out how fortunate the residents were 
to have anywhere to live, called them 'not too cheerful 
looking' (213). The Government Hutments Tenants Protection 
League (GHTPL) was formed in November 1918 to campaign for 
rent reductions of 5/- a week so that tenants might 
purchase coal as the hutments were damp and many tenants 
expected to lose their jobs and receive only 24/- a week in 
benefit. After five deputations to the Minister of 
Munitions the rents were reduced by 2/6d for the winter. 
David Englander argues that this action was used as model
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for tenants elsewhere and was viewed with consternation by 
landlords (214). The GHTPL fought to get the rents 
permanently reduced, for the reduction of tram fares and 
for general improvements to the estates, but as people 
moved away the campaigning faded. By December 1919 only 20 
people attended the GHTPL Annual General Meeting and at the 
end of the following year when 1,930 wartime hutments were 
still occupied, the GHTPL lost its funds when the locally 
based Farrows Bank collapsed in December 1920 (215).
Before the war there was some state housing which 
'facilitated the continued operation of the 'invisible 
hand' and the laissez-faire principles by providing a 
temporary prop' (216). Immediately after the war it 
appeared if there would be more state housing. The press 
and the Cabinet demanded, in the words of Lloyd George's 
election promise of November 1918, 'Homes For Heroes'.
Churchill made the point that
work should be taken to to the workmen 
rather than that large numbers of 
workmen should be discharged from 
Woolwich and Enfield and left to find 
accommodation where no housing 
accommodation exists (217).
As the government had built during the war it was a 
reasonable assumption by the 'Peace Arsenal' campaigners 
that such properties would require maintenance and that the 
government might continue to build as it was committed to 
the further provision of housing and by its own admission 
there was a perceived need for 300,000 new post-war 
dwellings. Even the Evening Standard held the view that 
'we are by no means averse to the principle of 
nationalisation of certain great utilities', and then gave 
the example of subsidised housing (218). In fact as early 
as 1917 the Housing Panel of the Department of 
Reconstruction ruled out government house building and in 
August 1919 the Cabinet decided that it was 'undesirable 
that the Government should itself manage houses... every
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effort should therefore be made to transfer Government 
houses to local authorities, or failing them, to approved 
public utility societies 1 (219). Sheila Marriner argues 
that although some building firms gained economic 
advantages through enforced war-time standardisation, most 
still lacked sufficient finance to build and that in regard 
to this the government was totally unsympathetic and 
utterly intransigent (220).
Although it opposed rent increases the Uoolwich council 
focused on its own administration of housing (221). It 
built more dwellings between the wars than any other London 
borough. In January 1920 the council sponsored a national 
conference for local authorities on housing, and in 
February work on a 2,700 home estate commenced, the cost of 
which came for the government on the understanding that the 
local and county councils would pay for the upkeep (222). 
The Uoolwich council complied with all the government's 
strictures in regard to the building work, it secured the 
site, obtained materials and put up £250,000, but there 
were delays, and the figure of 1,200 houses was reduced to 
300. The Pioneer blamed this on Addison, the appropriate 
Minister (223). His 'Ministry of Muddle and Misdeed' was 
'increasing the exasperation of the people* (224). This 
was a similar response to that of the Pioneer to 
unemployment, which could lead to a 'serious inflammatory 
campaign amongst the common people', or to squatting which 
it argued was 'a demonstration of the inefficiency of the 
government' (225). Although there were 3,000 more people 
in Woolwich in 1920 than there were in 1914 and there was a 
housing list with 2,000 names on it, the Pioneer described 
the situation in terms of comic opera, rather than as an 
aspect of capitalist economics; 'the situation is 
Gilbertian 1 , an example of 'political roguery', and 'enough 
to make the proverbial cat laugh' (226).
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Sir Alfred Mond was the first Commissioner of the Office of 
Works, which was the government body responsible for 
building homes. He was enthusiastic for the government to 
build; for it to employ ex-Servicemen as builders and to 
compel local authorities to take responsibility for the 
completed houses (227). The Treasury's opposition to the 
scheme led Mond to modify his views (228). In addition, 
although courts often found in its favour, the government 
found rent collection on its estates difficult and, backed 
by the recommendations of the 1922 Geddes Committee, made 
concerted efforts to sell those properties that it owned 
(229). By 1923 Mond had changed his views. He said that 
from his experience it was 'impossible to carry on the 
industries of the country from a government department... a 
curiously paralysing influence seems to over everybody as 
soon as they begin to work for the state 1 . In 1925 a 
solution which reflected the importance of community self- 
help was found when the RAGS purchased most of the 
government houses and thus added over 1,200 dwellings to 
the 3,500 that it already owned (230). By contrast Sir 
Kingsley Wood took up the issue of hutments sanitation with 
both Kellaway and the local council. Sir Kingsley Wood, 
accompanied by a surveyor and a local MR councillor 
inspected the hutments and told the GHTPL that 'I cannot 
believe that the rent charged is a fair one... I am 
considerably impressed with the justice of your case 1 . In 
addition the local magistrates thought the huts insanitary 
(231). He was also invited to the GHTPL fundraising party, 
and in 1929 Wood's firm of solicitors represented a 
hutments tenant who was being evicted, by Eltham Parks 
Estates Limited, for rent arrears (232).
Alternatives to the constitutionalist approach were 
presented, and, as with Poplarism, marginalised. Although 
Mills lent his support to 400 LCC tramworkers who were 
living in a Ministry of Munitions hostel and who occupied
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it when they were told to leave, in general there was 
little support for such action (233). There were squatters 
living rent-free in Woolwich hutments for over a year but 
such direct action was not seen as a significant example to 
follow (234). Women wanted to run their own hostel, rather 
than it being closed. They received more support from Sir 
Kingsley Wood than the WLP and eventually the hostel was 
not dismantled but destroyed (235). The difference came to 
the fore when the GHTPL organiser, George Haley, (a navvy 
at the Arsenal and also a Labour Party activist), stood 
against Mills in the 1919 town council election (236). All 
three seats in the ward were won by the Conservatives, who 
gained enough votes to beat Labour even if all of Haley's 
'independent labour 1 votes had gone to Labour. Indicative 
of the continued prominence of the Arsenal is the fact that 
one of the MR victors was an Arsenal worker who had been on 
the council from 1906 (237). Two of the Labour candidates 
were engineers and the third one labelled himself as an 
artisan. Mills went on to become an Alderman, a home 
owner, (after he was evicted for rent arrears during a rent 
dispute in 1921) and PPS to the Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster (238). Haley countered the local labour 
community, lost his job at the Arsenal, got into debt and 
was evicted (239).
For established men at the Arsenal in the mid-nineteenth 
century their employer was, 'a vague non-profit making body 
confused with concepts of Britain's power, and with 
working-class patriotism 1 (240). This view, coupled to 
their control of the largest local trader and a significant 
local employer, the RAGS, and their experience of running 
their own company, the AFC, provided the Arsenal workers 
with an unusual perspective on the world of business which 
determined their view as to the best means by which they 
might secure alternative work for the Arsenal. The 
emphasis, throughout the campaign, on constructive change,
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eliminating the defects of society rather than total1v 
reiectinq; it, owed more to local moral codes than the 'Coon 
to Jesus' Snowden. Visionaries ,even socialist ones, 
clearly did not appeal to the practical Arsenal men, 
whereas a vicar, or a pastor, who offered constructive, 
piecemeal, change did. MacDonald n i ^  h t have offered an 
elaborate theoretical edifice, hut on an evervday level the 
'Peace Arsenal' campaigners recognised the value of their 
own non-socialist sources of support, including clerics and 
businessmen. The idea, popular immediately after trie war, 
that ex-Servicemen ou^ht to be provided with work and 
accommodation, was, in iJoolwich, placed within a framework 
provided bv the labour community. The notion of a fair 
deal for the war heroes was used to promote the continued 
use of the Arsenal. The availability of accommodation for 
workers in Joolwich and the stake which the RACS and other 
local traders had in the locality, encouraged workers to 
seek alternative work at the Arsenal; to retain their local 
focus.
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Chapter V
no snore bloodv Woolwich Arsenal for me
Spike riillie,an in Hobbs J (ed) ' RomTiel? ' 
'Cunner Who? ' 1974 pl r^ >
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Hall, Schwarz and Durham's work lias been employed to show 
the extent to which the 'Peace Arsenal' campaign 
contributed to the passive transformation of British 
society, politics and the state. Their proposal is that 
'at the very core' of the passive reform were progressive 
state administrators who took up the challenges from those 
outside the state and presented back to the people as state 
policies (I). In its constitutional forn and its statist 
content the 'Peace Arsenal 1 campaign exemplifies this 
process. It had some influence upon new liberals at the 
Tlinistry of Munitions and it also contributed to another 
aspect of the passive transformation, the
constitutionalisation of the Labour Party (2). This latter 
process involved the creation of Labour Socialism, key 
elements of which were the privileging of responsibility 
for the community, not class politics, and two-party 
constitutionalism. Through this study of a specific 
campaign it has become clearer how the new order, which 
rested upon a social and political environment constructed 
on all levels of society, was implemented.
The relatively warm personal contacts between the Ministry 
of Munitions and the 'Peace Arsenal 1 campaigners are 
indicative of the reception that the ideas of the latter 
received in the Ministry. The shop stewards' All Grades' 
Committee made a point of inviting a Leading Ministry of 
Munitions official concerned with the Arsenal, Sir Henry 
Fowler, to visit the borough to see how respectable it was. 
Uhen he arrived, in March 1.919, he was escorted around 
t/oolwich in a RAGS car, by Voce, of the <\OC. Addison's 
diary reveals that whilst he wrote almost nothing about 
workers in it, he was 'seriously impressed' with the shop 
stewards from Uoolwich. The Arsenal workers did not argue 
for a new form of public ownership, or worker' control, 
they simply wanted the Arsenal to switch from munitions 
production to making locomotives. The continuance of state
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ownership was not identified with the advance of socialism. 
Similarly, when the Ministry of Munitions took up the case 
for 10,000 Arsenal workers in peacetime it proposed the 
maintenance of a Ministry to run the Arsenal. As Schwarz 
and Hall put it, the challenge from below was reconstituted 
in a bureaucratic mould.
An element of the creation of two-party constitutionalism 
was that nationalised industries were placed in one camp, 
as state ownership became part of the socialist discourse, 
and the newly strengthened armaments industry cartels, were 
firmly in the other camp. Schwarz and Durham argue that 
this had occurred by 1920 or 1921 and that arguments on the 
right for a strong state sector were dropped. Pressure 
from private companies was added to the opposition of the 
Treasury to further expenditure by the Ministry. This 
meant that the Cabinet's decision, to disallow state 
production in any field where it might compete with private 
production, was buttressed. Although the Ministry's 
arguments in respect state production at the Arsenal were 
outweighed, some of its new liberal concepts of state 
collectivism prevailed in the Labour Party (3).
Schwarz and Durham emphasise the fluidity of the political 
situation in the period 1918-24. They suggest that the 
opposition between reformist and revolutionary socialists 
had not been settled; that only by 1.924 had these two 
categories had hardened into organising principles (4). 
The Labour Party had to be won to the idea of 
constitutional gradualism and parliamentarianism. This 
occurred as a result of a number of decisive battles, both 
inside and outside the Labour Party. In part it involved 
the leadership winning consensus for Labour Socialist ideas 
in the party by pointing out how more abrasive form of 
socialism might provoke a backlash which would reverse 
'Britain's historical "liberal" route' and would result in
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an authoritarian anti-socialist bloc (5). Certainly the 
idea of ousting the Liberal Lloyd George and replacing hin 
with two-party constitutionalisn built around Labour and 
Conservative would have appealed in Woolwich from where the 
Liberals had long departed. A further aspect of the 
creation of this consensus was that the leadership 'focused 
popular energies on the demand for state reforms while 
limiting the forms of struggle within a particular and 
narrow conception of legality' (6). This occurred in 
Woolwich because this agenda addressed local concerns.
The leaders of the 'Peace Arsenal 1 campaign knew the 
importance of securing orders for the Arsenal because they 
remembered the distress after the Boer War, they knew that 
many Arsenal workers, through owning their own houses, were 
tied to the locality, where there was little work outside 
the Arsenal. Other workers were tied to work at the 
Arsenal through their tenancy agreements. flany owners and 
tenants would find moving to other accommodation or other 
work where they might be considered 'skilled' to be a 
difficult task. The campaigners decided that the best 
approach was to build a campaign based on the locality, not 
upon class. There had been a collapse of unity, during the 
period of the post-Boer War unemployment. In their 
adaptation of the idea of citizenship to the local 
circumstances after the war the campaign leaders laid the 
emphasis upon civic pride and the parochial community. In 
their readiness to create an understanding between 
business, unions and the council, in the Joint Town 
Committee, in their attempts to integrate new forces 
including as the Workers Union and the National Federation 
of Women Workers, the campaigners eased the settlement of 
events at national level.
Of the many "socialisms" which made 
themselves available in this period, it 
was this variant, with its commitments
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to statism and sociai engineering, which 
prevailed - not least because of the 
critical role played by the state itself 
in containing the more 'extreme 1 
elements in the Labour formation, while 
educating the more accommodative 
elements into a safe place within the 
pale of the constitution (7)
That which Hall and Schwarz say of Fabianism can be applied 
to the socialism of the WLP as exemplified in the 'Peace 
Arsenal' campaign. The campaign provided the focus, around 
which the new consensus could be constructed. The WLP, one 
of the first constituency parties, was organised on a 
geographical basis. This drew in individuals without 
regard to their occupational or class background. Trade 
unionists joined as individuals and non-trade unionists 
were involved at all levels of the party. This structure 
buttressed the idea of community and individual 
responsibility to vote, over the concept of class action. 
The corollary was constitutionalism and efficiency whilst 
in office. This, despite the example set by Lansbury two 
miles away in a different economic environment. The early 
experience of office marked the WLP, it was interested in 
governing the community, not in acting as a working class 
pressure group. Hall and Schwarz acknowledge the 
hetrogeniality of "socialisms", but stress the 'immense 
influence' of the Fabians and new liberals 'in defining 
socialism, in fixing the character of labour and in setting 
the targets of what could be achieved politically by the 
nascent Labour Party' (8). Schwarz and Durham, also 
highlight the importance of locality and a base in a 
community and Hinton provides a comment appropriate to 
Woolwich when he suggests that, 'socialism is the 
aspiration of a. community, not the destiny of a class' (9).
There was already a strong community upon which the labour 
activists could build the campaign. \t the centre were the 
core workers, and especially their shop stewards who,
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despite the potential disruption due to the sudden influx 
of a vast number of dilutees, and despite the threat to 
their control over skilled work, maintained their status 
throughout the war. These workers found Links with 
munitions workers outside the Arsenal difficult to sustain, 
unless they were buttressed by proximity. The Arsenal site 
was far larger than other munitions factories, and had 
employed more men for longer. There were connections with 
Waltham Abbey and Enfield, but competition for orders and 
plant weighed against these ties.
The strength of the community also rested upon the fact 
that there were almost no local employers besides the 
state, and the state was also a local landlord. Local 
businessmen did not directly pay for higher wages at the 
Arsenal and they benefited from the increased expenditure 
of the recipients of pay awards or larger pensions. Being 
a garrison town full of current and former Army personnel 
encouraged many businesses to maintain symbiotic 
relationships with Territorials and veterans. The ex- 
Servicernen and traders had a stake in the prosperity of 
Woolwich, and sought work for the Arsenal. Furthermore 
the Arsenal workers had experience of running their own 
businesses, the Pioneer, the Football Club and the RAGS. 
The campaigners targeted not local businesses but large 
private firms, 'the Munitioneers', as the enemies of 
alternative work. Despite the limited success of the 
campaign they dominated the skilled men maintained their 
importance. As McKinlay and Zeitlin say 'the continued 
centrality of skilled workers within the division of labour 
was the basis of the resurgence of workplace militancy 
after 1935' (10).
Alternative work fitted the mould of previous work in 
Woolwich. It was organised and financed at national level, 
it required both skilled and unskilled labour, and it
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fitted the Fabian ideal of rational efficiency and 
administrative neutrality which was the nost sophisticated 
economic policy to justify state intervention that the 
Labour Party had. The 'Peace ^senal' campaign failed when 
the private manufacturers of armaments saw a threat to 
their profits, their cartel, their virulent anti-unionisn 
and because of, to quote Hall and Schwarz, 'the emergence 
of a new plutocracy - bankers, stockbrokers investors and 
so on' (5).
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Appendix 
The numbers employed at the Arsenal in a selection ot years
Date
1314
1840
1854
1856
1862
1870
1880
1895
1898
1900
1901
1902
1905
1906
1907
1912
Jul 1914
Dec 1914
Jan 1915
Dec 1915
Nov 1916
May 1917
Nov 1917
Feb 1918
May 1918
Aug 1918
Nov 1918
  Jan 1919
Apr 1919
May 1919
Oct 1919
Dec 1919
Feb 1920
Mar 1921
Nov 1922
Sep 1940
Aug 1945
Number 
Employed
5,000
1,000
2,500
8,000
9,000
4,975
5,153
12 160
15,293
20 015
21 000
21 000
15,150
14,000
13,385
10,463
10,750
23,000
22,631
46,000
68,000
74,467
74,000
69,270
64,977
65,462
63,827
38,203
24,628
24,338
19,729
18,461
16,598
16,000
6,000
32,500
15,500
Wars
Napoleonic Wars
Crimean War
Crimean War
Crimean War
New Zealand Wars
First SA War
Sudan War
Boer War
Boer War
Boer War
First World War
First World War
First World War
First World War
First World War
First World War
First World War
First World War
First World War
Second World War
The largest number of women recorded 
period was in February 1918 23,877. 
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